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i
AbstractChannel Theory is a recently developed mathematical model of information ow, based on ideasemanating from situation theory. Channel theory addresses a number of important properties ofinformation ow, such as context-dependence, modularity of information, and the possibility oferror. This thesis is concerned with the use of channel theory as a formal framework for variousconstructs relating to conditional sentences. In particular, the main concern is to obtain logicsfor reasoning about conditionals, generics and default properties within the channel theoreticframework.After presenting the philosophical and mathematical foundations of channel theory, the viabilityof using this framework as a basis for a logic of conditionals is examined. It is demonstrated thatthe channel operations dened by Barwise and Seligman are unsuitable for this task since theysupport certain unacceptable instances of transitivity and monotonicity . The problem seems tobe that, while the contextual nature of a channel reects the implicit background conditions of aregularity, these conditions are not adequately represented in such a way as to account for themin the operations themselves.A method is proposed for implicitly representing the background assumptions of a channel, byway of a subchannel relation, which results in an ordering being dened over any given collectionof channels. As required by the maxims of situated reasoning, the background assumptions ofa particular channel are not represented within that channel itself, but are instead distributedthroughout an ordered collection of channels. The channel operations are modied so as toaccount for background assumptions encoded in this way, leading to a channel theoretic logic ofconditionals that invalidates the unacceptable rules of inference. It is shown that by imposingcertain simple, independently motivated conditions on channel hierarchies, a powerful logic ofconditionals, supporting many desirable patterns of reasoning, is obtained.A channel theoretic analysis of generic sentences is proposed and is shown to have several use-ful properties. In particular, the contextual component provided by a channel addresses cer-tain examples that prove problematic to normative accounts of generics. By making a simpleassumption|that any given collection of channels is self-contained with respect to implicit back-ground assumptions|a channel theoretic logic of generics is obtained directly from the previouslogic of conditionals. This logic is shown to support several important patterns of reasoning,including the principle of specicity .In order to obtain a system for defeasibly reasoning about individuals from the channel theoreticlogic of generics, a maximal normality condition is dened. This condition reects an agent'sassumption that individuals are \normal" (with respect to some collection of properties) unlessthat assumption conicts with other information held by the agent. The resulting system isshown to eectively dene a preferential consequence relation, in the sense of Kraus, Lehmannand Magidor. The channel theoretic framework suggests an approach to defeasible reasoning thatinvolves a shift in methodology from standard approaches and seems aligned to the particularconcerns of situated reasoning. Basically, rather than viewing defeasible reasoning as reasoningwith incomplete information, the channel theoretic approach is to view the problem as reasoningwith approximate regularities which hold only within some limited context. This methodologyis illustrated via an application to the qualication problem from the AI planning literature.The thesis concludes with a brief discussion of the potential use of channel theory as a mathe-matical framework for situated reasoning. In particular, the indexical nature of reasoning in amulti-agent environment seems particularly relevant to the particular issues addressed by channeltheory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the application of Barwise and Seligman's Channel Theory(Barwise and Seligman 1993; Barwise and Seligman 1994; Seligman 1993; Seligman andBarwise 1993), a framework for modelling information ow that has its roots in Barwiseand Perry's (1983) Situation Theory . In particular, I investigate the use of channeltheory as a semantic framework for reasoning with conditionals, generics and defaultrules. These various tasks have much in common and using a unied framework tomodel each of them oers the possibility of insights into the general nature of reasoningwith such constructs. In particular, an important underlying theme of the thesis is thegeneral problem of situated reasoning|i.e. developing a framework for reasoning inwhich not all information relevant to the process needs to be made explicit.My original attraction to situation theory (and channel theory) centred around itspossible use in modelling situated representation and reasoning, particularly in relationto recent work reported in the Articial Intelligence (AI) literature. Many of the centralconcerns of situation and channel theories are closely related to issues that have recentlyreceived attention in this literature, such as indexicality, dierent perspectives for dif-ferent agents, focus on a limited part of the world, and interaction between an agentand its environment. In this Introduction, I briey discuss some of these issues fromthe perspective of the AI literature before informally outlining some of the propertiesof situation and channel theories, particularly as they relate to the problem of situatedreasoning.
1
Introduction 21.1 Formal Models for AIThere is a tradition in AI of using formal tools to model the reasoning of agents andprocesses.1 Not surprisingly, formal tools from the philosophy of language have provedextremely useful and popular|many of the concerns of cognition and use of languageclearly overlap. While many of the formal frameworks used in the AI literature arebased on classical logic, sophisticated techniques have been developed to deal with is-sues of particular importance (e.g. variants of Hintikka's epistemic logic|e.g. (Halpernand Moses 1985; Levesque 1984)), systems for defeasible reasoning (e.g. (Reiter 1980;McCarthy 1980)), logics for planning and reasoning about action (e.g. (Lifschitz 1987;George 1987a)). Many of these techniques have found their way back into the philos-ophy and linguistic communities, leading to new research in these areas.In AI, it is often the hope that formal models will lead more directly to computationalinterpretations of the processes involved. However, while the nal aim of AI is to buildmachines that can operate as cognitive agents, the use of formal models to aid in theunderstanding of the processes involved in cognition is an important end in itself. This isespecially true in Cognitive Science, where it is important for any sort of formal modelto rest on sound philosophical foundations. Even if such models do not specicallyaddress computational issues, they are still of immense value to the AI community ifthey address properties of cognition that are of particular concern to AI.Recent work in the philosophy of language has shown standard truth-conditionallogic to be poorly suited to formal semantics. The dynamic aspect of language hasgained prominence and formal logics designed to address this property have emerged(e.g. (Heim 1982; Kamp 1981; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991)). What these logicsspecically address is the ability of a linguistic utterance to change the informationstate of the hearer|what is important is not under what conditions the propositionalcontent of an utterance is true, but what information is provided by that utterance,given the context in which it is made. Similar issues are central to other work informal philosophy which is of direct interest to AI (e.g. Gardenfors et al.'s work onbelief revision (Gardenfors 1988) and Veltman's (1993) work on defaults and epistemicmodalities).2 Dealing with the dynamics of a changing environment is just one aspect of1The paper by McCarthy and Hayes (1969), where they draw attention to work done in formalphilosophy to the AI community, is seminal in this regard.2Work by logicians has also taken a more \informational" slant|e.g. workers in Relevant Logic
Introduction 3current AI research into autonomous agents that must be addressed by any satisfactoryformal framework.Many issues very closely related to those above have recently become the centreof focus in AI research, particularly in the areas of situated reasoning and multi-agentsystems. The range of issues correlates, not surprisingly, with the shortcomings ofclassical logic when applied to natural language semantics. These include the following: The importance of an agent interacting with its environment|the unsuitability ofclassical formal systems for this task is discussed at some length by Smith (1992); The limited scope of perception and reasoning|i.e. agents tend to be concernedonly with partial descriptions of their embedding situations (e.g. (George et al.1993; Lifschitz 1990)); The link between mental states and embedding environment: the content of anagent's internal states and the eects of its actions cannot be separated from theway in which it is situated in its environment (e.g. (Rosenschein 1985; Israel et al.1993)); The indexical nature of reasoning and the importance of allowing dierent \per-spectives" on the world, particularly in multi-agent models (e.g. (George et al.1993; Lesperance and Levesque 1995)).These are just some of the important issues that a theory of situated reasoning andacting must address. As is described below, these are also central concerns of situationand channel theories. In particular, properties related to the above are not only easilymodelled but are core properties of the frameworks themselves. While the main contentof this thesis does not specically address the above issues from the perspective of AIagents, the nature of situated reasoning|and the way in which situation and channeltheories cater for its central concerns|is an important theme throughout. In Chapter5, I outline a methodology for situated reasoning based on the particular frameworkdeveloped in this thesis, and briey return to the issue of using situation and channeltheory as potential frameworks for modelling situated agents in Chapter 6.(Anderson and Belnap 1975; Dunn 1984; Read 1988) and Linear Logic (Girard 1987) claim that theselogics are more concerned with information rather than truth.
Introduction 41.2 Situation TheoryMuch of the formal toolbox I use in this thesis has its roots in situation theory, whichis a development of the semantic theory originally developed by Barwise and Perry(1983).3 Situation theory is concerned with issues which have recently been gatheringprominence in the cognitive science and AI communities. B&P discuss how their theoryof situations arose from what they perceived as an inadequacy with rst-order logic todeal with the semantics of natural language. More recently, the aims of the theory havebroadened in scope, to an attempt to provide a mathematical theory of information (e.g.(Barwise 1989b; Devlin 1991)). Manipulation of information is at the heart of inferenceand reasoning, and as such, many of the concerns raised by B&P are also of centralimportance to cognitive science and AI.My own interest in situation theory arose through the possibility of its use as aframework for building formal models of reasoning, as is popular in AI. Many of theformal techniques that appear in the AI literature are based on conventional logic, andmany of B&P 's concerns for logic as a basis for the semantics of language hold forthe sort of tasks that logic is used for in modelling AI processes. In this thesis, I donot explicitly address AI problems except very briey towards the end. However, theimportant issues of the models dened in Chapters 3 to 5|particularly the contextualnature of information and information ow|are themes throughout the work describedhere, and are closely related to the problems addressed by the AI community under theguise of situated reasoning.1.2.1 SituationsSituation theory is, not surprisingly, about situations. A situation is a part of theworld|it may be a visual scene, an event, a whole sequence of events, an utterance,a mental state. B&P take a very realistic stance toward situations|the ones thatmatter are very much a part of the world, existing externally to any agent (althoughthe information supported by a situation is heavily dependent on the way a given agentindividuates it|see below). However, such issues are not particularly important to theconcerns of this thesis. Unlike a possible-world, a situation does not describe the waythe world could be, but the way the world is, or at least the way it is perceived to be.3Throughout the thesis, I will tend to abbreviate \Barwise and Perry" by \B&P".
Introduction 5An important property of situations is that they are partial, i.e. they do not re-solve all issues there are. This is an important way in which situations dier frompossible-worlds and partiality plays a signicant role in the use of situations withinB&P 's semantic theory. Other authors have also stressed the need for partial objectsto be incorporated into semantic theories (although not always as situations|e.g. seeLandman (1986)). Situations (actually, partial possible-worlds) have also been used toalleviate problems inherent in Hintikka's (1962) modal epistemic logic|i.e. the so-calledlogical omniscience problem|whereby an agent is forced to know/believe all logical con-sequents of its knowledge/beliefs. Levesque (1984) and Muskens (1989) dene modallogics of beliefs based on Hintikka's work, but which avoid some of the unwanted patternsof reasoning associated with logical omniscience.4Another important property of situations is that they are rst-class intensionalobjects|i.e. situations have the same status as other objects and individuals|whichmeans that they can stand in relation to objects, be abstracted as part of a complex ob-ject, or participate in the theory in other \interesting" ways.5 Perhaps most importantly,situations support infons, which form the most basic \informational unit". An infonconsists of a relation, a sequence of arguments and a polarity|this last object indicateswhether or not the relation holds of the given arguments, according to the given infon.A pair consisting of a situation and an infon forms a proposition|i.e. a truth-bearingobject.6 These objects are described in more detail in the following chapter.In some respects, situation theory is reminiscent of the situation calculus of Mc-Carthy and Hayes (1969), a formalism popular in the AI literature on reasoning aboutaction and change. The situation calculus is a sorted rst-order theory, in which one sortis comprised of situations. Basically, each predicate in the situation calculus is accordedan extra argument, which denotes the situation in which the appropriate propositionholds. As such, truth in the situation calculus bears some resemblance to the way truthis dened in situation theory, at least when a situation in the latter is taken to be a(partial) state of the world. Hence, we would expect to take formal models of actionsand events (as they are formulated in the situation calculus) and easily recast them in a4Note that the logical omniscience problem does not go away by making possible-worlds partial|allthat really happens is that a much weaker notion of consequence is involved.5One consequence of the fact that situations can stand in relations is that if we are to model situationsset-theoretically, then the appropriate set-theory must violate the Axiom of Foundation|i.e. we requireAczel's (1988) non-well-founded set theory . This issue and the occurrence of non-well-founded situationsin the actual world is discussed at length by Barwise (1989d).6I do not make much of a distinction between infons and situation-types in what follows.
Introduction 6situation theoretic framework (especially since situation theory is a much richer formal-ism, oering many powerful tools for reasoning with situations). Further to this line ofthought is the fact that some recent authors, such as Lifschitz (1990) and George et al.(1993), have argued that some long-standing problems with the situation calculus canbe solved by making the situations of the situation calculus limited in scope, eectivelymaking them partial entities. George et al. are particularly interested in reasoningabout events within a multiple-agent environment, characterising the concept wherebyan agent is not aware of all that is going on around it.1.2.2 Individuation and SituatednessFrom the outset, situation theory has been concerned with a relativisation of ontology|the objects, properties and relations of a fragment of situation theory are assumed to bewith respect to some scheme of individuation,7 which is generally associated with theview of some particular agent. These objects, properties and relations are discriminatedby an agent as uniformities across its environment (Barwise and Perry 1983).8 Any factsthat a situation supports must be constructed from objects, properties and relations, andthereby are only meaningful with respect to a particular scheme. Hence, any informationrepresented in the theory is relativistic, in the sense that it is relative to some suchscheme.An even more ne-grained relativisation is obtained by relativising informationwithin a particular scheme, i.e. by taking a particular viewpoint into account. Thisis modelled by Seligman's (1990) notion of a perspective. A perspective basically con-sists of a collection of situations and the information supported by them. However, thesame situation may support dierent information in dierent perspectives P1 and P2,even when P1 and P2 are based on the same scheme of individuation. For example,if s is a situation containing a table supporting a vase and a book, the informationsupported by s as to whether the vase is behind the book, or vice versa, depends onthe particular perspective or viewpoint. This sort of relativisation is one aspect of sit-uated information|the way an agent is embedded in its environment plays a part in7Devlin (1991) denes a scheme of individuation as follows: \... a way of carving up the world intovarious \uniformities" that form the basis of our study: individuals, relations, spatial and temporallocations, and further entities ..." (pg. 26).8This notion of individuation as uniformity across situations is formally modelled rather comprehen-sively by Seligman (1990).
Introduction 7determining what information that agent extracts from the environment.Another aspect of situated agents is that the content of intensional states, suchas knowledge and belief, is dependent on the environmental circumstances in which theagent is embedded. Again, situation theory takes this as a central thesis: the importanceof the embedding situations in representation and inference is considered fundamental.This is demonstrated by what Barwise calls the Situatedness of Content Principle (SCP),whereby \the semantic content of a representation in general depends on its embeddingcircumstances. From the SCP it follows that valid inference also depends on embeddingcircumstances." (Barwise 1989e, p. 157).Finally, a situated agent has much to gain by making use of environmental regular-ities. The environment surrounding an agent satises various informational relations;whether these be based on laws of physics or other relations, perhaps arising from socialconvention, is not of particular concern. For example, the environmental relationshipbetween smoke and re, in that the presence of smoke indicates a nearby re, meansthat a sprinkler-system for combating re can be attached to a smoke-detector|whenthe smoke-detector is activated by the presence of smoke, so too is the sprinkler, therebydousing the oending re. Of course, it is possible that a particular environmental re-lationship may be less than robust in certain circumstances|e.g. we would not wantto connect a smoke-detector in a crowded Edinburgh pub directly to such a sprinklersystem! The possibility of exceptions in environmental regularities is a primary concernof Channel Theory (discussed in Section 1.4.3), which provides the central technicalframework of this thesis.The aspects of relativism and situatedness touched on in this section have relevanceto much important work currently being performed in the AI community. An extremelyactive area of AI research concerns the design of autonomous agents, and \situated-ness" is playing an increasingly important role. Several prominent programs of researchdemonstrate this. Agre and Chapman describe a program that \exploits regularities inits interaction with the world to engage in complex, apparently planful activity with-out requiring explicit models of the world" (Agre and Chapman 1987). Brooks (1986a,1986b) describes the design and implementation of robots that have minimal internalrepresentation and basically use the external world to represent their own internal state.Rosenschein and Kaelbling (Rosenschein 1985; Rosenschein and Kaelbling 1986) describesituated automata, simple machines that can be given a formal epistemic analysis by ex-
Introduction 8ploiting the way in which they are connected to the world. Other authors, writing fromoutside of situation theory, have also argued for the need to take greater account of anagent's situating environment: e.g. Smith (1987) describes the need for an agent's par-ticipation in the world, and Suchman (1987) argues that instructions for the behaviourof an intelligent agent cannot be separated from its environment|the interpretation ofsuch instructions and the resulting behaviour is critically dependent on the context inwhich they occur.Another important area of current AI research involves the interaction and coop-eration of dierent agents. Dierent agents can, of course, use dierent schemes ofindividuation and take dierent perspectives on their shared environment. The rela-tivistic nature of situation theory, and Seligman's theory of perspectives in particular,9seems ideally suited to formally modelling this aspect of agent interaction.10 This is-sue, as well as the possibility of using situation theoretic tools to formally model otheraspects of situated AI agents, is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.1.2.3 Information and Information FlowAn important slogan for situation theory is that it is a mathematical theory of informa-tion.11 Exactly what constitutes information is not really specied by the theory, asthis issue is not fully resolved.12 According to Israel and Perry (1990), the bearers ofinformation are facts. Again, what constitutes a fact is not clear, but facts certainlyaren't simply propositions|they have certain properties, such as veridicality and causalproperties (e.g. (Barwise 1989b, p. 227)), not possessed by propositions (sometimes noteven true ones). However, in Israel and Perry's theory of information, the content ofa fact is a true proposition. For all intents and purposes to this discussion, I will takean item of information to be the fact that a situation s is of a particular type. Suchtypes are known as situation-types, and they classify a situation as being a certain way.Situation-types are discussed in greater detail later.9Seligman's theory of perspectives is at the heart of Classication Theory , an integral part of channeltheory. This is described in Section 1.4.3 below.10Along similar lines, Healey and Vogel (1994) use channel theory to dene a situation theoretic modelof dialogue that involves these very properties of agent interaction.11Perhaps this is being both overgenerous and unfair|the claim is usually that situation theory is astep towards a mathematical theory of information.12The nature of information is discussed by Barwise (1989c), Devlin (1991), and Israel and Perry(1990), amongst others.
Introduction 9Because of the way in which the world is structured, certain facts give rise to otherfacts. For example, the fact that it is raining outside gives rise to the information thatI will be wet when I arrive home after walking from work. As a theory of information,situation theory's main concern is modelling how an agent uses informational relationsabout its environment so as to function in that environment|given certain information,what other useful information can be inferred about the world.13 In Situation Seman-tics (Barwise and Perry 1983), the relevant informational relations are those that holdbetween types of utterances and the types of situations described by those utterances.In a theory of content based on natural regularity, the relevant relations are those thathold between types of intensional mental states and propositions regarding the world.In a theory of situated inference and cognition, such relations relate types of situations,such as that linking smoke-lled situation-types to on-re situation-types.In situation theory, informational relations of the type described above are calledconstraints. Constraints were introduced by B&P and have played a central role inthe theory ever since. Constraints are said to license information ow: the informa-tion supported, or contained, in one situation s \ows" into another situation s0. Theinformation regarding s can be extracted by an agent because of certain informationsupported by s0. For example, if s is a situation containing a house on re, and s0 isthe situation comprising the smoke-lled sky above s, then an agent, on extracting theinformation that s0 contains billows of smoke, can infer that s contains an object that ison re. In this case, we say that the fact that s0 is smokey carries the information thats contains re.14Constraints such as these can be seen as underpinning any inference, including an-alytical (or \logical") relations. At this point, I simply want constraints to be seen assemantic objects which model the structural regularity of the world|i.e. the way inwhich information of one type ensures the presence of information of another type. Therole of constraints in inference is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, after I introducechannel theory.13That such information is both situated and relative to some scheme of individuation has alreadybeen discussed.14Israel and Perry (1990) are specic on this matter: it is facts that carry information, and they doso via constraints.
Introduction 101.3 Information Flow via RegularitiesBefore discussing specic models of information ow, I want to briey consider thegeneral concept of regularity. Regularities underlie the relationships between situation-types that give rise to information ow. Barwise and Seligman's15 channel theory is anattempt to model the structure of regularity, thereby explaining how regularities can beboth reliable yet fallible.My main reason for discussing here some of B&S 's ideas on what constitutes a validregularity is that in later chapters I use channel theory as a model for conditionals andgenerics. Without at least sketching out the boundaries as to what does and does notcount as a regularity, there is no way to judge the breadth of applicability of the model.One of the attractive features of channel theory is that it does not attempt to reduce thenotion of a regularity to a function of more primitive objects in the ontology, such aspossible worlds|regularities are taken to be irreducible entities in themselves. However,regularities do have structure, as will be described in Section 1.4.3.1.3.1 The Nature of RegularityAlthough the concept of regularity is central to the foundations of channel theory, thetheory itself makes very weak claims regarding it. The rst, and main, claim that thetheory makes is: Regularities exist. That is, regularities between objects and theirtypes exist in the world, and are objects that can be discriminated by an agent andused in cognition and inference to make useful predictions about the behaviour of itsenvironment.The notion of regularity has long played an explanatory part in philosophy and theclaim that such things exist is not a particularly strong one. The problematic issue re-garding regularities has generally revolved around the attempt to reduce them to moreprimitive concepts (e.g. using relations between possible worlds); such attempts havegenerally been deemed unsatisfactory, either including as regularities relationships thatdo not intuitively t the description, or ruling out relationships that seem to be accept-able as regularities. Channel theory, however, makes no such reductionist claims: thereis no attempt to reduce the concept of regularity to a more fundamental one involving15Henceforth, I will tend to abbreviate \Barwise and Seligman" as \B&S".
Introduction 11concepts that are somehow more primitive. A regularity is seen as an intensional object,discriminated by some agent, which holds in the world without requiring an explanationof its behaviour in terms of its components.This is a great attraction of channel theory: no commitment is required with regardto how regularities arise, yet the theory provides tools that allow rich explanatory ac-counts of processes that arise in many diverse domains, such as cognitive science, logicand computer science. The main contributions of this thesis involve showing how chan-nel theory can be used to model various formal systems of conditional reasoning thathave traditionally relied upon some reductionist commitment of the conditional rela-tionships central to the system in question. For example, systems of conditional logic(e.g. (Nute 1980)) have traditionally made use of possible worlds and \nearest world"selection functions. The channel theoretic logic of conditionals presented in Chapter 3takes conditional regularities to be primitive, yet the system obtained displays many ofthe necessary properties of an adequate logic of conditionals.It may well be hoped that the primitive-ness of regularities within the channel the-oretic framework avoids many of the problems that arise in reductionist treatments ofconditional reasoning. This is especially true of conditional and generic sentences, whereit is well known that the conditional operators involved are highly intensional and se-mantics for these that rely on reducing the operator in some extensional way often leadsto serious problems (e.g. Morreau (1992a) points out some such problems that circum-scription runs into when used as the basis for a semantics of generic sentences). Theproblems of extensionality, especially for generics, is discussed later in the thesis, and itwill be shown that the channel theoretic account avoids these particular problems.The second major claim of channel theory, with regard to regularities, is that theyhave structure. The structure that B&S claim for regularities in no way involves anattempt to reduce the relationship involved in a regularity to the objects related by thatregularity. The claim regarding structure involves a decomposition of a regularity intotwo aspects: a relationship involving the level of tokens, or particulars, and a relationshipinvolving the level of types that classify those tokens. This decomposition is made inan attempt to explain the manner in which reliable regularities can still be fallible, inthat exceptions to a general rule can be observed without invalidating the general rule.Channel theory is an attempt to give an account of regularities that overcomes this veryproblem.
Introduction 12There are two ways in which channel theory seeks to account for the failure ofa regularity. The rst involves adding a contextual component to the information-owmodel. This allows contradicting regularities to be simultaneously supported by virtue ofthem being supported by dierent contexts. The utility of this property is demonstratedin Chapter 4 for the case of generic sentences.The second, more radical way in which channel theory deals with the possibility ofexceptions to general rules is by the decomposition of a regularity into type-level andtoken-level components. One of the basic tenets of channel theory is that it is not onlythe relationship between two types that plays a part in the denition of a regularity,but also the connections between tokens that are classied by those types, and therelationship between the two levels. This decomposition allows an account of exceptionsto be easily given|a general rule is represented as a type-level relationship, while aparticular exception to the rule is given by the absence of the appropriate token-levelconnection, or by the token-level connection falling outside the domain of inuence ofthe type-level relationship. This notion is made more precise when the formal conceptsof the theory are presented.In some ways, the type-level regularities of channel theory play a very similar roleto situation theoretic constraints. In the early situation theory literature (e.g. (Barwiseand Perry 1983)), constraints involved a relationship between situation-types. However,attempts to provide an account of conditional constraints, i.e. constraints that fail ingiven contexts, were always less than satisfactory. Solutions to this problem generallyinvolved making the type-level relationship itself a situation-type, which was then sup-ported only by certain situations, those which satised the context under which the givenconstraint could be relied upon (e.g. see (Barwise 1986; Nivre 1992; Seligman 1990)).Channel theory can be seen as an attempt to give some esh to this idea, providingdetail about the structure of the particular situations (i.e. channels) that support theseconstraints. By decomposing regularities into separate token- and type-level relations,B&S are able to give an account of when a regularity actually does hold of a given pairof tokens, with respect to the appropriate channel.1.3.2 What Regularities Aren'tThe above discussion has done very little to dene what constitutes a regularity. How-ever, there are some relationships which B&S most denitely rule out as constituting
Introduction 13regularities of the sort they intend. The rst case that needs to be ruled out involveschance correlation. A regularity constitutes information about the structure of theworld, useful in cognition and prediction, but chance correlation cannot be relied uponin this way. For example, suppose that every time Jerry has visited the UK there hasbeen an election campaign in progress. This does not mean that next time Jerry visitsthe UK there is any real likelihood of an election campaign being run.16 Certainly, otherinformation notwithstanding (e.g. being told that an election has been called), Jerrywould not plan his next trip to the UK with the strong probability of an election inmind.It may be tempting to think of regularities as somehow related to causation. How-ever, the mistake of relating regularity and causation too directly should not be made.Early work in the analysis of causation attempted to give a reductionist account in termsof regularity. However, this line of thought is well-known to be awed (e.g. see Lewis(1986)). For example, accounts of causation based on regularity suer from the epiphe-nomena problem, whereby common eects of a single cause are analysed as related bydirect causation. For example, consider a situation where re causes both smoke andheat.17 The regularity \Smoke indicates heat" is certainly well supported|any situa-tion in which there is smoke is linked to a situation in which there is re, which in turnleads to a hot situation|i.e. there is a regularity between smokey situations and hotsituations. But the smoke did not cause the heat, nor vice versa. Of course, many reg-ularities do arise from direct causation. In fact, it may well be true that every instanceof direct causation leads to a regularity|the causal link between re and the smoke itcauses leads to the regularity between rey situations and smokey situations.18Even given the problem of epiphenomena (and other problems with the regularityanalysis of causation), it may well be that the relationships that we want to be classedas regularity are all somehow related to causation. However, the literature on genericsentences (e.g. (Carlson 1977; Morreau 1992a)) shows that there are many genericsthat do not arise from causation at all. For example, the rules and regulations view ofgenerics argues that many generic sentences are based on conventional rules; one such16Of course, there may be other mitigating factors|Jerry may happen to visit the UK only every fouryears, and has begun a cycle that corresponds in timing to the running of election campaigns. Of course,even this hypothetical circumstance could not really be relied upon because of the unpredictability ofthe timing of elections.17To make this regularity more robust, one may want to assume that re is the only cause of smoke.18The notion of \causation" I need for this claim is one between types, rather than between particulars.
Introduction 14generic is the following:\Bishops move diagonally in chess".Another class of generic sentences are those based on descriptive generalisations; theseinclude sentences such as\Dogs bark".We clearly want to consider the relationship underpinning generic sentences such asthese as regularities.It may perhaps be argued that some sense of causation is involved in these examples|a chess-piece's bishop-ness \causes" it to be moved diagonally; the fact that d is a dog\causes" d to be an animal that barks. I am not really concerned with how such reg-ularities are viewed since I am not in any way attempting to give a characterisation ofthe concept of \regularity", but am only trying to outline the concept I have in mind(and also what I understand B&S to have in mind) when I use this concept below.1.3.3 Real and Approximate RegularitiesThere are a number of important properties of regularities that are specically addressedby the B&S channel theoretic model. As has been described a number of times already,a central concern of B&S (1994) is how a regularity can be both reliable yet fallible. Theproblematic issue concerns the question, once again, as to what constitutes a regularity|why are some fallible informational relationships (such as \Smoke means re") classedas regularities while others (such as \Penguins y") are not ?The issue proves to be problematic to any attempt to reduce the concept of regularityto more primitive concepts. If the denition is too lax|so as to allow fallible informa-tional relationships to be accepted as regularities|then unacceptable relationships haveto be accepted as constituting regularities. On the other hand, taking the view thata fallible relationship is simply an approximation to a \true" regularity|i.e. the limitcase being that in which there are no implicit \background assumptions"19|has severeproblems. Consider again \Smoke means re". There are numerous situations in whichthis informational relationship fails|for example, if there is a smoke machine present.19\Background assumptions" are those conditions that are assumed to hold when the constraint isreliable. For example, for the \Smoke means re" constraint, the background assumptions include thefact that there is not a smoke-machine in the vicinity.
Introduction 15The problem arises because it is generally accepted that|due to it being impossible tocompletely specify all the background assumptions behind such relationships (e.g. see(Suchman 1987; Winograd and Flores 1986))|there is no corresponding infallible reg-ularity except the tautological \Smoke and re means re", ruling out the possibility ofthere being any meaningful regularities at all.The approach to the problem taken by B&S , and adopted here, is to accept fal-lible relationships as bona de regularities and to avoid the temptation to provide areductionist account of them. The meaningful regularities are exactly those that arediscriminated and considered to be meaningful by some agent. This actually ts nicelywith situation theory's shift from truth to information|what is of importance is notwhat makes an informational relationship a regularity, but rather what information canbe inferred once a given regularity is accepted. The relativism introduced by the notionof a scheme of individuation permeates the concept of regularities, since the type-level(and token-level) informational relationships discriminated by an agent depend on thetypes (and tokens) available in the agent's scheme. Hence, dierent agents will discrim-inate dierent regularities in their respective environments.By rejecting the approach by which a fallible regularity is seen as an \approximation"to some infallible version of it, one is led to a view in which there is no \correct version"of a regularity|each regularity is a regularity independently of other regularities thatmay happen to be related to it. Two regularities may be such that one can be reliedupon in a subset of those situations in which the other is reliable|e.g. \Smoke meansre" is less reliable than \Smoke means re if there are no smoke-machines present"|but the former is no less a regularity than the latter. While the notion of \more reliable"does have a central role to play in the framework for conditional reasoning introducedin Chapter 3, the fact that each regularity can be used independently of any other iscrucial in the account of situated reasoning that I outline later in this thesis.1.4 Models of Information FlowThe important role that information ow plays in situation theoretic analyses of lan-guage and cognition was very briey mentioned above. Barwise and Seligman's ChannelTheory (Barwise and Seligman 1993; Barwise and Seligman 1994; Seligman 1993; Selig-man and Barwise 1993) can be seen as eshing out the situation theoretic model of
Introduction 16information ow, addressing several important issues, such as relativism and contextdependence. Most importantly, channel theory is an attempt to give an account of thestructure of \natural regularities", on which information ow is based, which in turnleads to an explanation of how such relationships can be both reliable and fallible (i.e.can admit exceptions). In particular, channel theory addresses shortcomings in previousmodels of fallible information ow.1.4.1 Dretske and Information FlowThe foundational ideas behind situation theoretic constraints come fromDretske's (1981)seminal work on information ow. Dretske denes a probabilistic model of informationow, based on Shannon and Weaver's (1949) quantitative model, that attempts to pro-vide the basis for a naturalistic account of knowledge and belief. The information thatan object s is in a certain state or satises a particular property can provide informationabout the state of some other object t. This is known as carrying information: the factthat s is in the state it is carries the information that t is in its particular state. Dretskereduces the relation of information carriage to probabilistic measures: s being F carriesthe information that t is G i the conditional probability of t being G, given that s isF (and some \background knowledge" k), is 1, while the conditional probability that tis G (given k only) is strictly less than 1. This can be loosely rephrased as: s being Fcarries the information that t is G i s being F means that t must be G (given k), whileit is not the case that t must always be G (given k).Some aspects of the above denition are worth discussing. The rst concerns theproperty that the conditional probability be 1. The value 1 could theoretically bereplaced by some \threshold" probability. However, Dretske insists that the \carriesinformation" relation should satisfy what he calls the Xerox Principle: if A carries theinformation that B, and B carries the information that C, then A carries the informationthat C. Since the conditional probability of C given A is multiplicative of those of Cgiven B and B given A, then the Xerox Principle can only be satised if the \threshold"probability is 1. The second point concerns the fact that the probability of t being G (i.e.not conditional on the state of s) must be less than one. This means that the relation ofcarrying information is a stronger one than the material implication of classical logic: inclassical logic, A  B holds whenever B is valid (or whenever A is unsatisable). Thisis one of the foundational issues of certain logics with intensional implication relations,
Introduction 17such as relevant logic (Anderson and Belnap 1975; Dunn 1984; Read 1988) and linearlogic (Girard 1987)20|such logics are claimed by their authors to be more concernedwith information, rather than truth-conditions, and this seems to be supported by thisparticular property.21Dretske's information-ow theory of content and representation, based on the infor-mation-theoretic framework, has been criticized as being unable to adequately explainthe possibility of misrepresentation|in Dretske's model, the information content of amental state (representing an external world) becomes too \weak" to ever be incorrect.22The problems with Dretske's account stem from an inadequate treatment of exceptionsto the information ow relation|given the possibility of exceptions, how can the condi-tional probability of t being G given that s is F ever be 1? Dretske attempts to circum-vent the problem by appealing to channel conditions, which amounts to the disclaimerthat the above-mentioned conditional probability is 1 under \normal" conditions. Insome ways, channel theory can be seen as providing technical esh to this informalnotion.1.4.2 Situation Theoretic ConstraintsBefore turning to the foundations of channel theory, it is appropriate to briey discusssituation theoretic constraints. B&P take constraints as imposing structure on reality|i.e. constraints are law-like relationships that reside in the world and which cognitiveagents can make use of in getting about in the world. These law-like entities existbecause \what happens at one place and time must contain information about what hashappened or will happen, elsewhere and elsewhen" (Barwise and Perry 1983, p. 94).In the B&P model, a constraint is modelled as a relation between two situation-typesT and T 0|the fact that a situation s is of type T carries information that some othersituation s0 is of type T 0.Unlike Dretske, B&P do not attempt to reduce the law-like dependencies to other,somehow more primitive entities, such as conditional probabilities. The constraints are20Note that not all non-truth-functional implication operators satisfy this property|for example,strict implication 2! in modal logics satises the property that A2! B whenever B is valid.21I briey return to relevant logic and its relationship to the channel theoretic model of informationow in Section A.4.2.22See Fodor's (1990) criticism's, which uses the disjunction problem argument. Dretske's proposed x,distinguishing a \training" stage from a \prediction" stage, is criticised by Koons (1994), who proposesa solution to the problem within Dretske's framework by using a non-standard probability theory.
Introduction 18assumed to hold \out there" in the world, and an important aspect of an intelligent be-ing's interaction with its environment involves discovering and making use of constraintsto infer information that it does not necessarily have immediate access to (e.g. by di-rect perceptive means). Constraints are primitive, though structured, entities. Notethat constraints, being situation theoretic entities, inherit important properties fromthe situation-types they involve. As with situations, the fact that they are objects inthe world does not mean that there are not important relativistic considerations. Forexample, the format of a constraint is dependent on the appropriate scheme of indi-viduation with respect to which the relevant situation-types are dened|changing thescheme can change the constraint. Hence, the world is structured dierently for dif-ferent agents. Of course, this is part and parcel of the situation theoretic approach tomodelling cognitive agents.Of the several sorts of constraint classes that B&P identify (see (Barwise and Perry1983, p. 97)), the most interesting are the conditional constraints. Conditional con-straints involve fallible relationships between situation-types|they may well be localisedin their applicability, or contain exceptions under certain \unexpected" conditions. Forexample, while the informational relationship \Smoke means re" is in general a reliableone, it is not so in a crowded Edinburgh pub or in the presence of a smoke-machine.Even so, such constraints can still be extremely useful to a cognitive agent. For example,if an agent is inserted in an environment where the \abnormal" conditions do not occur,then the constraint becomes a reliable one|even if the abnormal conditions sometimesarise, if they are infrequent enough then the constraint can still be considered robustenough to be useful.Various attempts have been made in the situation theoretic literature to representthe conditionality of constraints. B&P reduce conditional constraints to unconditionalones by adding the \background assumptions" to the antecedents of constraints. Barwise(1986) requires the informational relation for conditional constraints to be a three-place,rather than two-place, relation|the third argument-place consists of the situation-typeunder which the constraint (modelled by an informational relation between the other twoarguments) is reliable. Nivre (1992) models a conditional constraint as nested inside anunconditional constraint|i.e. there is a two-place unconditional informational relationthat relates the background conditions to the two-place conditional constraint. Eachof these approaches can be seen as an attempt to capture Dretske's notion of \channelconditions". The problem with each approach is that the background conditions must
Introduction 19somehow be made explicit for the conditional aspect to be eectively captured, whichgoes against the grain of important recent ideas in cognitive science (e.g. (Suchman1987; Winograd and Flores 1986)).Seligman (1990) takes a somewhat dierent approach|a conditional constraint isjust one part of a perspective on the world. A perspective models a particular way ofviewing the world and the formal concept itself is localised to a specic set of situationsand types. As such, the background assumptions of a constraint are not spelt outexplicitly, but the fact that they limit the applicability of the constraint is captured bythe limited scope of the perspective. This perspectival model of conditional constraintscan be seen as a step towards B&S 's theory of channels, which accords a central role toDretske's notion of a communication channel.1.4.3 Channel TheoryRecently, Barwise and Seligman have been working on a mathematical theory thatbegins with the intuitions of the information ow models of both Dretske and B&P . Atthe heart of the theory are channels, objects based on Dretske's intuitive notion of acommunication channel. A channel is structured in a way outlined below, and part ofthis structure involves objects very much like situation theoretic constraints. However,a channel also encompasses the notion of \normal conditions", reminiscent of Dretske'sappeal to such to address the issue of exceptions. This notion is eshed out somewhat,but does not require any explicit representation of background assumptions, as didprevious situation theoretic treatments of conditional constraints. Instead, connectionsat the level of situations, as well as informational relations at the level of situation-types,are employed in a manner described below. While channel theory does not attempt toreduce regularities to concepts such as conditional probabilities or relations betweenpossibilities, it does attempt to give an account of the internal structure of regularity,thereby explaining how informational relations can be reliable yet at the same timeadmit exceptions.The issues discussed here are treated very informally|Chapter 2 contains a presen-tation of the main concepts of channel theory, which constitutes the main frameworkfor the technical results of this thesis.
Introduction 20Tokens, Types and ClassicationsConstraints in situation theory involve informational relations between situation-types.In most accounts of conditional constraints, a third situation-type is used to capture theconditions under which the two-place relation can be relied upon. The basis of B&S 'stheory of channels, however, stems from the observation that it is also the objects atthe level of the situations themselves, i.e. at the level of particulars, that play a role inthe ow of information. As well as the type-level constraints familiar from the standardsituation theoretic model, the channel theoretic account of information ow also containsconnections between tokens, some of which are situations.23For B&S (1994), these token-level connections are as much a part of the structureof reality as are the type-level constraints.24 A collection of type-level constraints and acollection of token-level constraints are the two main components of a channel, an objectthat regulates the ow of information. The nal component of a channel is a classicationrelation, which indicates which constraints are applicable to which connections. The factthat a connection c is classied by a constraint  means that information ows along c,information of the sort described by . When c is \broken" or \abnormal", then eitherc lies outside the channel or c is not classied in the expected way|again which of thesetwo possibilities occurs depends on the way in which the connections are individuated.25Context DependencyContext dependency is an important property of information ow, as pointed out byB&S (Barwise and Seligman 1993; Seligman 1993). For example, \Swans are white" is areliable informational relation when residing in Europe, but nowhere near as reliable inAustralia. Even so, a cognitive agent can still make use of an informational regularity,so long as the environment in which it operates falls within the context under whichthe regularity holds. Context in channel theory is modelled by channels themselveshaving limited scope|an integral part of a channel C is a collection C of connections,23Actually, what counts as a token and what counts as a type depends on the way an agent choosesto carve up the world. For example, a situation could play the role of a type, rather than a token, insome carving-up of the world. This is made more explicit when channel theory is introduced in greaterdetail in Chapter 2. To keep matters simple, I will assume for the rest of this discussion that the tokensare situations and the types are situation-types.24Of course, what counts as a token-level connection depends, as usual, on the particular scheme ofindividuation, as do the connected situations themselves. I return to this point below.25This issue is treated in detail in Section 2.3.4.
Introduction 21which reects the context of C. Any connection that falls outside C is not applicable tothe information ow supported by C. This notion of context is one important way inwhich the \channel conditions"|i.e. the conditions under which the information ow inquestion is reliable|are dened. Another way channel conditions are reected is via theclassication relation of C.26 Most importantly, the channel conditions themselves arenot explicitly represented, as they are in the situation theoretic accounts of conditionalconstraints described above.A channel supports a particular sort of information ow; i.e. dierent sorts of infor-mation ow are supported by dierent channels. For example, the fact that the heightof mercury in a thermometer carries information about the surrounding temperature issupported by a dierent channel to that which supports the regularity \smoke meansre". This, of course, is as it should be|the collections of token-level connectionsthat are applicable to such dierent informational regularities will obviously not over-lap greatly (in fact, for these two regularities they are probably disjoint). Hence, thecontexts associated with the applicability of dierent regularities, as well as the chan-nel conditions, can dier wildly, thereby requiring dierent channels. This means thatthe world is full of a multitude of all sorts of dierent channels, supporting all sorts ofdierent information ow, which again is hardly surprising, since, given B&P 's originalconsiderations, the world is highly structured. Some of these channels support analyti-cal, or logical, relationships; others support metaphysical ones; while yet others supportthe more familiar (from our examples!) \smoke means re" variety. The importantpoint is that each of these channels denes a dierent context.Towards a Model of Situated ReasoningB&S 's channel theoretic model of information ow addresses a number of importantissues in situated reasoning|e.g. the distributed nature of information, the localisationof facts and the informational links between them, the reliance of regularities on theircircumstances|some of which are discussed in the following chapter (see also (Barwiseand Seligman 1993)). Perhaps the most important of these issues, for the purposesof this thesis, is the manner in which a fallible regularity can be used for inferenceindependently of its relationship to other, more reliable, regularities. The fact that two26The dierent ways of modelling the failure of the channel conditions seem to account for importantproperties of generic sentences, as is discussed in Chapter 3.
Introduction 22regularities may be closely related, with one being applicable in a wider context than theother, was briey discussed in 1.3.3. In the channel theoretic setting of Chapter 3, thisleads to an ordering between channels, with one channel being a subchannel of anotherif the regularity corresponding to the rst is less widely applicable than the regularitycorresponding to the second.The subchannel relation is used in Chapter 3 to encode the implicit backgroundassumptions of a channel. It turns out that these assumptions need to be explicated insuch a way as to ensure that they aect the operations on channels that lead to the logicalsystem for inferring new channels from old|without the background assumptions beingtaken into account, unacceptable patterns of reasoning for conditionals and generics areobtained. The relation between a channel C and other channels encodes the backgroundassumptions behind the regularities supported by C. However, while the nature ofthe subchannel relation is partially determined by the internal structure of C and itsrelated channels, the background assumptions encoded by the relation are not explicitlyrepresented within C at all.This leads to a framework in which a regularity can be used for inference completelyindependently of the background assumptions upon which it is founded, which is a crit-ical property of a satisfactory model of situated reasoning. In the framework involvingthe subchannel ordering, this translates into the ability to base inference on a channelwithout needing to refer to that channel's location in the ordering. This property formsthe basis of a methodology for situated reasoning which is described in Chapter 5.1.5 What This Thesis is AboutThe ideas described in this thesis began from two dierent points and met in the middle.One starting point involved an investigation into B&S 's claim that channel theory couldbe used as the basis for a semantic analysis of conditional sentences. In particular, Iwas interested in exploring the viability of using the operations on channels described inSection 2.3.7 as the basis for a channel theoretic system for reasoning about conditionals.At the same time, I was interested in using channel theory for developing a model ofsituated planning. In particular, the channel theoretic model of fallible regularities,coupled to the concept of a subchannel ordering reecting the notion of a \reliability"ordering on the associated regularities, seemed to suggest an elegant approach to AI's
Introduction 23qualication problem (e.g. (George 1987b)), whereby background assumptions behinda plan cannot be easily specied.On realising that an acceptable logic of conditionals needs to account for backgroundassumptions of a conditional so as to avoid certain unwanted rules of inference, I realisedthat the framework I was developing for the situated planning task could also be used forthe logic of conditionals task. This oered the potential of a uniform framework beingused for a number of important related problems that I collectively refer to as conditionalreasoning , since they all deal with conditional-like constructs: i.e. conditional sentences,generics and default rules,27 planning operators. The channel theoretic interpretationof each of these constructs oers distinct advantages for each task.1.5.1 Outline of the ThesisIn Chapter 2, I present the formal concepts which I will be using in this thesis. Af-ter a brief informal presentation of the main concepts of situation theory,28 I presentclassication theory, a relativistic theory of information that constitutes an importantcomponent of channel theory. A classication encompasses a collection of tokens andtypes, together with a relation indicating which tokens are classied by which types. Assuch, a classication can be seen as representing a particular viewpoint on the world.I then present the main concepts of channel theory, focussing on how dierent sorts ofexceptions to general regularities can be modelled in this framework in dierent ways.A channel can be seen as a special type of situation, one that supports information of aconditional (i.e. \if{then") nature, and the theory involves exploring the internal struc-ture of channels and using this structure to account for exceptions to the regularitiessupported by them. In particular, channel theory pays close attention to the role ofconnections at the level of tokens.Other properties of channels are also presented, the most important (for the purposesof this thesis) being a number of operations on channels. These can be seen as formingthe basis of a calculus of channels, or a channel theoretic logic. This logic forms thebasis of the channel theoretic systems of conditional and default reasoning dened in27Another motivation for examining generics and default reasoning within this framework stems fromrecent work which develop logics for default reasoning from a conditional logic basis (e.g. (Morreau1992a; Boutilier 1992; Lehmann 1989).28A more precise and comprehensive presentation is contained in an appendix. However, the informalpresentation will suce for the purposes of this thesis.
Introduction 24later chapters.Chapter 3 investigates the viability of using the channel theoretic logic as a basis fora logic of conditionals. A satisfactory logic of conditionals must invalidate certain classi-cally valid patterns of inference, notably, Transitivity, Strengthening of the Antecedent(or Monotonicity) and Contraposition. The channel theoretic analysis of conditionalsentences endows the propositional content of a conditional sentence with a demonstra-tive content|i.e. the object described by the sentence|which is taken to be a channel.The addition of a context (in the form of a channel) to each conditional alleviates theproblem of the unwanted patterns of inference but does not remove it altogether|whilethe channel reects the assumed background conditions which are in place when a con-ditional statement is asserted, it does not represent them in a manner that can beexploited by the channel operations so as to invalidate Transitivity, Monotonicity andContraposition.A method of encoding background assumptions is proposed within the channel the-oretic framework. This involves dening a subchannel ordering between channels, whichrelates two channels whose internal structure satises certain simple conditions. Thisordering results in a hierarchy being imposed on any given collection of channels. Ahierarchy encodes the assumptions of a given channel C via the way in which C is relatedto other channels in the hierarchy. Most importantly, those assumptions are not explic-itly represented in C at all, which is seen as an improvement on a similar approach ofBarwise's (1986) to account for background assumptions in a situation theoretic modelof conditionals. The channel operations are modied so as to account for a given hierar-chy, resulting in a system which does not support the unwanted patterns of reasoning.Further, it is shown that any \reasonable" hierarchy (i.e. one satisfying certain simpleconstraints) results in a fairly powerful logic of conditionals. This is shown by consid-ering the various axioms and rules of inference discussed by Nute (1980, 1984) in hissurvey articles.In Chapter 4, I consider the possibility of obtaining a logic for generic sentences fromthe channel theoretic logic of conditionals. This was partially motivated by similar workin the AI and philosophy literature within possible-worlds frameworks (e.g. (Morreau1992a; Boutilier 1992)). By imposing a tacit assumption that a given collection ofchannels S is closed with respect to background assumptions|i.e. any backgroundassumption to a channel C 2 S is explicitly represented by some other channel in S
Introduction 25supporting a regularity that somehow contradicts the regularity supported by C|I showthat a powerful system for reasoning with generics is obtained. In particular, this logicsatises the Specicity Principle (also known as the Penguin Principle) by which a morespecic regularity overides a contradictory regularity that is the composition of twoothers.This chapter also contains some discussion of the channel theoretic analysis of genericsentences. As in the analysis of conditionals, each generic is endowed with a context(i.e. a channel). Context is seen to play an important role in the analysis of genericssuch as the following:\The Dutch make good farmers and good sailors".Such examples cause problems for other accounts of generics, particularly those basedon the normative view of generics (by which a generic is seen as quantifying over all\normal" individuals).Morreau (1992a) discusses how a useful logic of generics must also be able to be usedto draw inferences about the default properties of individuals. In Chapter 5, I denea maximal normality condition which allows the system of Chapter 4 to be used toinfer information regarding the classication of tokens (i.e. individuals). The normalitycondition is required since in the channel theoretic model of generics the validity of ageneric is independent of the properties of the associated individuals. I show that thedefault logic thereby obtained eectively denes a preferential consequence relation, inthe sense of Kraus et al. (1990). While I conjecture that it also denes a rationalrelation, this remains an open problem.The channel theoretic account suggests an approach to defeasible reasoning thatis somewhat dierent to traditional default logics. The maximal normality conditioneectively picks an \appropriate level" in the hierarchy, with respect to the given infor-mation, and inference is performed using the channel found at that level. This approachto default reasoning seems to be aligned to the idea of situating reasoning, wherebyreasoning proceeds with imprecise regularities (i.e. regularities which can only be reliedupon in certain contexts) rather than reasoning with imprecise information. After out-lining a general methodology for defeasible reasoning, the approach is illustrated by anapplication to the qualication problem (one of the original starting points of the workin this thesis, as described above).
Introduction 26Finally, in Chapter 6 I discuss various avenues for future research. One of theseinvolves exploring the methodology for defeasible reasoning described above. Anotherimportant topic involves situated multiagent systems. As has been discussed at variouspoints in this introduction, the ideas motivating situation theory and channel theoryseem to underly important work currently being performed in this area in the AI com-munity. The relativistic nature of information and information ow provided by classi-cation theory seems particularly well suited to the task of modelling multiple interactingagents.
Chapter 2
Channel Theory: FormalConcepts
In this chapter, I present the basics of Channel Theory, Barwise and Seligman's modelof information ow. This theory provides the formal tools that I use for the rest of thethesis. Most of the concepts and terminology are taken from (Seligman and Barwise1993), with further input from (Seligman 1993). The foundational and motivationaldiscussion is based on that of (Barwise and Seligman 1994) and (Seligman 1993).2.1 Elements of Situation TheoryIn this section, I present some of the main concepts of situation theory. I will presentonly a very small portion of the theory and leave many important foundational issuesuntouched|these are not the primary concern of this thesis. Situation theory is still adeveloping theory, although many of the original tenets of Barwise and Perry (1983) stillhold. Some of the attempts to dene large fragments of the formal theory include thefollowing: (Barwise and Perry 1983; Barwise 1989b; Devlin 1991; Nivre 1992; Barwiseand Cooper 1991). The last of these forms the basis for the presentation of the formalconcepts below.The presentation of this section is fairly informal, involving a brief discussion ofissues that I consider important to the content of the thesis. Appendix A containsa more formal account of basic situation theory, borrowed pretty much directly from27
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 28(Barwise and Cooper 1991).1 However, the concepts described here should adequatelyaddress the issues of situation theory required for the purposes of this thesis. One pointto be made before commencing is that, following Barwise and Cooper, I assume thetheory of situations outlined below to contain set theory, which in particular implies theexistence of functions.2.1.1 Situations, Infons and PropositionsThe main objects of the ontology of situation theory are situations. A situation maybe an event, a sequence of events, a visual scene, a mental state, a classication ofobjects, or any of a number of other things. In more general terms, a situation is somepart of the world that supports facts, where such facts are dependent on some schemeof individuation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the fact that the ontology ofsituations is dependent on such a scheme has traditionally been at the heart of situationtheory, and is considered to be a central aspect of it. Other important issues regardingsituations include the fact that they are rst-class objects of the theory and that theyare partial, in the sense that they do not resolve all possible issues.Some authors have attempted to formally model situations using more traditionallogical tools, such as partial possible-worlds (e.g. (Escriba 1992; Fenstad et al. 1987;Muskens 1989)); another way of modelling partial objects, or partial information states,is via sets of possible worlds (e.g. (Veltman 1993)). While such frameworks have manyattractive logical properties, they do not capture the full nature of situations as theyare used in situation theory, particularly the fact that situations are rst-class objects ofthe theory.2 Throughout, I will take situations to be rst-class objects, and not denedin terms of partial worlds or by any other similar means.The second important sort of objects are infons, which are the objects which classifysituations. An infon consists of a relation r, an assignment f and a polarity p, wherep 2 f0; 1g|such an infon is written  r; f ; p. The relations from which infons areconstructed are also taken to be primitive rather than dened set-theoretically, whichresults in a ne-grained intensionality in the logic of infons.3 An assignment is a function1As they acknowledge, Barwise and Cooper's denitions owe much to the work of others, notablyAczel and Lunnon (Aczel 1990; Aczel and Lunnon 1991).2These approaches also involve dierent foundational commitments, such as the ontological commit-ment to possible worlds.3Such a move is at the heart of property theory (e.g. (Bealer 1982; Turner 1987)).
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 29from roles (roughly, argument-place-holders) of a relation to objects of the situationtheoretic universe. As a convenient abbreviation, I will usually assume that the roles ofa relation consist of a sequence of natural numbers, thereby allowing the assignment tobe treated simply as if it were an ordered sequence|in this case, an infon involving theassignment [1 7! a1; :::; n 7! an] is written as r; a1; :::; an; p.4 For example, the infon run; john; 1 involves the relation run and object john; this infon would representthe fact that some individual named John is running. I assume there to be operationson infons, namely infon-conjunction and infon-disjunction. I will say no more on thesefor the moment|eectively equivalent operations are introduced in Section 2.2.2 in theform of operations on types.5The truth bearing objects of situation theory are propositions. One way of forminga proposition is via the binary type j= which holds between situations and infons. Theproposition that a particular situation s supports infon  is written (s j= ) and s issaid to support . Barwise (1989a) calls such a proposition an Austinian proposition.For example, (s j= run; John; 1) is the proposition that makes the claim that thesituation given by s supports the information that John is running|this is true exactlyif John is running in s. As is usual, I assume there to be a set of operations, namelyconjunction, disjunction and negation, over propositions. These operations interact withthe type-operations in ways discussed below.2.1.2 Parameters, Anchors and RestrictionsParameters are situation theoretic objects that play a similar role to variables in stan-dard rst-order logics. Basically, a parameter lls an arguments place without com-mitting to a specic object|e.g. the infon  run;X; 1, where X is a parameter,represents the state of aairs where someone is running, without specifying who it isthat is doing the running. In general, any situation theoretic object may be replacedby a parameter. Objects containing parameters that are not bound by an abstractionoperation (see below) are known as parametric; so we have parametric infons, paramet-ric propositions, etc. Given an object o, we assume the existence of a function par(o)that returns the set of parameters in o that are not within the scope of an abstrac-4As a further abbreviation, I will often write the infon r; a1; :::; an; 1 simply as r; a1; :::; an ,and the infon  r; a1; :::; an; 0 simply as : r; a1; :::; an .5Barwise and Etchemendy (1990) dene a model of inference based on an algebra of infons.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 30tion operation (see below).6 Note that some properties, such as truth, are not alwaysstraightforward for parametric objects.An anchor f is a function that assigns objects to parameters|the domain of f ,which is a set of parameters, is written dom(f) and the range is written rng(f). Givenan object o and anchor f , the application of f to o, written o[f ], is the object thatresults from replacing any parameter X 2 par(o)\ dom(f) by f(X), the value to whichX is mapped by f . If o[f ] is non-parametric, then f is said to be a grounding anchorfor o.Barwise and Cooper (1991) diverge from previous presentations of situation theoryin that they allow restrictions to be attached to any object, rather than to parametersonly. Given an object o and proposition p, the restriction of o to p, written o # p, is theobject just like o except that is it restricted so that an anchor can be applied to o # ponly if it meets the conditions in p in addition to any in o. In particular, o # p is denedif and only if p is not a false proposition, and if p is true then o # p = o. Restriction isa very powerful operation and has important uses in applications of situation theory.2.1.3 Abstracts and TypesAn extremely important and powerful operation that can be applied to a parametricobject is abstraction. This operation is similar to the abstraction operation of the -calculus but involves greater generality. In particular, more than one parameter may beabstracted simultaneously, a feature that makes the indexing of parameters important|for example, in the Aczel{Lunnon (1991) framework, abstraction is performed over afunction from a set of roles to a set of parameters, rather than over the parametersthemselves. However, as with assignments, I will usually blur this subtlety by assumingthat the roles comprise of a sequence of natural numbers, and simply let the ordering ofthe parameters themselves determine the appropriate role of each parameter.Abstraction is performed via a binary operation , which takes as arguments anindexed set of parameters [X1; :::;Xn] and a parametric object o. The resulting object,written [X1; :::;Xn]o,7 is called an abstract, and is itself a rst-class citizen in thesituation theoretic universe. Dual to the operation of abstraction is that of application6Appendix A contains further details on this function.7I will sometimes drop the square brackets, especially when n = 1.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 31of an abstract to an (appropriate) set of objects. Basically, the result of applyingan abstract [X1; :::;Xn]o to a sequence [o1; :::; on] of objects is the object o[X1 7!o1; :::;Xn 7! o1].8 For example, applying the abstract [X] run;X; 1 to the objectJohn results in the infon  run; John; 1.A particularly important sort of abstract is the collection of proposition abstracts|i.e. objects formed by abstraction over propositions. These objects are known as types.For example, the object X(X j= run; john; 1) is a situation-type, namely, thetype of situation in which John is running.9 Given a type [X1; :::;Xn]o and assignment[o1; :::; on], we obtain a proposition via the (partial) binary operation (: : :)10|theproposition ([o1; :::; on] : [X1; :::;Xn]o) is true (roughly) i the proposition that resultsfrom applying [X1; :::;Xn]o to [o1; :::; on] is true.11 I will often generalise Barwise'snotation and refer to any proposition of the form (o : t) as an Austinian proposition. Ascan be seen from the notation above, types can in general be n-ary, for any n. However,I will usually be concerned with simple unary types in what is to follow.In the theory of classications described below, types are usually presented as if theyare unstructured objects|i.e. the internal make-up of a type, via abstraction involvinga proposition, is not explicitly shown. This is a matter of convenience, and is alsodue to the fact that any such internal structure is not relevant to my enterprise|asfar as this thesis is concerned, types are rst-class objects and they may as well beunstructured.12 The denition of an adequate semantic model involving such types,however, would generally require greater detail in this matter to be demonstrated. Forexample, when using situation theory as a semantic framework for the analysis of certainlinguistic phenomena, then the internal structure of the (situation theoretic) types usedin the analysis is typically a central part of that analysis. However, in this thesis it willgenerally be the internal structure of channels and regularities that are of importance,and situation-types will generally be treated as unstructured entities.8Of course, both the parameters in the abstract and the objects to which it is applied are assumedto be indexed, in this case by the indices 1; :::; n.9In fact, all infons, such as  run; john; 1, are themselves seen as situation-types, as is formallycaptured in Appendix A.10This relation can be seen as an instance of the classication relation of the next section.11This is a little sloppy|there are matters such as appropriateness to be considered here. This isexplained more carefully in Appendix A.12Actually, Barwise and Cooper treat abstracts (and therefore types) as rst-class intensional objects,as can be seen in Appendix A.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 322.1.4 ConstraintsConstraints were introduced by B&P as objects that support the ow of informa-tion from one situation to another. To B&P , a constraint is an infon of the form involves; T; T 0; 1, where T and T 0 are situation-types. Given a situation s of typeT , the constraint above indicates the existence of a situation s0 of type T 0. For exam-ple, the informational relation \Smoke means re" is represented by a constraint of theform  involves; smokey; firey; 1|a situation that is of type smokey indicates thepresence of some other situation that is of type firey. In the B&P model, constraintsunderly all information ow, inference and meaning.13B&P present a taxonomy of dierent sorts of constraints, the most relevant to thisthesis being conditional constraints, i.e. constraints that can involve exceptions to thegeneral rule. Notable attempts to provide formal models of conditional constraintsinclude (Barwise 1986) and (Seligman 1990). Barwise and Seligman's theory of channels,described in Section 2.3, can be seen as an elaboration of these attempts, particularlythat of Seligman. I will be further investigating constraints and the nature of conditionalinformation ow when I present B&S 's theory of channels.2.2 Classication TheoryA theory of classications was introduced by Seligman (1990) and expanded upon bySeligman and Barwise (1993).14 A classication is an object that supports various propo-sitions, basically that certain particulars, or tokens, are of certain types. Classicationsform the basis of a relativistic model of information: the tokens of a classication areparts of the world carved out by some agent in question, and the types are propertieswhich can appropriately be used to classify those tokens.2.2.1 Basic ConceptsA classication collects various particulars in the world and assigns types to them. Theparticulars are called tokens: they may be just about anything occurring in the world,13Nivre (1992) provides a detailed analysis of communication and meaning in a situation theoreticframework, making heavy use of constraints.14Henceforth, I will tend to abbreviate \Seligman and Barwise" by S&B .




Figure 2.1: A Classication A.Given a classication A = htok(A); typ(A);K+;K i, a 2 tok(A) is said to be posi-tively classied (resp., negatively) by  2 typ(A) in A if  2 K+(a) (resp.,  2 K (a)).Rather than referring to the functions K+ and K , I will usually make use of thefollowing relations :+A; : A that can be dened from them:a :+A  i  2 K+(a) in A;a : A  i  2 K (a) in A.15These relations are known as positive and negative classication relations, respectively.15I will tend to drop the subscript from :+ and : .
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 34As is the case for the functions K+;K , these relations are dened with respect to agiven classication A. I will also refer to the positive classication relation as an of-typerelation|a is said to be of type  in A if a is positively classied by  in A.The way in which the classication relations of a classication have been denedclearly leaves room for both under- and over-specication: i.e. for any token a and type, it could be the case that neither (a :+ ) nor (a :  ) holds, or that both (a :+ ) and(a :  ) hold. A classication that satises the rst of these cases is said to be partial;a classication that is not partial is said to be total. A classication that satises thesecond of the above cases is said to be incoherent; a classication that is not incoherentis said to be coherent. A classication that is both total and coherent is said to beclassical. Throughout the thesis, I will concern myself with coherent classications.Classications form the basis of a relativistic theory of information. The informationsupported by a classication A is obviously relativised to the tokens and types containedin A, as well as to the classication relations associated with A. This viewpoint avoidsany commitment to an objective world outside of the classifying agent, and is most usefulwhen modelling aspects of multi-agent interaction. For example, dierent classicationscan arise over the same collection of tokens and types, which can be used to modeldierent agents having dierent \perspectives" or viewpoints over the same objects.2.2.2 Adding Structure to ClassicationsThe notion of a classication is a simple one and involves very little ontological commit-ment. In fact, classications have analogues in model theory, i.e., models|the tokensare the individuals and the types are properties, with the of-type relation being thepredication relation. Throughout this thesis, however, I will assume that classicationshave some added structure to them, inherent mainly in the types.16Denition Any set of types typ(A) of a classication A is assumed to be closed underoperations of conjunction, disjunction and negation, denoted ^ ; _ ;: respectively|i.e.if ;  are types in typ(A), then so too are ( ^  ); ( _  ); (:). The type-negationoperation is constrained to satisfy the following condition: for any token a and type ,a :+  i a :  :, and a :+ : i a :  .16Seligman and Barwise use the term perspective to refer to such classications|i.e. those whosetypes have internal structure in the way described here.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 35The above property of the type-negation operator allows a simplication to thenotation since we can do away with the negative classication relation `: '; this allowsus to write the positive classication relation simply as `:'. Hence, given classicationhtokA; typ(A);K+;K i,  2 K+ i a : , while  2 K  i a : :. Throughout the restof the thesis, I will adopt this simplication in notation, except where explicitly statedotherwise.Denition Any set of types typ(A) is assumed to come equipped with a type-entailmentrelation A 17|for ;  2 typ(A),  A  means  type-entails . Any such type-entailment relation is assumed to be at least a preorder. The minimum interactionrequired between the type-operations and the entailment relation of typ(A) is the follow-ing: for any ;  2 typ(A),  A ( ^  ) and ( _  ) A .18 Given a classication A,the type-entailment relation A associated with A constrains the classication relationof A as follows: for a 2 tok(A) and ;  2 typ(A), if a :  and  A  then a : .The above denition provides the minimum conditions that a type-entailment re-lation must satisfy. Of course, we may want a particular type-entailment relation tosatisfy stronger conditions than these; for example, we may want such a relation tomimic the entailment relation of some logic.19 In a later section, I will discuss the use ofa logical channel, which supports the information-ow provided by some logical system,to constrain the entailment relations of certain classications.It should be noted that type-entailment can be used to model more than just \logi-cal" entailment between types. For example, the notion of type-entailment can be usefulin a multi-agent setting where we want to model dierent agents having dierent abilitiesof discrimination. We may associate a classication A with an agent that cannot distin-guish between the colours blue and green|typ(A) would contain the type blue:or:green.Another classication B could model the normal case|typ(B) would contain the typesblue and green. A classication that provided a \God's-eye view" of this world wouldcontain all three types, with blue:or:green  blue and blue:or:green  green holdingover its collection of types.2017I will often leave o the subscript when it is clear from the context.18Throughout the thesis, I will tend to assume that type-entailment mimics (zero-degree) relevantentailment in the sense of (Anderson and Belnap 1975). Relevant entailment (and its link to channeltheory) is discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.4.2.19This involves drawing the obvious analogy between the structured types of a classication and thesentences of some (propositional) language.20Of course, whether one would want to allow a \God's-eye" classication is debatable, but this isanother issue.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 36Finally, work described in a later chapter requires that classications come equippedwith a type-conict relation.Denition A type-conict relation ?A over a set of types typ(A) is an irreexive,symmetric relation that holds between two types that are mutually incompatible. Theminimum conditions required of such a relation are the following:?A:, for all  2 typ(A);if ?A and  A  then ?A , for all ;  ;  2 typ(A);if ?A then either a :  or a :  fails to hold, for a 2 tok(A), ;  2 typ(A).Once again, as with type-entailment relations, there will be occasions where tighterrestrictions on a classication's type-conict relation will be required. For example, wecould require that?A i : A  and/or : A .2.2.3 Operations on ClassicationsSo far, I have implicitly taken classications to be somehow unstructured at the token-level|any logical structure has been present only at the type-level, through the useof type-entailment relations and type-operations. However, this does not allow therepresentation of complex propositions involving more than one token. For example, letA be a classication containing tokens a; b and types ;  ; there is no way of representingthe fact that A supports the proposition that is the conjunction of (a : ) and (b :  ). Ofcourse, A can support each of the individual propositions, but we would like some wayof representing the complex proposition within the classication-theoretic framework.Seligman and Barwise (1993) dene a number of operations on classications whichcan be used for this purpose. For example, the following operation of sequential con-junction allows the representation of the conjunction of (Austinian) propositions.21Denition (Seligman and Barwise 1993) Given classications A1 and A2, the se-quential conjunction A1 
 A2 is the classication whose tokens are fh^ ; a1; a2i j a1 2tok(A1); a2 2 tok(A2)g and types are fh^ ; 1; 2i j 1 2 typ(A1); 2 2 typ(A2)g, andwhose classication relation is dened as follows:21Seligman and Barwise actually dene a more general concept allowing the conjunction of an arbitrarycollection of classications.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 37h ^ ; a1; a2i :+ h ^ ; 1; 2i in A1 
A2 i a1 :+ 1 in A1 and a2 :+ 2 in A2;h ^ ; a1; a2i :  h ^ ; 1; 2i in A1 
A2 i a1 :  1 in A1 or a2 :  2 in A2.The classication A 
 B eectively supports (Austinian) propositions of the form(s : ) ^ (t :  ), where (s : ) and (t :  ) are propositions whose truth is determinedin A and B respectively. Seligman and Barwise dene operations on classicationscorresponding to disjunction, negation, complementation and other useful properties.That said, in this thesis I will tend to reect all logical structure at the type-level|however, it is important to know that the more general framework is available.22A characterisation that will prove useful in later chapters is the following conceptof one classication being a subclassication of another. Actually, I dene two suchconcepts, closely related to each other.23Denition Classication A is a subclassication of classication B, written A v B, itok(A)  tok(B), typ(A)  typ(B), B agrees with A when restricted to typ(A), andfor each a 2 tok(A) and  2 typ(A), if (a : ) holds in A then (a : ) holds in B. If thislast condition is strengthened to a biconditional (i.e. (a : ) holds in A i (a : ) holdsin B), then A is said to be a restriction of B, written A 6 B.Note that A being a restriction of B is a slightly stronger condition than A being asubclassication of B, in that every restriction of a classication is a subclassicationof it, but not vice versa. For example, suppose A is a subclassication of B, witha 2 tok(A),  2 typ(A), (a : ) holds in B, but (a : ) does not hold in A|then A is nota restriction of B. The rationale for introducing the notion of a restriction (Seligmanand Barwise (1993) only dene subclassication) is that I want to capture the concept ofan agent extending the set of types it uses for classication without altering the way ituses the original set of types. Both the above concepts clearly impose partial orderingson classications whenever the type-entailment relations are themselves partial orders.I write A < B for A v B and A 6= B, where equality between classications A and B isdened as follows: A = B i tok(A) = tok(B), typ(A) = typ(B), and A 6 B.One nal pair of concepts that will prove useful later on (in the denition of achannel, Section 2.3.3) is the following.22Appendix A.2 contains some further illustrations of the use of classication operations to generaliseconcepts dened below.23Subclassication needs to be extended in the presence of classication operations such as 
. Thisis briey discussed in Appendix A.2.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 38Denition A bi-function f : A !! B from classication A to classication B is a pairof functions hf ^ ; f _ i with f ^ : typ(A)! typ(B) and f _ : tok(A)! tok(B).Denition A bi-function f : A !! B is a homomorphism from classication A to clas-sication B i: if a :+  in A then f _ (a) :+ f ^ () in B; if a :   in A then f _ (a) :  f ^ () in B.2.2.4 Situation Theory and ClassicationsSeligman and Barwise (1993) show how basic situation theory can be recovered fromclassication theory. Situations are equated with a certain sort of classication, so-calledstar-classications. In the reconstruction of situation theory, the types of such classi-cations are relations and the tokens are nite sequences of elements of some underlyingset. If A is such a classication, then the situation corresponding to A supports theinfon  r; a1; :::; an; p (where p 2 f+; g) if and only if a1; :::; an :p r in A.In this thesis, I am more concerned with the relationship between situation theoryand classication theory by which we have classications whose tokens are situationsand whose types are situation-types. I have already introduced the fragment of situationtheory that I am concerned with in this thesis (see Section 2.1). Taking tokens to besituations and types to be situation-types is straightforward, except for the case whereparameters are involved. Disallowing parameters would severely curtail the expressivepower of the channel theoretic models of later chapters. In particular, parameters areneeded if the full expressive power of the GEN operator for representing the meaningof generic sentences is to be captured (see Section 4.1.3). However, the treatment ofparameters within the channel theoretic framework needs to be handled with some care,especially if we are to model the behaviour of the GEN operator, and of discoursereferents in DRT. Section A.3 contains one treatment of parameters within the channeltheoretic framework that results in the required behaviour.2.3 Channel TheoryChannel Theory (Barwise 1993; Barwise and Seligman 1993; Barwise and Seligman 1994;Seligman 1990; Seligman 1993; Seligman and Barwise 1993) is a theory of information-
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 39ow. The ideas behind channel theory have their roots in situation theoretic constraints.The whole concept of the analysis of information-ow had its beginnings in Shannon andWeaver's (1949) quantitative analysis of information-ow for communicating systems,which led to Dretske's (1981) seminal work. Many of the central concepts of channeltheory, in particular its explicit focus on the possibility of error in information-ow, canbe seen as an explicit attempt to address the sort of problems that arise in Dretske'saccount of a naturalistic theory of content based on information-ow.2.3.1 Types, Tokens and Information FlowAs I will discuss below, there are several properties of channel theory that contributetowards its attractiveness as a model of information-ow. Perhaps the most crucialaspect, however, is the careful distinction between the token level and the type level.It is this distinction that leads to the theory's ability to account for the fallibility ofgeneral regularities, which is a central contribution of the theory.A channel supports information ow of a certain sort. As will be seen, this is reectedin the fact that a channel has an associated set of tokens and types, those which areappropriate to the regularity in question|this plays the part of a \context" for theinformation ow. Basically, the scope of a channel denes the \normal conditions" underwhich a regularity can be relied upon. For example, regularities involving laws of physicsgenerally assume some \ideal" conditions|a channel supporting such a regularity willbe dened by these conditions, although such conditions are not explicitly representedin the channel. The information ow supported by a channel is relativised in anotherimportant way: as is the case in the theory of classications outlined above, tokens andtypes exist only with respect to scheme of individuation. Hence, the existence and formof a regularity, both at the token-level and at the type-level, depends very much on theway the tokens and types are discriminated.The distinction between tokens and types extends to the model of regularities them-selves|it is not just the regularity between a pair of types that plays a role, but alsothe connection between a pair of tokens that support those types. It is not alwaysclear-cut as to what can play the part of a connection: in an electrical circuit, it maybe the conducting wire between two components; when talking about the \connection"between a thermometer and patient, however, the actual connection in question is moreabstract. Barwise and Seligman (1994), however, are quite specic about their claims










Figure 2.2: Smoke means re: direction of information ow.The points made in this section outline some of the ideas behind B&S 's channeltheory. The rest of this chapter involves introducing the formal concepts of the theory,and expanding on the points made above in the light of these concepts.2.3.2 Information LinksSection 2.2 introduced B&S 's theory of classication. As described there, classicationtheory can be seen as a relativistic theory of information. Channel theory is concerned
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 41with relativistic information ow, i.e., how information supported in one classicationcarries information regarding another. The previous section introduced the notion ofconnections between tokens and regularities between types, and the manner in whichinformation \ows" along these connections. This notion is formally captured by thenotion of an information link.Denition An information link (or just link) L : A !! B from classication A to clas-sication B consists of an indicating relation L^ on typ(A) typ(B) and a signallingrelation L_ on tok(A)  tok(B). I will sometimes write !L for h;  i 2 L^ ; whenthis is the case, we say that  indicates  in L. Similarly, I will sometimes write a L7! brather than ha; bi 2 L_ ; when this is the case, we say that a signals b in L.24An information link is a model of the ow of information between two classica-tions. The signalling relation models the connections between tokens, while the indicat-ing relation models the type-level relations. The information ow modelled by a link isrelativistic in that it is dependent on the tokens and types discriminated in the linkedclassications, as well as the particular signalling and indicating relations themselves.In general, an information link is to be seen as modelling information ow of a specicsort|every tuple in the indicating relation is applicable to every element of the sig-nalling relation, so the information-ow modelled by a particular link is correspondinglyconstrained. (Note that the direction of the relations is in the direction of inferencerather than ow as indicated by Figure 2.2.)As a simple illustration, consider the usual \Smoke means re" example. The factthat a situation s is \smokey" carries the information that some other situation s0is \rey". This is modelled as follows. There is some classication S that classiessituations according to whether or not they are smokey: i.e. tok(S) consists of a setof situations, and typ(S) contains the single type smokey. Another classication Fclassies situations according to whether or not they are rey: tok(F ) also consists of aset of situations and typ(F ) contains the single type rey. The regularity \Smoke meansre" is modelled as a link L between S and F . A situation s that is smokey is linkedto a particular situation s0|s0 is the rey situation that causes s to be smokey; i.e. s0being rey causes s to be smokey. In the link L, this is represented by the pair hs; s0iin the signalling relation of L and the pair hsmokey; fireyi in the indicating relation.This models the ow of information from s0 to s|the fact that (s : smokey) holds in S24I will usually leave o any reference to L in the above notation when it is clear from the context.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 42carries the information that (s0 : firey) holds in F .The important motivation behind channel theory is the ability to model error in infor-mation ow. The token/type distinction, which is present in the concept of informationlink, allows the following characterisation of unexpected behaviour in information ow.Denition Let L : A !! B be a link. A pseudo-signal for a constraint !L in L is atoken a 2 tok(A) such that (a : ) holds and there is no b 2 tok(B) such that a L7! b inL.25A pseudo-signal can lead to error if an agent is not aware of its existence. Forexample, consider again the link L above modelling the regularity between smokey andrey situations, and suppose that s is a smokey situation that is caused by a smokemachine. Within the signalling relation of L, s is not linked to any situation|i.e. thereis no situation s0 whose rey-ness causes s to be smokey. In this case, s is a pseudo-signalin L. However, if I am in the vicinity of s and notice its smokey-ness, without realisingthat this state was caused by a smoke machine, I may well come to assume that there issome nearby rey situation and call the re-brigade. It is in this way that pseudo-signalscan lead to error.Pseudo-signals, and the manner in which they lead to error, are discussed in greaterdetail in Section 2.3.4, where they are compared to exceptions. This latter conceptconstitutes a more interesting characterisation of error, which becomes available whenwe add classication relations to links, leading to the concept of a channel (Section2.3.3).26 A dierence between a pseudo-signal and an exception is that the latter canlead to error even when there is a connection between a signal token and a target. Thiscircumstance arises when the information carried by the signal a about some target bdisagrees with the information directly supported by b in the appropriate classication.Denition A link L : A !! B is sound if, for all a 2 tok(A); b 2 tok(B) such that a L7! band all  2 typ(A);  2 typ(B) such that !L , if (a : ) holds in A then (b :  ) holdsin B.The fact that a link is sound or unsound is not reected within the internal structure25S&B also dene a dual concept, that of pseudo-target . The reason for my omitting the dual conceptis discussed below.26Actually, there is a bit more to the dierence between a channel and a link than this classicationrelation. These dierences are discussed later in this chapter. Note that a link in the sense of S&B(1993) is more or less the same as the concept of a channel as it rst appeared in the situation theoreticliterature (e.g. (Barwise 1993; Barwise and Moss 1991)).
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 43of the link itself|the succedent classication needs to be checked before any unsoundnessshows itself. However, the introduction of a classication relation, which leads to theconcept of a channel, provides for an extra degree of freedom which allows soundness tobe be modelled more directly, as shown in the next section.2.3.3 ChannelsIn this section, I present S&B 's concept of a channel. Channels are objects that sup-port regularities|underpinning any regularity is a channel of some sort. Channels arerelated to the concept of information link introduced above but are seen as primary toit|any information link is obtained from a channel by removing some added structurethat is available in the channel. As is the case with information links, a channel sep-arates regularities into distinct token- and type-levels, but also involves a classicationrelation between the objects at these two levels. Further, channels have ner-grainedintensionality than links|connections between tokens and types are primitive objectsand are not identied with the tokens/types they connect. The denition of a channelinvolves the notion of a homomorphism between classications, which has consequencesthat are discussed below.Denition Let A and B be classications. A channel from A to B is a triplehleft(C); C; right(C)iwhere C is a classication, and left(C) : C !! A and right(C) : C !! B are homomor-phisms from C to A and B respectively.The types of C are called constraints and the tokens are called connections. Given aconstraint , left(C)^ () is called the antecedent of  and is sometimes denoted byanteC(), and right(C)^ () is called the succedent of  and is sometimes denoted bysuccC(). Given a connection c, left(C)_ (c) is called the source of c and is sometimesdenoted by sourceC(c), while right(C)_ (c) is called the target of c and is sometimesdenoted by targetC(c).27Figure 2.3 illustrates diagrammatically the concept dened above. As an example ofa channel, consider the Rey channel R : T ) P which relates a thermometer's readingto a given patient's body-temperature.28 The classication T classies thermometers27The subscripts are dropped when the channel in question can be determined from the context.28This example is taken from (Barwise and Seligman 1994).
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Figure 2.3: A Channel C : A) B.by height of mercury (in centimetres) and the classication P classies patients bybody-temperature (in degrees Celsius). The Rey channel is illustrated in Figure 2.4.The connections of R are between thermometer-tokens and patient-tokens|a particu-lar thermometer-token t is related to a particular patient-token p if t indicates somethingabout p (rather than some other patient!). The constraints of R relate heights of mer-cury (which classify thermometer-tokens) and temperatures (which classify patients)|aparticular height-type height is related to a particular temperature-type temp if (ingeneral) a reading of height indicates a temperature of temp.29 The fact that a par-ticular constraint  (i.e. height-temperature link) is related to a particular connectionc (i.e. thermometer-patient connection) is given by  classifying c in the classicationR. When this is the case, then (by the Principle of Harmony described below) the factthat the thermometer t (where t is the source of c, from the diagram) contains mercuryat height height carries the information that the patient p has a body-temperature oftemp degrees.30The fact that the denition of channel makes use of homomorphisms has several29This should be qualied slightly: a height of height indicates a temperature of temp under the\normal conditions" reected by R. The fact that a channel reects the \normal conditions" of aregularity (and thereby provides a characterisation of error) assumes prominence below.30In general, given a connection c0 in tok(R) and constraint 0 in typ(R), R can be seen as supportinga conditional of the following form:\If source(c0) contains mercury at height ante(0) then target(c0) has body-temperaturesucc(0)."This is the case even if c0 is not classied by 0 in R|in this case, the antecedent (and consequent) ofthe conditional sentence may not hold (i.e. the sentence may be a counterfactual). This is the basis ofthe channel theoretic analysis of conditional sentences described in the following chapter.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of the Rey channel R : T ) P .consequences. The most important is that a connection's being classied by a constraintmeans that information-ow occurs: i.e. for a channel C : A) B, if (c : )31 holdsin C, then it must be the case that (left(C)_ (c) : left(C)^ ()) and (right(C)_ (c) :right(C)^ ()) both hold in their respective classications. The idea is that (positive)classication of a connection by a constraint models the fact that information-ow hasoccurred|i.e. the source is of the type given by the antecedent of the constraint, and(therefore) the target is of the type given by the succedent. Seligman (1993) refers tothis as the Principle of Harmony, which he represents diagrammatically as shown inFigure 2.5. .. .. .. ........................................... ................................... ...................................if + then + +cc

a b a b    Figure 2.5: Principle of Harmony.A similar principle exists for negative classication, of course: if c :   in C, then it31Given the notation so far, positive classication should be distinguished from negative classicationfor channels. However, I will sometimes leave o the superscript; such cases are assumed to correspondto positive classication. I return to this issue below.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 46must be the case that (left(C)_ (c) :  left(C)^ ()) and (right(C)_ (c) :  right(C)^ ())both hold. However, I will not make use of this property. My reason is that, in Section2.3.7, I introduce a Contraposition operation that denes a channel C : B ) A for anychannel C : A) B. The contraposition channel C satises the Principle of Harmony(for positive information ow) exactly when C satises the dual principle (for negativeinformation ow). Hence, I replace the need to talk about negative ow within a channelC with talk regarding positive ow within its contraposition channel C. A furtherconsequence is that there is no need to dene the duals of certain concepts, such aspseudo-signal and exception (see below)|e.g. the dual of a pseudo-signal in a channel issimply a pseudo-signal in the contraposition channel. Finally, I will drop the superscripton the classication relation for the rest of the thesis|classication in a channel is alwaystaken to be positive.I will make use of the following notational simplication throughout the thesis: Iwill often write a 7! b for a connection c such that signal(c) = a and target(c) = b; andI will often write ! for a constraint  such that ante() =  and succ() =  . AsI stress a number of times, connections and constraints should not be conated withtheir endpoints (i.e. the tokens and types they respectively connect). However, thisnotational simplication will prove to be most convenient and signicantly improvesclarity of the presentation.The presence of a classication relation between connections and constraints intro-duces a characterisation that is not available in links, namely, the characterisation thata given connection is not classied by a particular constraint. This allows S&B to modelexceptions to constraints, as dened below.2.3.4 Errors: Exceptions and Pseudo-SignalsAs I have discussed earlier, a central feature of channel theory is that it incorporates atreatment of \error" or \exception to the general rule". In a previous section, I discussedhow pseudo-signals in an information link can lead to error|i.e. if a signal that is notconnected to any target is nevertheless used as a basis for inference as if it had beenconnected. The concept of pseudo-signal is also available in a channel.Denition Let C : A) B be a channel. A pseudo-source or pseudo-signal for a con-straint  2 typ(C) is a token a 2 tok(A) such that (a : ante()) holds in A and there is
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 47no connection c 2 tok(C) such that source(c) = a.This concept exactly mirrors the concept of pseudo-signal in an information link.However, a much more interesting possibility for error is provided by the fact that achannel incorporates a classication between connections and constraints. This allowsa further distinction to be made, namely, when the source of a connection is classiedby the antecedent of some constraint but the connection itself is not classied by thatconstraint.Denition Let C : A) B be a channel. A connection c 2 tok(C) is an exception to aconstraint  2 typ(C) in C if (source(c) : ante()) holds in A and (c : ) does not holdin C.Given an exception c to a constraint , there is a lack of information-ow betweenthe tokens connected by c, even if the source token is classied by the antecedent of theconstraint. Since the antecedent condition of the Principle of Harmony does not hold,there is no guarantee that the source and target tokens of the connection are classiedby the antecedent and consequent types of the constraint. However, since the sourceis classied by the antecedent, an agent which bases its reasoning on the channel inquestion (in the manner described in the next section) may come to the conclusion thatthe target token is also classied by the consequent.As with an information link, we can dene the concept of soundness for a channel:a channel is sound just in case it contains no exceptions. Of course, even though aparticular connection c is an exception to a given constraint , an inference based on cand  may still happen to lead to a conclusion that actually is supported in the relevantclassication. Clearly, this does not justify the inference|any such conclusion is correctsimply by chance.Denition Let C : A) B be a channel. A connection c 2 tok(C) is a weak exceptionto a constraint  2 tok(C) if c is an exception to  and yet (target(c) : succ()) holdsin B. A strong exception is an exception that is not a weak exception.Any prediction based on a weak exception is basically correct simply by coincidence.Weak exceptions are not of much interest in the theory of channels, but play a role inthe following section, where I investigate the relationship between channels and links.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 48Exceptions versus Pseudo-SignalsThe formal treatment of error in a channel, whether it be via exception or pseudo-signal,localises error|a particular token or connection falling foul of a regularity does notinvalidate the regularity, or other information inferred by it.32 For example,33 considera diagrammatic representation of the plan of a house: there is a channel C between theclassication that classies features of the plan with their position on the diagram andthe classication that classies components of the house with their position in the house.Constraints in this channel have the form something likefeature-of-sort-X-at-posn-Y ! component-of-sort-f(X)-at-posn-g(Y).Now, suppose the representation of a door on the diagram does not accurately reectthe position of the door in the house|the connection between the representation ofthe door and the actual door constitutes an exception to the above constraint in C.However, the connections between other features of the diagram and their counterpartsin the house can safely be used to infer any necessary information regarding the layoutof the latter.34A tricky question that arises is the following: when is an error a pseudo-signal andwhen is it an exception? Basically, this boils down to the question as to when an \abnor-mal" connection is a connection and when it is something else. The answer is, roughly,\whenever you like (within reason)!". A channel is a classication and, as such, is basedon a classifying agent's scheme of individuation. Whether an error corresponds to anexception or to a pseudo-signal depends on how the channel-classication is constructed,and which tokens (i.e. connections) are discriminated by the agent involved.For example, consider again the Rey channel R,35 involving a thermometer t andpatient p. Suppose the conditions involving the use of t with respect to p are somehowabnormal; e.g. assume t has been lying around for some time after being extracted fromp. The nurse whose duty it is to monitor the reading of t, and thereby determine p'sbody temperature, may well be unaware of any problem|he may assume that all is asit should be and makes use of the connection c between t and p as a token of R, leading32This property is a very important one in the semantics of generics, and is discussed further inChapter 4.33This example is borrowed from B&S(1994).34At least, this is theoretically the case. Of course, it could be that the problem with the door issimply a symptom of the whole plan being unreliable.35This example was suggested to me by Jerry Seligman (personal communication).
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 49to a body-temperature estimate that is closer to room temperature than it should be.The alternative view is that the connection c should not be a token of R, but of someother channel R0|constraints in R0 would take a time-delay into account. A nurse thatwas aware of the delay would therefore not include c in the set of tokens of R|t wouldtherefore be a pseudo-signal in this channel.36 This shows that one channel's exceptioncan be another channel's pseudo-signal, depending on how the associated connectionsare individuated.Throughout this thesis, I will be a little more systematic as to the dierence be-tween pseudo-signals and exceptions, particularly when dealing with default reasoningin Chapter 5. Informally speaking, an error will be modelled as a pseudo-signal whenthere is sucient information to determine that it actually is an error. For example,if I am told that opus is a penguin, then opus will be a pseudo-signal in the channelcontaining the constraint bird!flies. However, if opus happens to be a mysterious,magical, ying penguin, then the connection involving opus will be an exception to theconstraint penguin!:flies, in the appropriate channel. This issue is discussed furtherin Section 5.1.4.372.3.5 Discussion of PropertiesHaving presented the basics of channel theory, it is worthwhile spending some timediscussing some of the properties of channels and advantages of the theory.Intensionality of RegularitiesA major attraction of channel theory is that it involves minimal commitment as to theconstitution of regularities and how they arise. There is an aspect of realism|B&S seeregularities as somehow being \out there", and that an agent can use these as the basisof inference and other cognitive activity|but there is no attempt to reduce regularitiesto more fundamental concepts, such as relations between possible worlds. Of course,there is the claim that regularities have structure and that the connections between36Since this nurse may not know enough about the structure of R0|i.e. exactly how the time-delayaects the thermometer-reading|he may well decide that a new reading-event is called for.37Section 4.2.2 describes how the dierent sorts of errors available in the channel theoretic frameworkis useful in distinguishing the dierent sorts of exceptions that need to be catered for in accounts ofgeneric sentences.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 50tokens plays a fundamental a role as the connections between types. However, this isnot the same as providing a reductionist exposition of regularity|the connections atboth levels are primitive intensional objects of the theory.The possible problem with taking a non-reductionist stance with regard to regulari-ties is that it seems to sacrice explanatory power|i.e. there seems little hope of beingable to say anything useful regarding the tasks we may wish to model using channels.However, this is not the case|the concepts that arise from the type-token distinctionallow for some very interesting characterisation of various phenomena when channel the-ory is as a formal modelling tool (e.g. Healey and Vogel (1994) dene a channel theoreticmodel of dialogue that uses the concept of pseudo-signal to characterise certain commu-nication errors). Also, work in subsequent chapters demonstrates how channels not onlypossess properties that make them particularly attractive as the basis for a semanticsof conditionals and generics, but also that powerful logics for conditionals and genericscan be dened within the channel theoretic framework. The fact that a powerful systemis obtained with little need for any commitment to a particular view of regularity is avery attractive feature.The non-reductionist stance does have some potential drawbacks, however. Whenregularities are reduced to relations between other objects, then a logic for applyingthose generics tends to arise as a result. For example, Morreau (1992a) describes howthe problem with the approach that generics are \simply true"|i.e. true in and ofthemselves, without relation to the behaviour of the associated individuals|is that alogic for using generics to reason defeasibly about the individuals themselves cannot bedirectly obtained. He uses this argument to support his view of generics as statementsabout \normal" individuals.38 Consequently, the logic of generics of Chapter 4 requiresthe imposition of a maximal normality condition in order to obtain a logic for defeasiblyreasoning about individuals in Chapter 5. I would argue that the separation betweenthe \truth" of generics and the way in which they are used in default reasoning is apositive thing.38Morreau's work is discussed in some detail in Chapter 4.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 51Contextuality and RelativismThe channel theoretic model of information ow can be seen as a development of ideasdeveloped in the situation theoretic literature. In particular, the theory of channels canbe seen as providing a concrete setting for conditional constraints. In situation theory,a conditional constraint involved infons with an involves relation, whose appropriatearguments are pairs of situation-types (e.g. (Barwise 1986; Barwise and Perry 1983)).Such an infon is supported by a situation s if s provides a context within which theconstraints holds. One view of a channel is that it is just such a situation|i.e. channeltheory is a framework in which the structure of constraint-supporting situations is eshedout.The set of connections of a channel C is determined by the context under which theconstraints of that channel are appropriate|i.e. it is intended that tok(C) contains onlythose connections to which the constraints in typ(C) are applicable. For example, if C isthe electric-circuit channel, then connections corresponding to bits of string should notbe included in tok(C). Of course, a channel is simply a classication, and it could bethat an inappropriate token is included in this classication|such a token is invariablyan exception. The sort of information that a channel C supports is the following, forevery token c 2 tok(C) and type  2 typ(C):If source(c) is of type ante() then (under normal conditions) target(c) is of typesucc().This leads to an interpretation of conditional sentences within the channel theoreticframework, which is the subject of Chapter 3.The qualication to \normal conditions" in the above conditional is needed to ac-count for the possibility of exception. However, an important feature of channel theoryis that the \normal conditions" or \background assumptions" under which a regularityholds are not explicitly represented in a channel, tting in with recent work in cognitivescience which has stressed the impossibility of representing in some complete way allassumptions under which a regularity holds (e.g. see (Suchman 1987; Winograd andFlores 1986)). The background assumptions behind a regularity determine the struc-ture of the channel (e.g. by constraining the set of connections), but are not explicitlyrepresented and therefore cannot be extracted from the channel. This contrasts with, forexample, Barwise's (1986) formulation of conditional constraints|Barwise associates a
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 52situation-type with each constraint, whereby the situation-type captures the conditionsunder which the constraint holds. In Chapter 3, I will argue that some representationof background conditions of a regularity is necessary if we are to provide an adequatemodel of conditional reasoning; however, the formal mechanism proposed does not re-quire the assumptions behind a channel C to be represented within C itself, nor that C'sassumptions be fully represented anywhere. Rather, these assumptions are representedby the way C is related to other channels.The contextual aspect of channels discussed above plays an important role in thetheory and its application|in Chapter 4 I argue that it resolves some problematic issuesin the semantics of generic sentences. However, there is another important way in whichchannel theory is relativistic|i.e. the types and tokens, both of classications and chan-nels, are dependent on some scheme of individuation. While this issue has been raisedbefore, it is important enough to raise once again. This property provides the basis for asort of cognitive semantics (e.g. (Gardenfors 1993)), and has been exploited by Healeyand Vogel (1994) in a multi-agent setting to provide an account of misunderstanding indialogue. Even within a single-agent, multi-perspective39 setting, this relativism pro-vides a property whereby the types linked by a constraint  in a channel C can be eithermore discriminatory on the world, leading to more robust regularities, or less discrimi-natory, leading to more ecient regularities. For example, in a normal environment, thefrog is happy to use a regularity based on a constraint linking types ying-black-thingand food ; if the world had been dierent, however, with many non-food ying-black-things in the frog's environment, then the frog may well have evolved in such a way thatit was attuned to a regularity linking the types ying-black-thing-that-buzzes and food .The trade-o between regularities that are more ecient and regularities that aremore robust is a critical one, and issues related to this have plagued workers in AI,especially those working on planning systems, where the relevant problem is known asthe qualication problem (e.g. (George 1987b)). The channel theoretic frameworkdeveloped in the rest of this thesis seems to oer a dierent approach to this tradeo,and to the qualication problem in particular. While this issue is not fully investigatedin this thesis, the approach is outlined in Section 5.4.39I am using the term \perspective" here in its informal sense, meaning something like \view of theworld".
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 532.3.6 Inference: Links and ChannelsI have so far presented the basic elements of B&S 's channel theory, but have said verylittle about the way I intend to use channels as a basis for inference and conditionalreasoning, the topic with which this thesis is primarily concerned. An important re-quirement is that any denition of the concept of inference must allow for the possibilityof drawing conclusions which are somehow \wrong". By basing inference on connections,it turns out that the presence of exceptions, as opposed to pseudo-signals, introducesthis possibility.Given a channel C : A) B, it is immediately obvious which connection/constraintpairings should not be used for making a prediction regarding classication B, givensome information in A; namely, if connection c is an exception to constraint , then thepair hc; i should not be used to infer information about the target of c. However, ifwe are to allow the possibility of error, we need to model the case where it is somehownot known that a particular connection falls out of the domain of classication of anappropriate constraint. Doing so allows an erroneous inference to be made; since eachconstraint of a channel is applicable to each of its connections, an erroneous predictionis made by taking an exception and inferring that the target token is classied by thesuccedent of the corresponding constraint.40It should be clear that the above criterion corresponds to (one of) the dierencesbetween channels and information links|a link is basically a channel minus the classi-cation between connections and constraints. Of course, a link is also less primitive thana channel|in the latter, the connections and constraints are not identied with theirend-points, so there may be more than one connection in a channel that corresponds toa single pair of tokens in the signalling relation of the corresponding link. However, thisis only really an issue in the presence of exceptions, and the notion of inference withrespect to a link dened below is based on the assumption that the given link is sound.Since this may fail to be the case, it is this assumption that introduces the possibilityof error. Before presenting the denition of inference that is used in this thesis,41 Iinvestigate the relationship between channels and links.40Of course, this only leads to error if the exception is a strong exception. If it is a weak exception,the inference is correct, although simply by coincidence.41Actually, the notion of inference introduced below is only really used in Chapter 5, since it is onlywhen reasoning about the properties of individuals (i.e. tokens) that such inference is required.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 54From Channels to LinksThe way I will treat the dierence between channels and links in this thesis is roughlyas follows: channels support regularities as they actually occur in the world42 while theinformation links are the objects on which inference is based. Links and channels are, ofcourse, closely related|inference is based on regularities, and so any (reliable) link willsomehow be based on a channel. This is made explicit in the following: given a channelC, we obtain a link based on C by making connections and constraints extensional andignoring the classication relation between them.Denition Let C : A) B be a channel. The link Link(C) : A !! B dened from C hasas indicating relation the set of pairs fhante(); succ()i j  2 typ(C)g and as signallingrelation the set of pairs fhsource(c); target(c)i j c 2 tok(C)g.Clearly, if a channel C is sound, then Link(C) must also be sound. However, theconverse does not necessarily hold|if C is unsound, but every exception in C is a weakexception, then Link(C) will be sound.From Links to ChannelsGoing in the other direction, from links to channels, is neither as clear-cut nor as im-portant. Since we have taken the stance that channels are somehow more fundamental(i.e. inference is based on regularity; links are based on channels), we do not generallyneed to go from channels to links. The technical hitch in trying to do so arises becausechannels have extra structure (namely, a classication relation and more ne-grainedintensionality) which cannot be recaptured from links. However, given a link, we candene a canonical channel.Denition Let L : A !! B be a link. The canonical channel Chan(L) : A) B denedfrom L is dened as follows:1. tok(Chan(L)) = fha; bi j a L7! bg;2. typ(Chan(L)) = fh;  i j !L g;3. (ha; bi : h;  i) holds in Chan(L) i (a : ) holds in A and (b :  ) holds in B;4. the homomorphisms associated with Chan(L) are the obvious ones mapping con-nections and constraints to their endpoints.42This is subject to the usual relationship with respect to a scheme of individuation.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 55Seligman (1993) shows that the constructions Link and Chan completely charac-terise the relationship between links and channels, under the following provisos: (i) thata channel contains no weak exceptions, and (ii) no distinct connections and constraintsare mapped to the same endpoints.43Inference with Links and ChannelsThe notion of inference I will employ throughout the thesis is the following one: givena link (or set of links) and an initial set of facts, the inferred facts are those which aresupported by the signalling and indicating relations of the link in the obvious way. Thisis made precise as follows.Denition Let L : A !! B be a link and 	 a collection of propositions formed fromthe tokens and types of A (i.e. 	 has the form f:::; (a : ); :::g, where s 2 tok(A) and 2 typ(A)). The predicted inferences from 	 supported by L, denoted ConsqL(	), aref(b :  ) j (a : ) 2 	; a L7! b and !L g.If L is a set of links, then I take ConsqL(	) to be SfConsqL(	) j L 2 Lg.Although all inference is underpinned by links, I will sometimes abuse this fact andrefer to the predicted inferences supported by a channel C. What I really mean torefer to in such a case are the inferences supported by Link(C); however, this abuse issometimes convenient, since it leads to a simplication of the terminology. It should bekept in mind, however, that it is always the links that are used in inference.The following notation and terminology will prove useful in what follows.Denition Let L : A !! B be a link and 	 a set of propositions.The classication induced by L from 	 is C such that1. tok(C) = fb j (b :  ) 2 ConsqL(	) for some  g;2. typ(C) = f j (b :  ) 2 ConsqL(	) for some bg;3. (b :  ) holds in C i (b :  ) 2 ConsqL(	).Following S&B, C is said to be the projection of 	 along L. I write 	 j;L  if  ConsqL(	). 	 j;L f(b :  )g is abbreviated to 	 j;L (b :  ).4443I.e., it is not the case that source(c) = source(c0) and target(c) = target(c0) for distinct connectionsc; c0, and similarly for constraints.44I will often drop the subscripts when the link in question can be determined from the context.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 56Since a link may be unsound, it may be that some predicted consequences are notsupported in the succedent classication, even though all the initial propositions aresupported in the antecedent classication. For example, suppose we have a channelC : A) B and proposition (a : ), such that (a : ) holds in A. Further supposethat c 2 tok(C) and  2 typ(C), with source(c) = a, target(c) = b, ante() = and succ() =  , and that c is a strong exception to . Then it is the case thatf(a : )g j; (b :  ), but (b :  ) does not hold in B. However, we do have the followingresult.Proposition 2.3.1 Let L : A !! B be a sound link45 and 	 a set of propositions suchthat (a : ) holds in A for each (a : ) 2 	. Then the classication C induced by L from	 is a subclassication of B.Proof Straightforward. 2Inference by way of a channel clearly resembles the use of modus ponens. However,I have not dened any notion of a \proof"|i.e. the set of consequences are not closedunder application of a set of channels. Instead, it is the set of channels that are closedunder some set of operations|this is the topic of the next section.The concept of inference in channel theory is developed further in later sections ofthe thesis, particularly in Chapter 5.2.3.7 Operations on ChannelsAs dened above, inference proceeds along a single channel or link. However, it is clearlypossible for one inferred proposition to lead to another. For this purpose, a number ofoperations on channels is required. These operations eectively allow a logic based onchannel theory to be dened.The operations dened below are based on those dened by S&B (1993), with theparallel composition based on a similar operation dened by Barwise (1993) in the orig-inal channel theoretic framework. In that paper, Barwise showed how certain Principlesof Information Flow could adequately be captured with these operations. In SectionA.4.2, I also show that these operations neatly capture the rules of inference of Rele-vant Logic. I could dene operations on links analogous to those on channels; however,45Recall that if C is a sound channel, then Link(C) is a sound link.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 57there is no need to do so, since a link arises from each channel, and therefore I take thechannels (including the complex ones) as primary.Connection GraphsSo as to aid in the formalisation of the following operations, the concept of a connectiongraph is needed. This is required for the denition of the necessary operations onconnections, ensuring that they posses the necessary properties. The denition followsthat of the same concept by S&B (1993), with the addition of an extra operation (parallelcomposition).Denition A connection graph G is a graph whose nodes are tokens and whose edgesare connections, together with the following operations: identity, contraposition, serialcomposition and parallel composition. Given a connection c, a c7! b denotes that c hassource a and target b. The identity operation provides a connection id(a) for each tokena; the contraposition operation provides a connection c for each connection c; the serialcomposition operation provides a connection (c1 ; c2) for each pair of connections c1; c2such that target(c1) = source(c2); the parallel composition operation provides a connec-tion (c1 k c2) for each pair of connections c1; c2 such that source(c1) = source(c2) andtarget(c1) = target(c2). These operations satisfy the following conditions:1. a id(a)7! a;2. a (c1 ; c2)7! b i there is a token t such that a c17! t and t c27! b;3. if dened, (c1 ; (c2 ; c3)) = ((c1 ; c2) ; c3);4. if a c7! b then (id(a) ; c) = (c ; id(b)) = c;5. a c7! b i b c7! a;6. id(a) = id(a);7. if (c1 ; c2) is dened then (c1 ; c2) = (c2 ; c1);8. (c) = c;9. a (c1 k c2)7! b i a c17! b and a c27! b;10. if dened, (c1 k c2) = (c2 k c1);11. if dened, (c1 k (c2 k c3)) = ((c1 k c2) k c3);12. if (c1 k c2) is dened, (c1 k c2) = (c1 k c2).
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 58While I will not mention it explicitly in each of the denitions below, it is assumedthat all connections are taken from a connection graph and that the operations onconnections satisfy the principles dened above.Serial CompositionSerial composition was originally introduced by Barwise (1993) as an aid to modellingDretske's Xerox Principle, which is the information-ow equivalent of the logical infer-ence rule of Transitivity.Denition Let C1 : A) B and C2 : B ) C be channels. The serial composition of C1and C2 is a channel (C1 ; C2) : A) C dened as follows:1. tok(C1 ; C2) = f(c1 ; c2) j c1 2 tok(C1); c2 2 tok(C2) and target(c1) = source(c2)g;2. typ(C1 ; C2) = fh1; 2i j 1 2 C1; 2 2 C2 and succC1(1) = anteC2(2)g;3. (c1 ; c2) :+ h1; 2i in (C1 ; C2) i c1 :+ 1 in C1 and c2 :+ 2 in C2;(c1 ; c2) :  h1; 2i in (C1 ; C2) i c1 :  1 in C1 and c2 :  2 in C2;4. source(C1 ; C2)(c1 ; c2) = sourceC1(c1) and target(C1 ; C2)(c1 ; c2) = targetC2(c2);5. ante(C1 ; C2)(h1; 2i) = anteC1(1) and succ(C1 ; C2)(h1; 2i) = succC2(2).Serial composition is most easily illustrated by way of an example (taken from (Bar-wise and Seligman 1994)). Consider a doorbell, which is attached to a button locatedon a porch. There are three classications involved in this example: R involves thebell-token b and the type ringing (i.e. R classies the bell as to whether or not itis ringing); P involves the button-token t and the type pushed (i.e. P classies thebutton as to whether or not it is being pressed); O involves the porch-token p andthe type occupied (i.e. O classies the porch as to whether or not it is occupied).There are two basic channels involved: C1 : R) P contains the connection b 7! t andconstraint ringing!pushed (i.e. C1 involves information-ow from pressed doorbell-buttons to ringing doorbells); C2 : P ) O contains the connection t 7! p and constraintpushed!occupied (i.e. C2 involves information-ow from occupied porches to presseddoorbell-buttons). The serial composition channel (C1 ; C2) : R) O contains the con-nection b 7! p and constraint ringing!occupied (i.e. the composition channel involvesinformation-ow from occupied porches to ringing doorbells). It is the compositionchannel that allows us, on hearing the ringing doorbell, to deduce that someone is atthe door. This example is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 59
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ringing pushed occupiedP OR
ringing!occupied
Figure 2.6: Serial Composition: the doorbell example.S&B (Seligman and Barwise 1993; Seligman 1993) prove various properties of thecomposition operation, such as associativity and the preservation of exceptions. One ofthe more interesting results is the following.Proposition 2.3.2 (Seligman 1993): (c1 ; c2) is an exception to h1; 2i in (C1 ; C2) ieither1. c1 is an exception to 1 in C1; or2. (c1 : 1) holds in C1 and c2 is an exception to 2 in C2.Parallel CompositionThere are several dierent ways in which a notion of \parallel" composition can be de-ned. Barwise (1993) required an operation of this form to ensure that his ve principlesof information ow were satised|Barwise's parallel composition specically addressedthe principles of Addition of Information and Exhaustive Cases. For technical reasons, Iactually dene two separate parallel composition operations, each dealing with the twopreviously mentioned principles. The parallel meet operation deals with constraints that
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 60link the conjunction of two types, while the parallel join operation deals with constraintsthat link disjunctions. Recall (from Section 2.2.2) that I assume all classications tohave conjunction and disjunction operation dened over their types.46 I will sometimesuse the term parallel composition to refer to both or either of these operations.Denition Let C1 : A) B and C2 : A) B be channels.The parallel meet of C1 and C2 is a channel (C14C2) : A) B dened as follows:1. tok(C14C2) = f(c1 k c2) j c1 2 tok(C1); c2 2 tok(C2); source(c1) = source(c2)and target(c1) = target(c2)g;2. typ(C14C2) = fh^ ; 1; 2i j 1 2 typ(C1) and 2 2 typ(C2)g;3. (c1 k c2) :+ h ^ ; 1; 2i in (C14C2) i c1 :+ 1 in C1 and c2 :+ 2 in C2;(c1 k c2) :  h ^ ; 1; 2i in (C14C2) i c1 :  1 in C1 or c2 :  2 in C2;4. source(C14C2)(c1 k c2) = sourceC1(c1) and target(C14C2)(c1 k c2) = targetC1(c1);475. ante(C14C2)(h ^ ; 1; 2i) = (anteC1(1) ^ anteC2(2));succ(C14C2)(h ^ ; 1; 2i) = (succC1(1) ^ succC2(2)).48The parallel join of C1 and C2 is a channel (C15C2) : A) B dened as follows:1. tok(C15C2) = f(c1 k c2) j c1 2 tok(C1); c2 2 tok(C2); source(c1) = source(c2)and target(c1) = target(c2)g;2. typ(C15C2) = fh_ ; 1; 2i j 1 2 typ(C1) and 2 2 typ(C2)g;3. (c1 k c2) :+ h _ ; 1; 2i in (C15C2) i c1 :+ 1 in C1 or c2 :+ 2 in C2;(c1 k c2) :  h _ ; 1; 2i in (C15C2) i c1 :  1 in C1 and c2 :  2 in C2;4. source(C15C2)(c1 k c2) = sourceC1(c1) and target(C15C2)(c1 k c2) = targetC1(c1);5. ante(C15C2)(h _ ; 1; 2i) = (anteC1(1) _ anteC2(2));succ(C15C2)(h _ ; 1; 2i) = (succC1(1) _ succC2(2)).46Actually, there is not really a need to assume that the conjunction and disjunction operationsare associated with the classications linked by the channels. An alternative is to have the parallelcomposition operations link classications A 
 A and B 
 B, where 
 is the sequential conjunctionoperation on classications. This possibility is briey discussed in Appendix A.2.47Recall that sourceC1(c1) = sourceC2(c2) and targetC1(c1) = targetC2(c2)48It should be noted that there are two dierent type-conjunction and type-disjunction operationsinvolved in the right-hand-side of these denitions, depending on whether the operation in question isassociated with classication A or classication B. To be precise, I should use dierent symbols, but Itrust that no confusion is caused.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 61The concept modelled by parallel composition can be illustrated by an example.Consider a television: this involves both an audio channel A : T!S and a visual channelV : T!S, where T is a classication of the television and S is a classication of somescene.49 Given some audio-visual image i, V carries visual information regarding somescene s whileA carries audio information regarding s. The parallel meet channel (V 4A)formed from these two channels carries a merger of this information. Note that if eitherof the channels is not working properly (i.e. i 7! s is an exception in one of them),then the parallel join channel can still be informative|i.e. (i : ( _ 0)) carries theinformation (s : ( _  0)) in (V 5A) (assuming constraints ! and 0! 0 in therespective channels) so long as at least one of the channels is working normally|whereasthe parallel meet channel is informative only when both channels are in order. This isreected in the denition.It can be shown that the parallel composition of any two channels is itself a channel,as one would hope. This property, as well as properties such as commutativity andassociativity of the parallel composition operations, is proved in Appendix A.4.1. Asa convenient simplication, I will sometimes write (C1 k C2) for what I have looselycalled \parallel composition". When this is the case, either of the parallel compositionoperations (i.e. meet or join) can be substituted.ContrapositionI mentioned above that I do not make use of \negative" information-ow (i.e. fromtarget to source) in the same way as S&B do. Instead, I make use of the followingcontraposition operation, which assigns to each channel C a channel C which modelsthe information-ow in the negative direction.Denition Let C : A) B be a channel. The contraposition of C is a channel C :B ) A dened as follows:1. tok(C) = fc j c 2 Cg;2. typ(C) = fh 1; i j  2 typ(C)g;49It would be preferable to have dierent classications involved here|i.e. one classication for thetelevision's visual image and the other for the television's audio image. This can be modelled in themore general setting of parallel composition, as dened in Appendix A.2. Given the current denition ofparallel composition, where the two channels involved link the same classications, we need to expressthe example in the manner given.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 623. (c :+ h 1; i) holds in C i (c :  ) holds in C(c :  h 1; i) holds in C i (c :+ ) holds in C;4. sourceC(c) = targetC(c) and targetC(c) = sourceC(c);5. anteC(h 1; i) = :succC() and succC(h 1; i) = :anteC().50An exception in a contraposition channel C exactly corresponds to S&B 's conceptof exception at the target in C (Seligman and Barwise 1993). Further, a channel C issound in the sense of S&B if neither C nor its contraposition C contains an exception.Throughout the thesis, I will use the terminology I have explicitly introduced|i.e. C issound if it does not contain any exceptions; the soundness of C is taken to be a separateissue.2.3.8 Logical ChannelsA particular class of channels that deserves special attention is the class of logical chan-nels. Logical or analytical relationships between types constitute one particular formof information-ow: if type  entails type  , then a token a being of type  carriesthe information that a is also of type  . I will be especially concerned with logicalchannels in later chapters, when I present channel theoretic models of conditional anddefault logics. Since I wish to compare my formal models with previous work, I need toinclude a \logical" component to the channel theoretic framework to facilitate a moredirect comparison. B&S (Barwise 1993; Seligman and Barwise 1993) also discuss logicalchannels|the ideas in this section are based on their observations.Since a logical channel is concerned with the logical structure of types, any pairof classications linked by such a channel must be such that the types posses logicalstructure|i.e. they are perspectives in the sense of Section 2.2.2. Since the information-ow is internal to the classication, a logical channel is also assumed to be reexive, inthe following sense.Denition The signalling relation of a channel C is said to be reexive if, for eachconnection c 2 tok(C), source(c) = target(c). A channel is said to be reexive if it linksthe same classication A to itself and has a reexive signalling relation.The fact that they are analytic also means that all logical channels are sound|i.e.50As was the case in the denition of parallel composition, there are two dierent type-negationoperations at work here.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 63contain no exceptions|and are closed under some appropriate set of channel opera-tions. This set of operations is generally assumed to be serial composition, the parallelcompositions and contraposition. I refer to this latter condition as the Logical ClosureConstraint: L = (L ;L) = (L5L) = (L4L) = L.Axiom Every logical channel L : A) A is reexive, sound and satises the LogicalClosure Constraint.Of course, the above denition leaves open many degrees of freedom; this is to beexpected, since there are many dierent logics and a logical channel for each of them.51Barwise (1993) presents various examples of logical channels (e.g. classical and intu-itionistic logic). For the sake of concreteness, I will tend to assume that logical channelsare based on Anderson and Belnap's system R of rst-degree relevant entailment (e.g.(Anderson and Belnap 1975; Dunn 1984)).52 That is, each logical channel R : A) A inthe remainder of the thesis is (eectively) assumed to support the following:  2 typ(R)i ante() relevantly entails succ() in R. (Of course, I should be much more precisehere|types aren't necessarily logical formulae. This is spelt out in greater detail inAppendix A.4.2, where I investigate the link between channel operations and rules ofinference for R.53) My reasons for choosing to base logical channels on relevant logic arebased on personal preference, but stem from relevant logic's concern with informationrather than truth conditions, as mentioned earlier.2.3.9 Notation and SimplicationsIn this chapter, I have presented the concepts from channel theory which I will use inthis thesis. S&B (Seligman and Barwise 1993; Seligman 1993) have investigated theproperties of channels in great detail|for lack of space, I have obviously been unable topresent all their results here. For the sake of simplicity, I will make some assumptionsthroughout the rest of this thesis. These simplications are by no means necessary andare made simply for the sake of ease of presentation.51Actually, there are many logical channels for each logic since technically there is a separate channelfor each classication.52A rst-degree logic is one with no nested implications.53Restall (1994) has also looked at the link between Channel Theory and Relevant Logic, although hiswork takes a very dierent tack to that described in Section A.4.2. Restall views channels as tokens andsignalling relations as a ternary relation between tokens. Ternary relations between possible-worlds isthe foundation of the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevant logics, and Restall is therefore able to drawinteresting links between the two systems. Lemon (1993) has done work along similar lines.
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 64Identication of connections and constraints with their endpoints: I will usu-ally identify connections and constraints in a channel by their endpoints. As discussedabove, the tokens and types of channels are primitive objects, and should not be identi-ed with the objects they connect. For example, two tokens may be connected by twodierent connections, one which gives rise to an exception in a channel and one whichdoes not. However, I will assume this not to be the case throughout the remainder(unless explicitly stated otherwise), allowing me to write a 7! b for the connection csuch that source(c) = a and target(c) = b, and ! for the constraint  such thatante() =  and succ() =  . I will also sometimes refer to the \signalling" and\indicating" relations of a channel|this slight abuse of terminology should cause noproblems, given the above assumption.As an example of the sort of simplication this assumption allows, consider thedenition of parallel meet composition, from Section 2.3.7. Identifying connections andconstraints with their endpoints allows the parallel meet of channels C1 : A) B andC2 : A) B to be dened as follows:1. tok(C14C2) = fa 7! b j a 7! b 2 tok(C1) and a 7! b 2 tok(C2)g;2. typ(C14C2) = f( ^ 0)!( ^  0) j ! 2 typ(C1) and 0! 0 2 typ(C2)g;3. (a 7! b) :+ ( ^ 0)!( ^  0) i a 7! b :+ ! in C1 and a 7! b :+ 0! 0 in C2;(a 7! b) :  ( ^ 0)!( ^  0) i a 7! b :  ! in C1 or a 7! b :  0! 0 in C2.While this may not appear a particularly great simplication in this case (mainlybecause of the cumbersome conjunctive types in the constraints), it does save much inthe way of notation in later parts of the text.Conation of channels and links: Another abuse I will make is to blur the distinctionbetween channels and links. The identication of connections and constraints with theirendpoints is already a step along this path, of course. However, I will sometimes referto inferences or predictions with respect to a channel C : A) B. Of course, what Ireally mean in such cases is the set of inferences with respect to the link Link(C). Giventhe identication of connections and constraints with their endpoints, this eectivelyinvolves simply ignoring the classication relation of the channel|i.e. any (strong)exception leads to an incorrect inference with respect to B.Assumption that signalling relations are reexive: Some of the work presentedin later chapters makes use of the assumption that all signalling relations are reexive,
Channel Theory: Formal Concepts 65in that source(c) = target(c) for each connection c. This assumption involves greatsimplication in the presentation|basically, it allows much of the technical work tobe performed solely at the level of types|but is also required for a more meaningfulcomparison of the logics developed in Chapters 3 and 5 with more traditional conditionaland default logics. Many of the illustrative examples given in later chapters will reectthis assumption.
Chapter 3
A Channel{Theoretic Model ofConditional Logics
Barwise (1986) has argued that situation theoretic constraints form the semantic contentof conditionals|i.e. the semantic content of a statement of the form \If A then B" istaken to be a constraint of the form ! , where  and  express the content of A andB respectively. Barwise (1993) renes this analysis of conditionals by embedding it in achannel theoretic setting and thereby providing an Austinian analysis|the descriptivecontent of a conditional statement is a type-level regularity, while the demonstrativecontent is a token-level connection.1 Barwise and Seligman (1994) also suggest that aconditional statement be seen in this light, but with demonstrative content a channelrather than a connection.In this chapter,2 I investigate the use of channel theory as a basis for the semanticcontent of conditionals. My main concern is with the logic of conditionals that arisesthrough the use of the channel-operations dened in Section 2.3.7. Various standardlogical rules of inference|specically, Transitivity , Monotonicity and Contraposition|are accepted to be invalid for conditionals (e.g. see (Nute 1980)) and the rst taskof the evaluation of a logic of conditionals based on the channel-theoretic model is toensure that these rules are in fact invalidated. I will argue that some extra mechanism isrequired before the channel operations (as they are dened in Section 2.3.7) are deemed1Informally, the descriptive content of a statement S is the claim made by S, while the demonstrativecontent of S is the object of which the claim is made.2Some of the work described in this chapter is reported in (Cavedon 1994).66
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 67suitable for a logic of conditionals. This mechanism will take the form of a SubChannelrelation, which more or less orders channels with respect to how \reliable" they are|i.e. a channel that is less reliable, in that it contains more exceptions, is a subchannelof the ner-grained channel. The hierarchy of channels that results can be seen asencoding the background assumptions of constraints and regularities, without necessarilyexplicitly representing such assumptions. The channel operations are redened to takeinto account a hierarchy of channels against which they are evaluated.The logic arising from the revised channel operations can be summarised by thefollowing rules, which for convenience are written in a notation roughly correspondingto natural deduction rules (i.e. the antecedent of a rule is written above the line andthe consequent is written below it). In the following, the C : ! denotes the assertionthat the conditional represented by ! is supported by the channel C.3C1 : ! C2 :  ! if the background conditions of ! are(C1 ; C2) : ! compatible with those of  !C1 : 1! 1 C2 : 2! 2 if the background conditions of 1! 1 are(C14C2) : (1 ^ 2)!( 1 ^  2) compatible with those of 2! 2C1 : 1! 1 C2 : 2! 2 without restriction (this reects the usual(C15C2) : (1 _ 2)!( 1 _  2) acceptance of Weakening as valid)C1 : ! if the background conditions of ! areC1 : : !: compatible with : The background conditions referred to in the above rules are, as mentioned, capturedby the use of a given hierarchy of channels. The resulting logic of conditionals is shownto possess many desirable qualities|in particular, the unwanted rules of Transitivity,Monotonicity and Contraposition are invalidated. On dening various constraints thatany given hierarchy is expected to satisfy, it is shown that much of the power of moretraditional conditional logics can be retained. Importantly, these constraints can bemotivated independently of their use in obtaining a powerful logic of conditionals. Theabove rules of inference (and the channel-hierarchy mechanism) also form the basis oflogics of generics and default reasoning in later chapters of the thesis.3As well as the rules given here, the logic of conditionals also supports the rst-degree entailmentsof the relevant logic R.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 683.1 A Simple Semantic Model of ConditionalsThe channel-theoretic semantic model of conditionals I propose here is very much inline with the ideas of Barwise and Seligman. Basically, a conditional statement involvesan assertion that a channel C supports some sort of \conditional information". Thisinformation is related to the internal structure of C, namely, that C contains someconnection c and regularity . Barwise's (1986) analysis relates a conditional statementto a constraint|the assertion expressed by a conditional lacks any demonstrative contentin this analysis. Barwise (1993) himself later suggests that the demonstrative contentof a conditional is a connection between tokens, while Barwise and Seligman (1994)intimate that it is a channel. For reasons discussed below|mainly to do with theanalysis of nested conditionals|I will adopt this last stance.The most urgent issue in a satisfactory logical analysis of conditionals is the problemof counterfactuals: a counterfactual may be true or false, even though its premise isfalse. For example, the statement\If it is raining, I will get wet."may be true even when it is not raining. As is well known, this property makes thematerial conditional eminently unsuitable for modelling the conditional connective ofsuch sentences|a more intensional treatment of the connective is required. The stan-dard way of resolving this problem is to resort to possible-worlds and the concept of\nearest-world functions" (e.g. (Stalnaker 1968; Lewis 1973)). Under this treatment,the truth of a logical conditional A!B (with respect to a world w) is determined byevaluating B in the \nearest" world w0 to w such that A is true in w0. For the exampleabove, the conditional is true in w if the nearest world w0 to w in which it is rainingis such that I am wet in w0. A specic logic of conditionals arises by imposing variousconditions on the nearest-world function f .4Barwise's (1986) analysis of conditionals avoids the potential problem arising fromcounterfactuals because the truth of a conditional (in his analysis) does not depend onthe truth of its constituent statements, but only on the factuality of a constraint. Thesemantic analysis dened below has the same property, with the extra proviso that,following B&S , the content of a conditional is relativised to a channel and also involves4A more detailed presentation of possible-worlds conditional logics is given in Section 3.2.1. See alsothe survey articles by Nute (1980, 1984).
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 69a connection between tokens. Other properties of conditionals, such as their context-dependency,5 are also immediately obtained due to the relativistic nature of channeltheory.I will note at this point that there are certain subclasses of conditionals that Iconsider outside the scope of the analysis of this chapter. Barwise (1986) discusses thepartitioning of conditionals into specic and general conditionals. An example of thelatter is the statement\If it is wet, then the footpaths will be slippery."This sentence can be seen as making a statement about footpaths in general, ratherthan about a specic case. While such conditionals could certainly be covered underthe semantic analysis below, for convenience I prefer to view them as generic sentences(which they are) and have them fall within the model of generics presented in Chapter4. Finally, a particular form of conditional is that involving the \even if" construct: e.g.\Even if it rains, I won't get wet."Such sentences denitely fall outside the scope of the following analysis, but are discussedin Section 3.1.3.3.1.1 The Semantics of ConditionalsIn situation theory, the content of a declarative utterance is an Austinian proposition,e.g. the claim that a certain situation is of a certain type. This idea can be extended toconditional sentences with channels playing the role of situations|a conditional sentenceis taken to be a particular type of declarative sentence, one that makes a claim about achannel C. The claim that such a sentence makes about C concerns the internal structureof C, namely, that C supports certain information ow. More precisely, a conditionalsentence asserts that a certain channel C : A) B contains a connection s 7! s0 amongstits tokens and a constraint ! amongst its types. Of course, the conditional in questioncould be a counterfactual. In this case, (s : ) does not hold in A. However, s 7! s0being a connection of C and ! being a constraint in C in no way depends on whether(s : ) holds or not.5That is, conditionals seem to implicitly assume some set of unstated background conditions. Thisissue assumes prominence below.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 70In general, the content of a conditional sentence is taken to be an Austinian proposi-tion of the form (C : ), where C is a channel and  is a conditional fact, dened below.There are assumed to be classications that classify channels by conditional facts.Denition A conditional fact (appropriate for classifying a channel C) is a type involv-ing Austinian propositions formed from the tokens and types of the classications linkedby C: in particular, a conditional fact  will be written h ) ;;	i, where  and 	 areAustinian propositions. If K is any classication whose tokens are channels and whosetypes are conditional facts, then for C 2 tok(K) and h ) ; (s : ); (s0 :  )i 2 typ(K),(C : h ) ; (s : ); (s0 :  )i) holds in K i s 7! s0 2 tok(C) and ! 2 typ(C).The fact that a channel C is of type h ) ;;	i can be read as \if  holds, then (ifconditions are normal)6 it carries the information 	, via C". It should be clear thatthis conditional information (i.e. that C is of a certain type) holds regardless of whether (and therefore 	) itself holds in the pertinent classication|it simply depends onthe internal structure of C. Note that K, being a classication, can be one of theclassications linked by a given channel. This allows a natural interpretation of nestedconditionals|the content of a nested conditional is a proposition concerning a channelC : A) K.As a simple example, consider the following conditional sentence.\If the doorbell is ringing, then there is someone on the porch."This sentence asserts a proposition of the form (C : h ) ; (b : ringing); (p : occupied)i),where b denotes the doorbell in question, the type ringing holds of b just in case b isringing, p denotes the porch in question, and occupied holds of p just in case there issomeone on p. This proposition holds whether or not (b : ringing) holds. The importantpoint here is that there is a regularity between ringing doorbells and occupied porches(i.e. there is a constraint ringing!occupied in typ(C)), and the connection between thedoorbell and porch in question falls within the domain of this regularity (i.e. there is aconnection b 7! p in tok(C)).As I mentioned above, a channel eectively plays an analogous role to that of asituation that supports a declarative sentence. An issue that has been raised (viapersonal communication) as a possible problem is that it is not clear which channelshould support a given conditional sentence. In the doorbell example, for instance,6The qualication to \normal conditions" is needed since there may be an exception involved.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 71there may be more than one channel that contains the connection b 7! p and constraintringing!occupied|which is the \appropriate" channel? The appropriate channel is, ofcourse, the one that the speaker is describing when she utters the conditional sentence|i.e. there is nothing about channel theory which determines which channel is the mostappropriate, just as situation semantics does not determine which is the situation de-scribed by the sentence \Fido is in front of the re" (e.g. is the described situationthe re-vicinity situation, the living room situation, the house situation, etc.).7 Whatchannel theory (and the model of this chapter in particular) is concerned with is: givena channel C about which certain information is known, what other information can bedetermined regarding C (and other channels related to it).It should be noted that not all conditionals are such obvious instances of generalregularities as the one above involving the doorbell. In fact, to account for some con-ditionals one may sometimes need to take a rather generous view of what constitutesa \regularity". For some conditionals, the pertinent regularity isn't so easily extractedfrom the conditional sentence. Some potentially problematic examples of conditionals,particular those based on correlation, are discussed in Section 3.1.3 and shown, I be-lieve, to be adequately covered by the semantic notion of conditionals provided by theabove denition. By taking the notion of regularity to be the basis of the meaning ofconditionals, the assertability of a conditional is based on whether or not there is aconnection between the antecedent and consequent of the conditional, thereby ensuringthe intensionality of the conditional operator. The semantic analysis of conditionalsprovided above is clearly a simplistic one; however, it is sucient for the main purposesof this chapter, which is to provide a channel theoretical logic of conditionals.3.1.2 Properties of the Channel Theoretic SemanticsThe above simple analysis of conditionals directly inherits several properties from thechannel theoretic model of information ow. For example, a suitably intensional model of7The fact that a hearer may take an utterance to be about a dierent situation/token than thatintended by the speaker is a starting point for Healey and Vogel's (1994) situation theoretic model ofmiscommunication in dialogue. A similar model involving \mistaken channel" would be most interestingin the setting of generics, the topic of Chapter 4, since generics are used to make default inferences aboutindividuals. In particular, a speaker and hearer may come to make a dierent default inference regardingsome individual due to them disagreeing as to the nature of the channel supporting the uttered genericsentence. This seems to be a most interesting topic for future research and is outlined in a bit moredetail in Section 6.2.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 72conditionals is obtained, one that adequately models counterfactuals, without a need tointroduce possible-worlds or a \nearest-world" selection function. Instead, a conditionalis supported by the existence of informational constraints, both at the level of types andtokens, thereby rendering the truth of the conditional itself independent of the truthof its constituent components. However, most importantly to the current enterprise,it is still possible to extract a viable logic for reasoning about conditionals withoutreducing such connections and regularities to more primitive entities. The contextualaspect provided by a channel as demonstrative content can also be used to explainvarious phenomena|in particular, the contextual component is used to account for theinvalidity of Transitivity, Monotonicity and Contraposition.The Roles of Regularity and ContextBarwise (1986) examines a number of problematic examples from the literature on con-ditionals and describes how the information-ow analysis deals with each of these ex-amples. In particular, requiring a conditional to be based on a regularity|rather thanattempting to reduce regularities to more primitive concepts|and the role of backgroundconditions seem to account for the various problems raised. For example, consider thefollowing pair of sentences, the rst of which is uttered by Tweedledee and the secondby Tweedledum:8\If we had tossed the coin, it would have come up heads."\If we had tossed the coin, it would have come up tails."Under Stalnaker's analysis, each of these conditionals is indeterminate in truth valuebut Barwise claims them to be false (and I agree with Barwise). The information-owanalysis falsies both conditionals because of the lack of a regularity underlying eitherof them. Similarly, conditionals with valid, or necessarily true, consequents are notnecessarily supported by the information-ow analysis. For example:\If the moon is made of green cheese then 2 + 2 = 4."is not supported in the channel-theoretic analysis but is validated by any standardpossible-worlds analysis.9 Finally, the information-ow analysis means that the same8This example is due to Stalnaker (1987).9An exception is Mares and Fuhrmann's (1993) conditional logic based on a Routley-Meyer semanticsfor relevant logic.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 73framework is used in the interpretation of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals.10Context and background assumptions also play a crucial role in the interpretationof conditionals since there is usually some assumed condition which is left unstated in aconditional's antecedent. For example, the following conditional is acceptable\If I strike the match then it will light."even though it does not refer to the fact that the match must be dry, that it mustbe struck in the presence of oxygen, or any other of the multitude of possible assump-tions on which the conditional rests. Further, the use of context helps to explain howsome conicting conditionals seem to be simultaneously acceptable. For example, Bar-wise describes the example of two observers of a card game who respectively assert thefollowing:\If Pete calls then he will win."\If Pete calls then he will lose."The rst observer bases his claim on the knowledge that Pete is cheating and knowshis opponent's cards and will therefore only call if he has a winning hand. The secondobserver does not knows this but has seen the respective hands (and knows that Pete'shand will lose). In this example, the conicting conditionals are supported by dierentchannels|the rst is supported by a channel containing the regularity that (when he'scheating) Pete only calls when he has a winning hand while the second is supported bya channel containing the regularity relating winning and losing hands with respect tothe rules of poker.11Nested ConditionalsFor the most part, I will be ignoring nested conditionals below.12 However, it is mostimportant to show that an inability to interpret nested conditionals is not an inherentshortcoming of the channel theoretic analysis. In fact, since any channel is itself aclassication, nested conditionals are handled without any extension to the current10There may be problems with the channel theoretic analysis of subjunctives if one were to assumean extreme realist stance to token-level connections. However, I do not adopt any such stance.11The role of context in the interpretation of conicting generics is further discussed in Chapter 4.12In particular, the channel theoretic logic of conditionals dened below assumes that conditionalsare not nested. Appendix B.1 briey discusses how the logic could be extended so as to handle nestedconditionals.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 74framework.Jackson (1987) claims that the only meaningful nested conditionals are those of theform \if X then if Y then Z"|i.e. a conditional whose consequent is itself a conditional.For simplicity, I will restrict attention to nesting of this form. The denition in Section3.1.1 dened the content of a conditional sentence to be a proposition of the form (C : ),where C is a channel and  a conditional fact. A conditional fact relates two Austinianpropositions and one of these could well be the content of some conditional sentence|i.e. the token of the proposition would be a channel and the type a conditional fact. Forexample, consider the following conditional sentence:\If Pete doesn't have an umbrella then if it rains he'll get wet."This sentence describes a channel C, claiming that it contains a connection s 7! C0 andconstraint :umbrella!0, where s is a situation, umbrella classies those situations inwhich Pete has an umbrella, C0 is a channel and 0 is a conditional fact. The channelC0 is itself the demonstrative content of the inner conditional|i.e.\... if it rains he'll get wet."This particular conditional claims of C0 that it contains a connection s 7! s and con-straint raining!wet, where raining classies those situations in which it is raining andwet classies those situations in which Pete is wet. It should hopefully be clear thatthis interpretation does not require any added machinery beyond that provided by theanalysis above.An interesting issue concerning the choice of demonstrative content for conditionalsentences revealed itself when I rst investigated the analysis of nested conditionals.Barwise and Seligman (1994) suggest that the demonstrative content of a conditionalis a connection between tokens|i.e. the particular connection that supports the (po-tential) information-ow described by the conditional|and the descriptive content isthe corresponding constraint. However, due to the Principle of Harmony, this imposesunrealistic requirements on the antecedent and consequents of the inner conditional.For example, consider again the previous conditional involving Pete and suppose thatthe demonstrative content of this conditional were the connection s 7! c, where c is it-self the connection s 7! s. Now suppose that Pete did indeed forget his umbrella (i.e.(s : :umbrella) holds) and further suppose that (s 7! c : :umbrella!) holds (where is the constraint raining!wet). By the Principle of Harmony, it must be the case
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 75that (c : ) holds which further means that (again by the Principle of Harmony) it mustbe the case that (s : raining) and (s : wet) both hold. However, this conicts withintuition|if Pete forgot his umbrella then it may still fail to rain in which case Petewouldn't get wet.13The above problem led to the revision of the semantic content of conditional sentenceswhereby the demonstrative content is taken to be a channel14 and the descriptive contentis a conditional fact. This seems to provide a more satisfactory interpretation of anested conditional|in the above example, the fact that Pete forgot his umbrella carriesthe (conditional) information that if it rains then he'll get wet, without carrying theinformation that it actually is raining or that he actually does get wet.3.1.3 Potentially Problematic ConditionalsWhile my main concern is in dening an adequate logic for conditionals, which in turnis the foundation of the logics of generics and default reasoning of later chapters, I wantto briey discuss some of the potential problems with the channel theoretic view ofconditionals presented above. The information-ow analysis of conditionals has severaldesirable properties but some conditionals do not seem immediately suited to such ananalysis. Pollock (1976) distinguishes four classes of conditionals: simple conditionals;necessitation conditionals; even-if conditionals; and might-be conditionals. Of these,necessitation conditionals are those requiring some sort of connection between antecedentand consequent, and it is to this class of conditionals that the channel theoretic analysisseems best suited.15 Might-be conditionals require the use of a modality and I considerthem to be outside the scope of the current analysis.13One way to avoid the problem is to deny that (s 7! c : :umbrella!) holds. This would meanthat s 7! c was an exception in the channel supporting the nested conditional, which seems ratherunsatisfactory.14This was actually suggested by Jerry Seligman (personal communication) on discussion of the aboveproblem.15Pollock (1976) presents a problematic instance of Transitivity for necessitation conditionals thatmost conditional logics do not invalidate (e.g. all standard possible-worlds conditional logics validatethis pattern of inference). I will discuss this problem, and present a solution to it in the channel-theoreticframework, in Section B.3.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 76Simple ConditionalsSimple conditionals are those with no link between antecedent and consequent. Somesuch conditionals seem objectionable, such as those whose consequent is necessarilytrue. For example, standard analyses make the following conditional true in any modelsatisfying the laws of arithmetic:\If the moon is made of green cheese then 2 + 2 = 4."Some analyses make a conditional true at any world at which both the antecedent andconsequent are (contingently) true|for example, Lewis's (1973) logic of conditionalscontains the axiom (A ^ B)  (A!B) (where  is material implication and ! is theconditional connective). Recent analyses that use relevant logic as basis for a logic ofconditionals (e.g. (Mares and Fuhrmann 1993; Hunter 1980)) invalidate such condition-als, requiring a stronger connection between antecedent and consequent.Some simple conditionals, however, seem acceptable. For example, suppose I amasked whether Jerry was in Edinburgh at some particular time. I don't know for sure,but I do happen to know that he was in Edinburgh at the time of the last two elections.I may then answer the query with the statement:\If there was an election on at that time, then Jerry was in Edinburgh."The coincidence of an election and Jerry's being in Edinburgh is the sort of accidentalcorrelation that B&S are quite careful to rule out as the sort of relationship that underliesregularities, which in turn form the basis of channels (as discussed in Section 1.3.2).)16Hence, at rst blush, it would seem that the above conditional is not supported by anychannel that is acceptable to B&S , even though the conditional itself seems a reasonableone to assert. However, it seems that the use of the past tense in the above statement hasan important eect|it seems that we can claim there is a regularity between elections inthe UK and Jerry being in Edinburgh, but this regularity is limited in scope to those twooccasions in the past when this occurred. The channel associated with this regularitycontains tokens related to those past events, but not possible future events. This isreected by the fact that the following conditional does not seem acceptable (given noreason other than coincidence for Jerry to be Edinburgh at the time of an election):16Of course, the coincidence of these events may not be accidental; e.g. Jerry may make the journeyto Edinburgh to vote in elections. However, I assume for the sake of argument that the coincidence isjust that.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 77\If there is an election on at that time, then Jerry will be in Edinburgh."Even-If ConditionalsEven-if conditionals have been explicitly argued by some authors to be in no signicantway dierent to other conditionals (e.g. (Stalnaker 1987)). Other authors have taken theopposite viewpoint, completely excluding even-if conditionals from their analysis (e.g.(Hunter 1980)). Certainly, even-if conditionals seem dierent to other conditionals|e.g.consider the following:\Even if it rains, I won't get wet."I may be able to assert this condition in the knowledge that I have remembered my um-brella. It seems dubious to suggest that there may be a channel, containing a constraintbetween types raining and not.wet, supporting such a conditional. However, even-if'sseem to involve a dierent assertion to other conditionals, namely, an assertion that ausual regularity fails to hold. For example, given the channel C containing a constraintraining!wet, the above even-if conditional seems to assert that some situation s (i.e.the future situation in which I am caught in the rain) is not involved in connection inC|i.e. s is a pseudo-signal in C. This distinction seems an interesting one, but I willnot pursue it further here.3.2 Logics of ConditionalsThe traditional approach to logics of conditionals, due mainly to Stalnaker (e.g. (Stal-naker 1968)) and Lewis (e.g. (Lewis 1973)), involves a possible-worlds framework, in-corporating the concept of \nearest-worlds" selection functions. Barwise (1986) deneda rather dierent analysis, whereby a conditional statement involves an assertion re-garding the factuality of a situation-theoretic constraint. By making such constraintsconditional|i.e. by assigning a context, in the form of a type, to each such constraint|Barwise is able to avoid the patterns of reasoning that prove problematic to condition-als. Through the use of the operations on channels dened in Section 2.3.7, one wouldperhaps hope to be able to similarly dene an adequate channel-theoretic logic of condi-tionals. However, as shown in the following, this is not so without rst adding an extramechanism to the framework.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 783.2.1 Stalnaker/Lewis Conditional LogicsBy far the most popular approach to the semantics of conditionals involves the use ofpossible worlds and the concept of a \nearest" world. Stalnaker (1968) was the rst tomake use of this technique. In Stalnaker's analysis, the truth of a conditional A!B in aworld w depends on the world w0 minimally dierent from w, but making A true. Thisworld is given by a selection function f , where f(A;w) is the nearest world to w thatvalidates A. We then have A!B true in w i B is true in the world f(w;A).Not much is said about the selection function f|i.e. what constitutes \nearness"|and this function is allowed to vary across models (i.e. dierent models may havedierent selection functions associated with them). However, Stalnaker insists on anumber of conditions that any such selection function must satisfy:1. A is true in f(A;w);2. if A is true in w, then f(A;w) = w;3. if A is true in f(B;w) and B is true in f(A;w), then f(A;w) = f(B;w).These conditions ensure that certain axioms and patterns of inference hold in the re-sulting logic.17 Transitivity is not an axiom of this logic because the antecedents oftwo dierent conditionals may be mapped to dierent \nearest" worlds by a given se-lection function. For example, given conditionals A!B and B!C, we may well havef(A;w) = w0 and f(B;w) = w00, with B true in w0 and C true in w00, thereby makingeach conditional true in w. However, C is not required to be true in w0, i.e. in f(A;w),and so it is not necessarily the case that A!C is true in w. Similarly, Stalnaker's logicdoes not validate Strengthening of Antecedents or Contraposition.Several authors, notably David Lewis, have taken exception to Stalnaker's uniquenessassumption: i.e. the assumption that there is a unique \closest" world picked out(for each proposition/world pair) by a selection function. In particular, the followingcontroversial axiom of conditional excluded middle follows from this assumption:CEM : (A!B) _ (A!:B)For example, CEM leads to the following conclusion:\Either: if it is raining then the moon is made of green cheese, or: if it is raining17C.f. the way modal logics are determined by the imposition of certain conditions on the accessibilityrelation associated with the corresponding Kripkean semantics.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 79then the moon is not made of green cheese"Lewis (1973) rejects the uniqueness assumption, leading to his system of spheres model,whereby many worlds can be equally \similar" to a given world. I will not present Lewis'semantic model here. However, some of the patterns of inference of his resulting logicare further discussed in Section 3.6.18 193.2.2 Situation{Theoretic AnalysesBarwise (1986) proposed an analysis of conditionals based on the situation theoreticmodel of information-ow. Barwise's analysis can be seen as a precursor to the chan-nel theoretic analysis described above|for Barwise, a conditional statement is a claimregarding an information relationship which, for him, is represented by a situation the-oretic constraint.The main problem that Barwise's simple logic of conditionals needs to address ishow Transitivity can, in general, be made to fail. In Barwise's model, Transitivitycorresponds to the Xerox property, in that two constraints of the form ! and  !can be composed to obtain a constraint of the form ! . However, as in the channeltheoretic analysis, a conditional statement corresponds (in general) to a conditional(i.e. fallible) constraint, with which is associated a \background condition". Barwise(1986) represents conditional constraints by making the involves relation a three-placerelation, relating an antecedent type , a consequent type  and a type B capturing thebackground conditions under which the constraint holds. Such a constraint is writtenas follows: ! j B, meaning \the constraint ! holds in situations of type B".The Xerox Principle is restricted to be applicable only to a pair of constraints whosebackground conditions are identical:\If B is xed, then the resulting two place relation is transitive: if S1!S2 j B andS2!S3 j B then S1!S2 j B." (Barwise 1986, p. 122)18Note that Lewis' logic, like most other conditional logics with possible-worlds semantics, validatescertain axioms that I nd objectionable. In particular, any conditional sentence with a valid consequentor unsatisable antecedent is itself valid. This particular problem has been addressed by combiningpossible-worlds semantics with a Routley-Meyer (1973) semantics for relevant logics, e.g. as done byMares and Fuhrmann (1993). This issue is further discussed in Section 3.6.19There are other interesting semantic analyses of conditionals that are not based on possible-worldsat all, e.g. Adams' (1975) probabilistic account and Gardenfors' (1988) belief revision model of theRamsey test.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 80Barwise's criterion for the cases where Xerox can validly be applied has much incommon with the approach taken below, described in Section 3.4. The problem withBarwise's approach, however, is that background assumptions are represented by a singletype. This state of aairs, where the all background conditions of a constraint arecaptured in this way, is an unrealistic one (as has been discussed numerous times above).However, Barwise's information-ow analysis has several attractive properties which areinherited by the channel theoretic analysis.20Wobcke (1995) describes an approach to reasoning about conditionals that uses thetools of the Stalnaker-Lewis conditional logics but which he motivates using situationtheoretic concerns. Wobcke's approach is particularly relevant within the current settingbecause he uses a hierarchy of situations to capture background assumptions behindconditionals in a manner that has some similarities to the approach described below.Like Barwise, Wobcke considers the semantic content of a conditional sentence to be aconstraint. However, Wobcke attempts to give an account of constraints using causallinks in the form of abstract plan schemata, a notion borrowed the AI planning literature.Wobcke denes a situated version of a Stalnaker-Lewis conditional logic, which he callsSC. Each sentence in SC (conditional or otherwise) is of the form c : A, where A is a(standard) propositional sentence and c is interpreted as a situation, modelled as a setof worlds. Letting [:] be the interpretation function, a (situated) conditional sentencec : A!B is true (in an interpretation) if f([c]; A) supports B. This is basically the sameinterpretation of conditional sentences as given in Stalnaker's logic|in particularly,f picks out a unique closest world|except that selection is with respect to partialsituations rather than total worlds. Because of this partiality, SC invalidates some ofthe (from an informational point of view) dubious axioms of Stalnaker-Lewis logics, suchas CEM and MOD (the axiom A ^ B  A!B). However, SC does contain weaker(situated) versions of some of these axioms|for example, the following is a theorem ofSC : c : (A ^ B)  c : (A!B).An interesting aspect of Wobcke's logic is that he considers the collection of situationsassociated with any given model as arranged in a hierarchy. He denes how such ahierarchy can be constructed from a given plan schema, which (for the current purposes)can be thought of as an abstract causal rule relating the preconditions of an action-type20Some of these were discussed in Section 3.1.2.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 81to the intended eect of that action-type. For example,charged(battery) ^ :empty(fueltank)!started(car)(partially) describes a start-car action.21 Each plan schema is seen as a situation-type. A hierarchy of schemas is obtained from an initial collection by a constructiondened by Wobcke so as to correspond to conditions imposed on the selection functionf associated with the model-theoretic semantics of SC. For example, given a schema P ,a failure schema for P is inserted into the hierarchy as a subtype of P . Constructinga failure schema for P involves negating some precondition of P and also negating theeect of P . For example, one failure schema associated with the previous causal rule isthe following::charged(battery) ^ :empty(fueltank)!:started(car).The resulting channel hierarchy of situation types is used as the basis for deningthe situation accessibility function f of the model theory|f(s;A) is the most gen-eral subsituation of s that satises A. If s is the situation supporting the start-carschema above (and by Wobcke's denition s thereby supports each of charged(battery),:empty(fueltank) and started(car)), then f(s;:charged(battery)) = s0 and s0 supportsthe conditional represented as :charged(battery)!:started(car)|i.e. the conditional\If the battery hadn't been charged than the car wouldn't have started".Wobcke shows that SC invalidates the problematic rules of inference for conditionallogics (i.e. Transitivity, Monotonicity and Contraposition) and also claims some interest-ing properties for it (e.g. subjunctive and indicative conditionals are interpreted withinthe same framework). However, since (the situation theoretic view of) SC involves areductionist account of information-ow constraints (in terms of the situation-selectionfunction), there are several problematic side-eects|for example, the situated versionof Lewis' MOD is validated, as is any conditional whose consequent is necessarily true.Also, it is not clear how Wobcke intends to account for conditional sentences that donot discuss actions and their eects. It is of interest that Wobcke's analysis (partially)stemmed from an investigation into the nature of plans (Wobcke, personal communica-tion) and the construction of a general framework for relating conditionals and plans isone of the underlying themes of this thesis.21The relationship between conditionals and planning operators is of interest to the current thesis, asdiscussed in the Introduction. I outline a channel theoretic model for reasoning about actions and theireects in Section 5.4.3.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 823.2.3 Towards a Channel{Theoretic Logic of ConditionalsIn Section 2.3.7, I dened a number of operations on channels for constructing new chan-nels from existing ones. These operations were serial composition, parallel composition22and contraposition. These operations form the basis of a \logic" of channels|for ex-ample, Barwise (1993) shows how similar channel operations can be used to capture hisPrinciples of Information Flow and models various standard logical frameworks.Given the channel-theoretic semantics of conditionals of Section 3.1.1, my originalintention was to dene a logic of conditionals based on the channel operations of Section2.3.7. Consider again the doorbell example from Section 2.3.7 (see Figure 2.6). Fromthe facts that channel C1 supports the conditional\If the doorbell is ringing then the button is pushed."and C2 supports\If the button is pushed then there is someone at the door."one can infer that the channel resulting from serial composition supports the conditional\If the doorbell is ringing then there is someone at the door."This result seems perfectly reasonable|although the rule of Transitivity is not generallyvalid for conditionals, some uses of the rule seem to be unproblematic. However, considerthe following pair of conditionals, and the conclusion that is obtained by Transitivity.(E1) \If the Lib Dems get the most votes, then the Tories lose the election."(E2) \If the Tories lose the election, then Labour will win it."(E3) \If the Lib Dems get the most votes, then Labour will win the election."The above example is a classic one for demonstrating the invalidity of the rule ofTransitivity for conditionals. Intuitively, the problem with the rst two conditionalsabove is that they seem to be evaluated with respect to dierent background contexts:the rst is true in more or less any context,23 while the second seems to assume acontext in which it is taken that either the Tories or Labour will win.24 This second22Recall that there are actually two parallel composition operations, but I usually refer to them underthe one umbrella term.23Actually, this conditional is not necessarily true in Britain, where elections are not conducted undera system of proportional representation. However, I will gloss over such matters for my current purposes.24This is generally the case in national elections in Britain.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 83assumption actually conicts with the premise of the rst conditional|i.e. there is a\shift" in background conditions. Barwise (1986) resolves this problem by insisting thatthe background conditions (modelled as a type) for two constraints must be identical ifthe factuality of the constraint formed by composition is to follow from the factuality ofthe two given constraints. This \shift" in background conditions is a problem that thechannel theoretic framework must capture if the composition operations are to lead toa satisfactory logic of conditionals.The context of a regularity is provided by a channel C, in particular, by the con-nections of C and the tokens connected by those connections. The expectation is thatthe channel theoretic view of conditionals can be made to avoid problematic cases ofTransitivity via an appeal to this context. For instance, in the election example, wemay say that the channel C1 supporting the conditional (E1) above contains only con-nections between situations that somehow support the information that it is possiblefor the Lib Dems to win the election, whereas the channel C2 supporting (E2) containsonly connections between situations that somehow support the information that eitherLabour or the Tories will win it, i.e. that it is impossible for the Lib Dems to winthe election in such situations. It may therefore be reasoned that C1 and C2 providemutually conicting contexts, thereby leading to a channel that is meaningless, or onethat fails to support the transitive conditional in some other way.25However, even if the use of Transitivity in the election example can be circumventedin this manner, consider the following example:(C1) \If there is sugar and diesel-oil in the coee, then there is sugar in the coee."(C2) \If there is sugar in the coee, then it will taste good."(C3) \If there is sugar and diesel-oil in the coee, then it will taste good."The conditional (C1) expresses an analytical, or logical, relationship|it holds uncondi-tionally and does not depend on any particular context. As such, one expects there tobe a channel C supporting (C1) that is somehow universal|i.e. any connection betweenappropriate tokens is contained in C. For example, suppose the connections in C are be-tween cups of coee; then one would expect there to be a channel C that supports (C1)such that C contains the connection c 7! c for any cup of coee c. Now, suppose that25Restall (1994) has argued that problematic examples of Transitivity can be explained away in thisway.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 84some particular cup of coee c makes both (C1) and (C2) true counterfactuals: i.e. ccontains neither sugar nor diesel-oil, but if c did contain sugar, then it would taste good;and if c did contain both sugar and diesel-oil, then it would contain sugar. Hence, it iscertainly possible to envisage channels C and C0, supporting (C1) and (C2) respectively,such that c 7! c is contained in both tok(C) and tok(C0). But then the compositionchannel (C ; C0) will also contain the connection c 7! c, and this channel supports theconditional (C3), a clearly undesirable result.The problem here is that when the conditionals are counterfactuals, there is nothingabout the connections (of the corresponding channels) that rules out the most straight-forward composition of the conditionals. For example, a channel C0 supporting (C2)does not reect that coee cannot contain diesel-oil and yet taste good|it is simply thecase that any cup of coee covered by this channel does not contain diesel-oil. As such, achannel reects the background context of a conditional without explicitly representingit. While this is a desirable feature of channel theory, the upshot is that the channelC0 does not in any way represent the information that a cup of coee satisfying (C2)cannot contain diesel-oil, even though C0 is constrained to be such that any cup of coeec involved in a connection in tok(C0) is such that c happens to not contain diesel-oil.It seems that background information pertinent to (C2) must somehow be repre-sented more explicitly than is done so in the channel C0. In Barwise's (1986) model ofconditionals, this is done by attaching a type , which holds only of situations wherethe cup of coee in question does not contain diesel-oil (or any other foul-tasting sub-stance), to the constraint representing the (C2). However, this falls back onto the needto explicitly represent all the background conditions of a conditional. The solution pro-posed in the following section is to evaluate a logic of conditionals with respect to ahierarchy of channels, where two channels C1 and C2 are related in the hierarchy if C2is a \more explicit" version of C1. For example, C1 may support the conditional (C2)above, whereas C2 may support the conditional(C20) \If there is sugar and no diesel-oil in the coee, then it will taste good."The conditional (C2') can be seen as a renement of (C2), with some of the backgroundconditions (i.e. that the coee should not contain diesel-oil) moved into the antecedent.2626Barwise (1986) states that potential problems arise if one tries to handle background conditionsby moving them into the antecedent. In general, this may be so. Moving background conditions intothe antecedent of a conditional is just one way to make them explicit|there are other ways, which arediscussed below.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 85Alternatively, the channel C2 can be seen as a rened, or \more reliable", version of C1.The important point to notice is that the background conditions of the conditional (C2)are still not in any way explicitly represented in C1. This is critical if we are not tolose one of the most important properties of channel theory, namely, that there is noattempt to explicitly represent all the background assumptions of a regularity within thechannel that provides its contextual component. Instead, the background assumptionsare represented in a separate channel (i.e. C2) and via the relation in which the twochannels stand. The next section presents the formal concepts underlying this notion ofa hierarchy of channels.The above discussion has concentrated on the inference rule of Transitivity and thechannel operation of serial composition. I mentioned above that other standard rules ofinference are accepted to be invalid for conditionals, and the other channel operationsalso need to be modied. For example, the use of parallel meet composition allows thethird conditional below to be obtained from the rst two:\If the Lib Dems get the most votes, then the Tories lose."\If the Tories lose, then Labour wins."\If the Lib Dems get the most votes and the Tories lose, then the Tories lose andLabour wins."Similarly, the contraposition operation also requires modication.273.3 Background Assumptions via the SubChannel Rela-tionIn this section, I present the formal denition of the subchannel relation discussed above.Given a collection of channels and a subchannel relation holding over them, we obtaina channel hierarchy with respect to which a set of composition operations are dened,27Actually, I know of no convincing counterexample to Contraposition, although it is almost universallyaccepted to be invalid (Hunter (1980) is an exception). For example, all of Stalnaker's (1987) counter-examples involve even-if conditionals, which I have argued require a rather dierent analysis to standardconditionals. Stalnaker's alternative argument involves showing that, in the presence of Weakening ofthe Consequent (which is universally accepted as valid), Contraposition reduces to Monotonicity. Whileit would be an interesting exercise to investigate the consequences of validating Contraposition at theexpense of Weakening|in particular, this would result in a neater symmetry since then both parallelcompositions operations would require modication|I will not pursue the matter here.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 86leading to a conditional logic that invalidates the unwanted rules of inference.3.3.1 The SubChannel RelationThe intention is to dene a hierarchy of channels that are increasingly discriminatory.This requires the following denition of a relation between constraints|one constraint isseen as a renement, or \more discriminatory version", of another if the former has eithera stronger antecedent or a weaker consequent. For example, the constraint involved inthe content of the conditional \If there is sugar in the coee then it will taste good"is less discriminatory than that involved in the content of \If there is sugar and nodiesel-oil in the coee then it will taste good".Denition Let A0 and B0 be classications with orderings A0 and B0 on their type-sets, and let ; 0 be types taken from channels C : A) B and C0 : A0 ) B0, respectively.I write  A0;B0 0, wrt C and C0,28 if:1. A 6 A0; B 6 B0,2. anteC() A0 anteC0(0), and3. succC0(0) B0 succC().Note in this denition that the ordering over the succedent classication is used inthe opposite direction to the way the ordering is used over the antecedent classication.For simplicity, I will usually assume that antecedents are strengthened and consequentsweakened by the addition of a conjunct or disjunct, respectively. However, this is notrequired to be the case|strengthening and weakening can be performed with respectto any type-ordering relation A .I now dene what it means for one channel to be a subchannel of another. Intuitively,one channel is a subchannel of another if every constraint  in the former can be mappedto some constraint 0 in the latter, such that  is a subconstraint of 0. The conceptof subchannel is dened with respect to a collection F of functions which map betweencollections of channel-types. This serves to make the subchannel relation more primitivethan it otherwise would be. For example, given two channels C and C0 which satisfy therst four conditions of the denition, and for each  2 typ(C) some 0 2 typ(C0) such28 is sometimes said to be subconstraint of 0. I will usually drop the subscripts and the reference tothe specic channels.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 87that   0, one does not necessarily want C to be a subchannel of C0.29 The collectionF is assumed to contain appropriate identity functions and to be closed under functioncomposition.30Denition Given a collection CH of channels and collection F of functions from channel-types to channel-types, let C : A) B and C0 : A0 ) B0 be channels in CH and let f 2 Fbe a function from typ(C) to typ(C0). C is a A0;B0 {subchannel of C0 wrt f , writtenC vf;A0;B0 C0, if1. A 6 A0; B 6 B0;2. tok(C)  tok(C0);3. for all c 2 tok(C), sourceC(c) = sourceC0(c) and targetC(c) = targetC0(c);4. for all c 2 tok(C) and  2 typ(C), if (c : ) holds in C then (c : f()) holds in C0;5. for all  2 typ(C),  A0;B0 f() wrt C and C0.I write C vA0;B0 C0 if there exists an f 2 F such that C vf;A0;B0 C0.Aspects of the subchannel relation are displayed diagrammatically in Figure 3.1.I will sometimes write C <A0;B0 C0 for C vA0;B0 C0 and C 6= C0, where equality betweenchannels is taken to be the strongest form possible: i.e. C = C0 i class(C) = class(C0),left(C) = left(C0), and right(C) = right(C0). Also, if C is a subchannel of C0, thenC0 is said to be a superchannel of C. The subchannel ordering vA0;B0 is a preorder(assuming that the type-entailment relations A0 and B0 are preorders) but, unlikethe subclassication relation, not necessarily a partial order. As with all the otherdenitions, I will usually drop the subscripts A0; B0 when this causes no confusion.The concept of ordering propositions in a hierarchy has proved useful in a numberof applications in the AI literature. For example, Section 4.1.4 discusses how certainproblems with the standard AI default logics (in that they do not satisfy Specicity) canbe alleviated by imposing an eective ordering on default rules, requiring that a defaultrule higher up the hierarchy be satised in preference to one lower in the hierarchywhen a conict occurs. Gardenfors (1988) uses the concept of epistemic entrenchmentto resolve similar conicts in belief revision|if an epistemic state can be revised in two29For example, the conditions may hold by coincidence|C0 may not actually encode real backgroundassumptions of C. The same eect (in fact, a stronger one) could have been achieved by making thesubchannel relation primitive.30This is required to ensure that the subchannel relation is reexive and transitive.
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C vf C 0 sFigure 3.1: Subchannel Relationdierent ways so as to achieve the same end (i.e. give up belief of some proposition),then it is revised in such a way that less entrenched formulae are dropped from thatstate in preference to more entrenched ones. Ryan (1992) denes a general frameworkfor reasoning with ordered theories.Apart from being purely syntactic (whereas the channel theoretic framework is asemantic one), these other frameworks involving ordered formulae have an importantdierence to the subchannel ordering in that they allow arbitrary sentences to be re-lated by the ordering, whereas the subchannel ordering can only relate channels whoseconstraints are related with respect to \type-informedness". This reects an importantdierence: the AI uses of orderings are used to address specic problems (in particu-lar, the principle of Specicity in default reasoning) whereas the subchannel orderingis meant to reect an information-ordering, in that moving up the hierarchy involvesmoving to a more \informationally robust" channel. This view|that superchannels aremore robust versions of their subchannels|is behind the use of the subchannel order-ing in representing (implicitly) the background assumptions of fallible regularities (asdescribed below).
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 893.3.2 Modelling Background ConditionsThe above concept of subchannel is intended to capture the notion of implicit backgroundcondition in the following way. The background conditions of a constraint  2 typ(C)are made explicit in some constraint f(), for some f and C0 such that C vf C0. Thisis why I have sometimes talked of C0 being a \renement" of C|intuitively, C0 containsmore discriminatory versions of all the constraints contained in C.31I have discussed earlier that an important feature of channel theory is that thebackground conditions of a regularity are not explicitly represented. In a given channelhierarchy, this is still the case|the background conditions of a constraint in a channelC are not represented in C at all, but may be represented in some channel C0 of whichC is a subchannel. This is very dierent to representing the conditions within C itself.Firstly, when a regularity is used in inference, background conditions are left implicitand do not enter into the reasoning process since they are in no way explicated in thechannel in question.32 In particular, a constraint in a channel still counts as a regularityeven though there are more rened versions of it in other channels. Secondly, givena constraint  in a channel C, there need not be any channel that makes explicit allof the background conditions of . For example, dierent channels may rene  indierent ways (i.e. dierent background assumptions associated with the constraints ofC may be represented in dierent channels, with C being a subchannel of each of these).Further, two channels C1 and C2 with a common subchannel need not have a commonsuperchannel. Even if a channel hierarchy was required to form a lattice, then this couldstill involve innitely increasing chains, each channel in a chain involving the additionof some new condition that was left implicit in each of its subchannels.33Hence, a particular channel hierarchy eectively provides another parameter against31In an earlier version of this work, I considered the channel-types in C0 to be the same as those in C|i.e. if C v C0, then typ(C)  typ(C0). However, C and C0 could have dierent homomorphisms associatedwith them, allowing the same type to be mapped to dierent constraints. For example,  could bemapped to (blue:or:green!sky:coloured) by the homomorphisms of C, and to (blue!sky:coloured) bythe homomorphisms of C0. The important dierence to the way things are done in the main text is that,on this account, the two channels operate on the same type, eectively the same constraint, under twodierent views or perspectives. This way of viewing things has its attractions, and actually is technicallysimpler. However, it is dubious whether this ts with B&S 's highly relativistic view of classicationtheory. Hence, I have chosen to take the more general option whereby dierent channels involve dierenttypes/constraints. It would be rather straightforward to modify things to take the other view, with noloss of formal generality.32This issue becomes clearer in Chapter 5, where I outline a methodology for defeasible reasoning inchannel theory.33Of course, no such chain could even be envisaged, and there is no need to require it to be.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 90which certain results (e.g. a logic of conditionals) is relativised, in much the same wayas an Austinian proposition is relative to a classication. In the logic of conditionals,the channel hierarchy can be seen as relativising the properties of the logic|i.e. chang-ing the hierarchy, and thereby eectively encoding dierent background assumptions,modies the behaviour of the conditional logic.34 What proves to be important arethe properties that all hierarchies are constrained to respect, thereby ensuring that thechannel theoretic conditional logic displays certain behaviour, no matter the choice ofhierarchy (see Section 3.6). Formally, a channel hierarchy could be seen as a structurehCH;Fi, consisting of a collection CH of channels and a collection F of functions asrequired by the denition of subchannel. For the most part, I will simply assume thatsome channel hierarchy is given and that any claims are made relative to it.I have described the subchannel relation as capturing the notion of increasing dis-criminability, or \renement", of channels|given channels C and C0, where C v C0, C0 issomehow a better approximation to its regularities than is C. This is indeed the case ifthe absence of exceptions is used as a metric of how well a channel captures a regularity.Proposition 3.3.1 Let C : A) B and C0 : A0 ) B0 be channels, with C vf C0, andsuppose c 2 tok(C) and  2 typ(C):1. if c is an exception to f() in C0 then it must also be an exception to  in C;2. c is not necessarily an exception to f() in C0 if it is an exception to  in C.Proof1. If c is an exception to f(), then c : f() does not hold in C0|in which case, c : cannot hold in C either (by denition of subchannel)|and source(c) : ante(f())holds in A0|in which case source(c) : ante() must hold in A, since A is a restric-tion of A0 (by denition of subchannel). So c is an exception to .2. Even if c is an exception to , it may still be the case that source(c) : ante(f())does not hold in A0, in which case c is not an exception to f().2 Finally, I dened the concept of a logical channel in Section 2.3.8. Logical channelsare rather unique in their properties, and one of these is that they are assumed to be34If one so desires, a particular channel hierarchy can be viewed as being associated with a particularagent: the inferences licensed by the resulting conditional logic are then the assertible inferences giventhe agent's cognitive state.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 91universally valid|i.e. there are no hidden assumptions or context-dependent factorsassociated with a logical channel. This is reected by adding the following condition tothe earlier denition of logical channel:Axiom For any logical channel L, there is no channel C such that L vf C or C vf L,except for L itself.That is, logical channels are eectively not involved in the subchannel relation atall.35 This is not to say that logical channels are not contained in the structure cor-responding to a channel hierarchy. In fact, I will generally assume that any hierarchycontains any logical channel required.3.3.3 Some AssumptionsThe rest of this chapter, which deals with a logic of conditionals based on the channeltheoretic model, involves the following important simplications.36 The rst of these issignicant, the others simplify the presentation but are easily removed.The rst simplication involves an assumption that the signalling relation of anychannel C is reexive in that, for any connection c 2 tok(C), source(c) = target(c).This simplication has a number of consequences. Firstly, it means that most of thecomplex denitions in what follows involves only types and constraints, rather thantokens and connections as well. In particular, this means that a type-conict relation ispowerful enough for the purposes of the logic, rather than requiring a notion of conictingpropositions, allowing simplication to the revised denitions of the channel operations(Section 3.4). A global type-conict relation is dened below. As an exploitation of thissimplication, much of the presentation in the rest of the chapter focuses on constraints,rather than other properties of channels.37 The removal of this simplication is brieydiscussed in Appendix B.2.The other simplications mainly involve notation, and are made simply for ease ofpresentation and readability. This includes the usual conation between connectionsand channel-types and the corresponding pairs of tokens and types, respectively. More35An alternative would be to allow logical channels to be related only to other logical channels, withthe constraint-mapping function f always being the identity function when restricted to logical channels.36These simplications are propagated to later chapters.37In particular, all the illustrative gures of this and the following chapters only ever contain thetype-level of the relevant channels.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 92pertinent to the concept of a channel hierarchy is the way in which a superchannel C0of a given channel C will be formed usually by adding a type conjunctively to the an-tecedent of a constraint, or disjunctively to a consequent. As stressed earlier, the earlierdenitions are fully general, and this simplication is again made solely for ease of pre-sentation. Finally, the reader will nd that some of the denitions below bias towardsthe assumption that background conditions to a channel are contained only as conjunc-tions in the antecedents of constraints.38 However, this is not at all a problem sincevarious conditions imposed on channel hierarchies (such as the antecedent backgroundconstraint of Section 3.5.1) ensure that such assumptions are completely justied. Thispoint will become clearer below.A nal concept I need is that of global type-conict. This is so I can meaningfullytalk about conicting types when those types are taken from dierent classications.Given the simplifying assumption that signalling relations are reexive and that complexAustinian propositions involve complex types and a single token, type conict is a strongenough notion to capture the concept of conicting background assumptions.Denition Types  2 typ(A) and  2 typ(B) globally conict, written ? , if thereexists a classication C such that A v C, B v C and ? C .3.4 Channel Operations Relative to a Channel HierarchyIn Section 3.2.3, I argued that the channel operations as they stand lead to some un-desirable patterns of inference being supported by the resulting logic of conditionals,the problem being that the composition operation doesn't adequately account for theimplicit background conditions of a regularity. I dened above the concept of a channelhierarchy, within which a constraint's implicit background conditions are representedvia the way in which the pertinent channel is related (via the subchannel relation) toothers in the hierarchy. I now modify the channel operations so that background con-ditions, as given by a specic hierarchy, are taken into account, resulting in a systemthat provides a satisfactory logic of conditionals. Throughout, I assume a particularhierarchy of channels, even though I often leave this parameter unspecied.38For example, the denition of conditional serial composition in Section 3.4.1 checks only the an-tecedents of constraints for conicting types.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 933.4.1 Conditional Serial CompositionBarwise (1986) rules out serial composition of conditional constraints whenever thetwo constraints in question do not have the same background conditions (representedby a type). The denition of conditional serial composition below does more or lessthe same thing, but with background conditions encoded in a channel hierarchy inthe manner described in Section 3.3. The basic idea can be illustrated by the elec-tion example. Suppose C contains the constraint  = Tories:lose!Labour:wins. Theassumption behind this constraint, i.e. that the Lib Dems can't win, is representedin another channel C0, and there is a function f such that C vf C0, f() = 0 and0 = (Tories:lose ^ Lib:Dems:lose)!Labour:wins. This leads to the following mod-ication of serial composition. Note that I use the same symbol for conditional serialcomposition as I did for standard serial composition. It may be taken that any instanceof serial composition in the rest of the thesis is the one dened below, unless explicitlystated to be otherwise. I trust that this will cause no confusion.Denition Let C1 : A) B and C2 : B ) C be channels, with 1 2 typ(C1) and 2 2typ(C2). The conditional serial composition of C1 and C2, written (C1 ; C2), is identicalto the standard serial composition of C1 and C2 except that h1; 2i 2 typ(C1 ; C2) onlyif there do not exist C01; C02 such that1. C1 vf1 C01, C2 vf2 C02; and2. anteC01(f1(1)) ? anteC02(f2(2)).The conditions under which conditional serial composition contains a compositeconstraint is illustrated in Figure 3.2.By the denition, we need to eectively check all super-channels of the ones inquestion since no one of them is guaranteed to contain all background assumptionsto the relevant constraints (as discussed earlier). Note that whether or not a channelformed by composition contains the composition of two constraints is dependent on aparticular channel hierarchy|if the hierarchy does not happen to contain channels withthe conicting antecedents then the composition goes ahead.As an example of the use of this operation, consider again the doorbell example.Recall that there are channels C1 : B ) D and C2 : D ) P , with b 7! d 2 tok(C1),ringing!pressed 2 typ(C1), d 7! p 2 tok(C2), and pressed!someone:there 2 typ(C2).The channel (C1 ; C2) contains the type ringing!someone:there unless there are chan-









..................C 02 :  2!2C 01 : 1! 1... ... ... ...f1
(provided :(1? 2))
f2 C2 :  !C1 : ! (C1; C2) : !Figure 3.2: Conditions under which the composition channel contains ! .nels C01; C02 containing constraints whose antecedents conict. Since C1 and C2 areassociated with dierent types of information ow, this turns out not to be the case,and the expected composition is allowed.Now consider the election example. I have already discussed how the channel con-taining the constraint Tories:lose!Labour:wins is related to a channel containing theconstraint (Tories:lose ^ Lib:Dems:lose)!Labour:wins. Now, one would expect thatLib:Dems:win?Lib:Dems:lose, which prohibits the composition channel from contain-ing the constraint Lib:Dems:win!Labour:wins.So far, I have concentrated on the rule of Transitivity. I now turn briey to Strength-ening of Antecedents. The invalidity of this rule of inference can be demonstrated bythe following example:\If there is sugar in the coee, then it tastes good"\If there is sugar and diesel-oil in the coee, then it tastes good"Strengthening of Antecedents follows as a valid pattern of inference from the presence of alogical channel39 coupled with the rule of Transitivity. For example, the rst conditionalabove can be modelled by a channel C : C ) C containing tokens of the form c 7! c andthe constraint sugar!good. Given a logical channel LC : C ) C containing (amongst39A very simple logical channel will do|for example, one containing constraints of the form (^ )!.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 95others) the constraint (sugar ^ oil)!sugar, then the channel (LC ; C) supports theconstraint (sugar ^ oil)!good if the earlier composition operation is used.The problem with Strengthening of Antecedents is solved by the use of conditionalserial composition. Since the background conditions associated with a channel may con-ict with the antecedent of the conjunction-eliminating constraint of the logical channel,the undesired inference does not necessarily go through. For example, if channel C issuch that C vf C0, and f(sugar!good) = (sugar ^ no:oil)!good,40 then the condi-tional serial composition of LC and C does not contain the unwanted constraint. Thefailure of the conditional composition as demonstrated by this example is illustrated inFigure 3.3.
................................................................................... .............................................. C : sugar!goodL : sugar ^ oil!sugar ? f
C 0 : sugar ^ no:oil!good
Figure 3.3: Failure of composition for the coee example.
3.4.2 Conditional Parallel CompositionAs discussed earlier, the unqualied use of parallel meet composition can also lead tounsatisfactory inferences. This operation is modied in much the same manner as wasserial composition.Denition Let C1 : A) B and C2 : A) B be channels, with 1 2 typ(C1) and 2 2typ(C2). The conditional parallel meet composition of C1 and C2, written C14C2, isthe same as the usual parallel meet composition of C1 and C2 except that h ^ ; 1; 2i 2typ(C14C2) only if there do not exist C01; C02 such that1. C1 vf1 C01, C2 vf2 C02; and2. anteC01(f1(1)) ? anteC02(f2(2)).40I.e. the fact that a given cup of coee does not contain diesel-oil is a background assumption to theconstraint that if it contains sugar it tastes good.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 96This operation behaves in much the same way as conditional serial composition. Thedenition of parallel join remains unchanged, reecting the fact that Weakening of theConsequent is universally accepted as valid in conditional logics. As with conditionalserial composition, whenever I refer to \parallel meet", I mean \conditional parallelmeet". If I ever refer to \parallel composition", then I mean the the conditional parallelmeet operation coupled with the (standard) parallel join operation.3.4.3 Conditional ContrapositionThe modication of the contraposition operation is somewhat more complex than forserial and parallel composition. An initial problem is that, given a constraint that con-tains a conjunction in the antecedent, after contraposition this becomes a disjunctionin the consequent. This seems to conict with the earlier assumption that any con-straint's background conditions are represented in the antecedent of a constraint higherup the channel hierarchy. For example, suppose C supports some conditional and thatC0 supports a conditional with a stronger antecedent|i.e. C v C0 and C0 contains (some)background assumption of the conditional supported by C. On contraposing C to obtainC, one would expect the contraposition C0 of C0 to represent the background condi-tions of C. However, C0 will contain a weakened succedent, rather than a strengthenedantecedent, which conicts with the assumption that background assumptions are rep-resented in the antecedent of superchannels.The solution to the problem is to ensure that even when C0 represents background as-sumptions of C, these assumptions are also represented in the antecedent of a constraintin some other channel. This resolves the problem entirely. It does not matter that morethan one channel represents the implicit assumptions of C, one channel representing theassumptions in the antecedent and the other in the consequent of its constraints. Themodied channel operations simply require some superchannel to provide a conictingantecedent for the unwanted composition to be blocked. The formal condition requiredof the channel hierarchy so as to provide this solution is dened in Section 3.5|fornow, I simply continue to assume that any background assumption is represented in theantecedent of a constraint higher up the hierarchy.The following is the new denition of the contraposition operation, modied toaccount for assumptions represented in a channel hierarchy. This denition is morecomplex than the previous ones, and some concepts need to be spelt out somewhat|
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 97this is done below the denition.Denition Let C : A) B be a channel, with ! 2 typ(C). The conditional con-traposition of C, written C, is the same as the usual contraposition of C, except that: !: 2 C only if there does not exist C0 : A0 ) B0, where C vf C0, such that: ?  , where  is the least type in A0 such that ante(f(! )) A ( ^ ).The rst point I need to address is the concept of \least type". By \least", I simplymean least with respect to the type-ordering A0 . The constraint f(! ) is thatwhich ! is mapped to, so the antecedent of this constraint is the one containinga background assumption of ! . Since  is the least type that, when added to ,results in a type at least as strong as ante(f(! )), then  is eectively the back-ground assumption.41 (Note that, if I assumed that the only way to strengthen anantecedent was by adding a conjunct, then  would always be this conjunct.) Hence,the contraposition of the constraint ! is not contained in C when the antecedent ofthe contraposed constraint (i.e. the negation of the consequent of the initial constraint)conicts with any background assumptions of the initial constraint.Perhaps the best way to illustrate the Conditional Contraposition operation is by wayof an example. As discussed above, clear counterexamples to Contraposition are hard tond. However, consider Stalnaker's (1987) argument (demonstrating how Strengtheningfollows from Contraposition) applied to the usual coee example. From\If the coee has sugar in it, it tastes good"the following is obtained by Contraposition:\If the coee tastes bad, there is no sugar in it".This conditional is supported by some channel C1. Using parallel composition on a logicalchannel containing the constraint :oil!:oil, the channel C of Figure 3.4 is obtained.This channel supports the conditional\If the coee tastes bad or there is no oil in it, then either there is no sugar in itor there is no oil in it".If standard contraposition is applied to C, a channel supporting the following conditionalis obtained:41I should really say  is a background assumption, since other background assumptions will berepresented in various other channels in the hierarchy.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 98\If there is sugar and oil in the coee, then it tastes good and there is oil in it"which is clearly an unreasonable inference to draw from the conditional I rst startedwith. However, the channel obtained by conditional contraposition does not support thisconditional. This is due to the presence of the channel C0, of which C is a subchannel; C0contains the constraint :good ^ :oil!:sugar _ :oil|this constraint was obtained, viaparallel composition,42 from the standard background constraint :good ^:oil!:sugar.Assuming that (:(:sugar _ :oil))? (:oil), the extra condition in the denition ofconditional contraposition blocks the unwanted inference.
...................................................... ............ C : (:good _ :oil)!(:sugar _ :oil)f
C 0 : (:good ^ :oil)!(:sugar _ :oil)
Figure 3.4: Illustration of the Conditional Contraposition operation.As a nal important aside, the following result demonstrates that Contrapositionpreserves the hierarchy. The proof (of this and all other results of this chapter) iscontained in Appendix B.4.Proposition 3.4.1 Let C : A) B and C0 : A0 ) B0 be channels such that C vf 0 C0.Further suppose that ! 2 typ(C) and that f(! ) = 0! 0.1. If : !: 2 typ(C) then : 0!:0 2 typ(C0);2. C v C0.3.5 Constraining Channel HierarchiesIn the previous section, I dened new versions of the channel operations, having modiedthem so as to take account of implicit background assumptions of regularities. The logicthat results from these modied operations does not support all inferences analogous42I.e. using parallel join with an identity channel containing the constraint :oil!:oil.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 99to Transitivity, Strengthening of Antecedents, and Contraposition. However, there areno guarantees that this logic satises any of the well-accepted patterns of inference ofstandard conditional logics|since I have specied no conditions on a channel hierarchyother than its existence, any implicit condition could be coded into it. For example, achannel supporting the conditional\If there is sugar in the coee and it tastes bad, then it tastes good."could be inserted in a hierarchy. Such a channel would seem to be meaningless|thehierarchy corresponding to this case seems to be internally inconsistent. However, thereis nothing in the current framework that prevents this.In this section, I dene a number of conditions that all channel hierarchies are as-sumed to satisfy. One such condition removes the possibility of internal inconsistenciesof the type described above. Other conditions serve to strengthen the logic by ensuringthat certain patterns of inference are supported by any channel hierarchy. This is anal-ogous to the way standard conditional logics are determined by constraints imposed onthe corresponding nearest-world selection function (see Section 3.2.1). An interestingproperty of the following constraints is that they are conditions one may expect anychannel to satisfy, given the view of channels presented in Chapter 2 and the notion ofthe channel hierarchy, as is discussed below.3.5.1 Antecedent Background ConstraintSo far, I have assumed that the background assumptions of a regularity supported bya given channel C are represented in the antecedent of constraints of superchannels ofC. In some cases, it is more appropriate to weaken a conditional by adding a disjunctto its consequent rather than by adding a conjunct to its antecedent.43 The followingcondition ensures that any background assumption associated with a constraint in C isrepresented in the antecedent of a constraint in some super-channel of C.Denition Antecedent Background Constraint: Let C be a channel with ! 2 typ(C),and suppose that C vf 0 C0, where f 0(! ) = 0! 0 and  0 6=  . Let  be the least typesuch that ( _ )   0. Then there exists C00 such that C vf 00 C00 and f 00(! ) =(0 ^ :)! .4443This seems especially true when channel contraposition is available.44It is easily shown that this denition is well-dened, i.e. that !  f 00(! ).
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 100This denition requires some explanation. As in the denition of conditional con-traposition, the type  represents a background condition to the constraint ! . TheAntecedent Background Constraint simply asserts the existence of a channel C00 thatcontains a constraint that represents the background assumption  (as well as any otherbackground assumptions contained in 0) in its antecedent, with no background condi-tions contained in its consequent (this is ensured by the condition that the consequentof f 00(! ) is  itself).To illustrate with an example, consider the standard coee conditional, supportedby some channel C. Let C0 contain a constraint that contains a background assumptionin its consequent. This is illustrated by the left half of Figure 3.5. In this example,the type  is oil. The Antecedent Background Constraint requires the channel C00 to becontained in the channel hierarchy, represented by the right side of the gure. Note thatthe type oil has been negated and moved into the antecedent.
........................................................ ............ ................................................................................................................................................................................C : :good!:sugar
C 0 : :good!:sugar _ oilf 0 C 00 : :good ^ :oil!:sugarf 00
Figure 3.5: Illustration of the Antecedent Background Constraint.The Antecedent Background Constraint ensures that any background conditions ofa channel C are contained in the antecedent of a constraint in some superchannel of C,which allows the simplication of the denition of conditional composition (which onlychecks antecedents for conicting background conditions). The alternative is to removethe Antecedent Background Constraint and generalise the denition of the compositionoperations.3.5.2 Consequent Background ConstraintJust as the Antecedent Background Constraint ensures that any implicit backgroundassumption is represented in an antecedent of a constraint in some superchannel, the
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 101Consequent Background Constraint below ensures the symmetric condition|that anysuch assumption is contained in a consequent somewhere in the hierarchy. While theformer constraint is needed to ensure that my earlier assumption (i.e. that only an-tecedents in superchannels need to be checked in the new denitions of the channeloperations) is a valid one, it turns out that both Background Constraints are useful inother ways, as shown when I introduce the Parallel and Serial Subchannel Constraintsbelow.Denition Consequent Background Constraint: Let C be a channel with ! 2 typ(C),and suppose that C vf 0 C0, where f 0(! ) = 0! 0 and 0 6= . Let  be the least typesuch that 0  ( ^ ). Then there exists C00 such that C vf 00 C00 and f 00(! ) =!( 0 _ :).45Since the above denition is analogous to the one in Section 3.5.1, I will not explainit any further. Note that the presence of the two constraints together ensure a certainsymmetry in a channel hierarchy|any implicit assumption that is contained in a con-sequent in a superchannel is also contained in an antecedent in some superchannel, andvice versa.3.5.3 Parallel Subchannel ConstraintThe next two constraints concern the interaction between a given channel hierarchy andthe channel composition operations.46 These constraints prove to be important later,when I show that the channel theoretic conditional logic veries certain patterns ofinference. The rst constraint concerns the parallel composition operations.47Denition Let C1; C2; C01; C02 be channels, with C1 vf1 C01 and C2 vf2 C02. Furthersuppose 1 2 typ(C1); 2 2 typ(C2) and h ^ ; 1; 2i 2 typ(C1 k C2). Then we dene(f1 k f2) : typ(C1 k C2) ! typ(C01 k C02) to be the function that maps h ^ ; 1; 2i toh ^ ; f1(1); f2(2)i, and maps h _ ; 1; 2i to h _ ; f1(1); f2(2)i.4845It is easily shown that this denition is well-dened, i.e. that !  f 00(! ).46I have already shown, in Section 3.4.3, that conditional contraposition interacts smoothly with thechannel hierarchy.47Following a convention I mentioned earlier, I will use the symbol ` k ' to represent \parallelcomposition"|either of the specic parallel composition operations (i.e. meet or join) can be sub-stituted in such cases.48It should be noted that, for technical correctness, the denition requires a proof that the typeh ^ ; f1(1); f2(2)i is actually contained in channel (C01 k C02)|i.e. otherwise it could be that the con-ditional parallel meet does not contain this constraint because of some conicting background conditions.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 102Although this denition may seem rather obscure, its function is fairly straightfor-ward|the dened function maps a type formed by parallel composition of 1; 2 tothe parallel composition of f1(1); f2(2). The denition (conned to the conjunctiveparallel types) is illustrated in Figure 3.6.
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C1 : ! 
..................
C2 : !
(C 01 k C 02) : (0 ^ 0)!( 0 ^  0)
f1 (C1 k C2) : ( ^ )!( ^ ) f2(f1 k f2)C 01 : 0! 0 C 02 : 0! 0
Figure 3.6: Denition of mapping (f1 k f2).The following result shows that the function dened above ts nicely into a channelhierarchy that is closed under parallel composition.Proposition 3.5.1 Suppose all the conditions of the above denition hold. Then(C1 k C2) v(f1 k f2) (C01 k C02).This result is an important one. It basically shows that conditional parallel compo-sition \merges" the background conditions of the channels involved|any such assump-tions are contained in channels higher up the subchannel ordering, and the channelobtained by parallel composition of the higher channels is itself higher up the orderingthan the composition of the lower channels. Of course, not all channels that are higherin the ordering than the channel (C1 k C2) need themselves be formed from the compo-sition of other channels. However, since those that are formed by composition containall the background assumptions needed, I will impose the converse of the proposition asa constraint on the channel hierarchy. This proves useful later on.Denition Parallel Subchannel Constraint: If (C1 k C2) vf C, then there exist C01; C02,where C1 vf1 C01 and C2 vf2 C02, such that C = (C01 k C02) and f = (f1 k f2).This is proved in Appendix B.4.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 103The Parallel Subchannel Constraint ensures that any channel containing backgroundconditions relative to a channel C formed by parallel composition is itself formed byparallel composition from channels that contain background conditions pertinent to thecomponent channels of C.The Parallel Subchannel Constraint is illustrated in Figure 3.7.
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C 02C 01 Cthen (C1 k C2)(f1 k f2)C(C1 k C2)Figure 3.7: Parallel Subchannel Constraint.
3.5.4 Serial Subchannel ConstraintThe Serial Subchannel Constraint is a direct analogue to the Parallel Subchannel Con-straint, but requires more work. To see why, consider channels C1; C2, containing con-straints ! and  ! respectively. Suppose (some of) the background conditions ofthese constraints are made explicit in channels C01; C02 respectively. Following the as-sumption that such conditions are contained in antecedents, this requires the existenceof constraints 0! and  0! , where f(! ) = 0! and f( !) =  0! . Now,even though C1 and C2 can be serially composed, C01 and C02 cannot, since  and  0 are(presumably) distinct types. However, the Consequent Background Constraint ensuresthe presence of another channel C002 in the hierarchy, containing the constraint  ! 00,such that C2 vf 00 C002 and f( !) =  ! 00.I can now provide denitions and results exactly analogously to those of the previoussection.4949The results are almost exactly analogous|the consequent of the constraint of the left-hand channelhas to match the antecedent of the right-hand channel (this condition did not need to be checked forParallel Subchannel).
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 104Denition Let C1; C2; C01; C02 be channels, with C1 vf1 C01 and C2 vf2 C02. Further sup-pose ! 2 typ(C1);  ! 2 typ(C2), ! 2 typ(C1 k C2) and succ(f1(! )) =ante(f2( !)).50 We dene (f1 ; f2) : typ(C1 ; C2) ! typ(C01 ; C02) to be the functionthat maps ! to f1!f2 , where f1 = ante(f1(! )) and f2 = succ(f2( !)).Furthermore, the following result can be shown to hold.Proposition 3.5.2 Suppose all the conditions of the above denition hold. Then(C1 ; C2) v(f1 ; f2) (C01 ; C02).Finally, the Serial Subchannel Constraint asserts the converse of the property provedimmediately above.Denition Serial Subchannel Constraint: If (C1 ; C2) vf C, then there exist C01; C02,where C1 vf1 C01 and C2 vf2 C02, such that C = (C01 ; C02) and f = (f1 ; f2).This constraint is illustrated in Figure 3.8.
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C2 :  !.... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... .....C1 : ! f2(C1; C2) : !
C 01 : 0! (C
01; C 002) : 0! 00 C 002 :  ! 00(also C 02 :  0!)(f1 ; f2)f1
Figure 3.8: Example using background assumptions in consequent for serial composition.The constraints imposed on the channel hierarchy so far ensure the existence ofsucient channels that (i) validate the assumption that background conditions are rep-resented in antecedents, and (ii) smooth out the interaction between the channel op-erations and the channel hierarchy. The rest of the constraints are directed towards50As I noted, I need to check this last condition. Each of C1 and C2 may have several superchannels,and it is only those which satisfy this condition, allowing them to be serially composed, to which thisdenition is applicable.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 105ensuring that the channel hierarchy is \internally consistent", in a way that is discussedbelow. Even though these constraints are independently motivated for this reason, theyalso serve to ensure that certain desirable patterns of reasoning are supported by thechannel theoretic conditional logic.3.5.5 Reliability ConstraintThe implicit background assumptions of a regularity, supported by a channel C, are rep-resented in superchannels of C. These assumptions may be distributed throughout thechannel hierarchy|i.e. dierent assumptions are made explicit in dierent superchan-nels. However, no such assumptions should mutually conict. This criterion is capturedby the following constraint.Denition Reliability Constraint: Let C : A) B be a channel containing types ! and ! . Let C1; C2 be such that C vf1 C1 and C vf2 C2. Then it is not the case thatante(f1(! )) ? ante(f2(!)).The Reliability Constraint is illustrated in Figure 3.9.
............................................................ ............ ...........................................................................! !C :
C1 : 1! 1 C2 : 2! 2f1 f2 :(1?2)
Figure 3.9: Reliability Constraint.If a channel contains two constraints with the same antecedent, the Reliability Con-straint ensures that these constraints have mutually consistent background assumptions.If this were not the case, then the channel C would be inherently \unreliable", or \un-robust", that it would be guaranteed to contain exceptions|i.e. any connection thatsatised the antecedent  would necessarily be an exception to one constraint or theother.5151This is assuming that classications are coherent, as has been assumed throughout.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 106Proposition 3.5.3 Suppose in the previous denition thatante(f1(! )) ? ante(f2(!))and let (a 7! b) 2 tok(C) be such that (a : ) holds in A. Then a 7! b is an exception toat least one of the given constraints.Of course, two constraints with identical antecedents can still have conicting back-ground assumptions; however, the given constraints must then be contained in separatechannels. Consider the following example, suggested to me by Jerry Seligman (privatecommunication):\If there is sugar in the coee (and it is daytime) then it tastes good."\If there is sugar in the coee (and it is nighttime) then it tastes good."The parenthesised part of each conditional is meant to be taken as an implicit back-ground assumption. Both these conditionals (when implicit assumptions are ignored)are represented via a constraint of the form sugar!good. However, they are dierentregularities|one concerns the goodness of sweet coee during the day, while the otherconcerns the goodness of sweet coee at night. In particular, the two conditionals takentogether are not intended to somehow assert that sweet coee always tastes good. Ifwhether or not it is daytime or nighttime is an implicit condition behind the regularity,then there must be two separate regularities involved, even though they link the sametypes.The Reliability Constraint proves extremely useful below, ensuring certain desirablepatterns of inference. However, the proposition above, concerning the \unreliability"of channels that fail to satisfy this constraint, shows that Reliability is independentlymotivated and should be imposed on any channel hierarchy, regardless of the resultinginference pattern that arises. In fact, an even stronger version of Reliability can beasserted, as follows:Denition Reliability Constraint (Revised): Let C : A) B be a channel containingtypes 1! 1; :::; n! n, with, for each i; j, either i A j or j A i.52 Let C1; :::; Cnbe such that C vfi Ci for each i. Then all the ante(fi(i! i)) are mutually consistent.53It can be shown that violation of the revised Reliability constraint leads to a lack52I.e. each pair of the antecedents is comparable in the type-ordering associated with A.53I.e. Vni=1 ante(fi(i! i)) is a consistent type.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 107of robustness, just as with the simpler version.54 When I make use of the ReliabilityConstraint below, I will mean this revised, more powerful version.3.5.6 Consequent Consistency ConstraintThe nal constraint I dene here is another that relates to the internal consistency ofchannels within a hierarchy. This particular constraint is only meaningful within thecontext of the assumption that all signalling relations are \reexive"|i.e. the sourceand target of each connection are the same token.The Consequent Consistency Constraint is straightforward|it ensures that back-ground conditions associated with the antecedent of a constraint do not conict withthe consequent of that constraint.Denition Consequent Consistency Condition: Let C : A) A be a channel with! 2 typ(C). Then for any channel C0 such that C vf C0, it is not the case thatante(f(! )) ?  .Not surprisingly, any channel that failed to satisfy this constraint would fail to berobust in a similar manner to one that invalidates the Reliability Constraint.Proposition 3.5.4 Let C be a channel as described in the above denition, and ! 2typ(C) a constraint that fails the given condition. If a 7! a 2 tok(C) and (a : ) holds inA, then a 7! a is an exception to ! .3.5.7 SummaryIn this section, I have dened a number of conditions that all channel hierarchies arehenceforth assumed to satisfy: Antecedent Background Constraint; Consequent Background Constraint; Parallel Subchannel Constraint; Serial Subchannel Constraint;54Note that the previous Reliability condition is a special case of the revised condition|it correspondsto the case where n = 2 and 1 = 2.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 108 Reliability Constraint; Consequent Consistency Constraint.Of these, the rst two simply ensure that there are sucient channels in the hierar-chy so that any background assumption is represented in the antecedent (respectively,consequent) of a superchannel; the next two smooth out the interaction between thechannel hierarchy and the composition operations; while the nal two simply ensure theinternal coherence of individual channels within a hierarchy. In particular, there are noconstraints whose sole purpose is to provide specic patterns of inference. However, asis shown in Section 3.6, these few constraints on a hierarchy ensure many of the patternsof inference desired of conditional logics.55Note that the above constraints do not fully dene a channel hierarchy|there aremany hierarchies that will t the required constraints. This is part of the relativism of thechannel theoretic model|dierent hierarchies result in dierent logics of conditionals.However, any candidate hierarchy is assumed to satisfy these constraints, resulting in a\minimum" guaranteed behaviour.3.6 Patterns of InferenceThe notion of a channel hierarchy was introduced above as a mechanism for encodingimplicit background assumptions of a channel, allowing the channel operations to bere-dened in a way that invalidate patterns of inference such as Transitivity, Strength-ening of Antecedents, and Contraposition. However, many other axioms and patternsof inference seem valid for conditionals. The question that I turn to here is whethersuch patterns of inference are supported by the channel-theoretic model of conditionalspresented above.3.6.1 Hierarchy as a Parameter or VariableI briey mentioned above that a particular hierarchy of channels could be seen as anotherparameter in a relativistic model of conditionals|i.e. whether a conditional sentence is55Of course, further constraints could be added, or the ones above modied, to obtain other patternsof inference, if desired.




... ... ... ...C 02 : pushed ^ :ringing!occupiedC2 : pushed!occupiedC1 : ringing!pushed... ...Figure 3.10: Doorbell Example with Strange Background Condition.By the denition of the conditional serial composition operation, the compositionchannel (C1 ; C2) does not contain the constraint ringing!occupied since the antecedentof the constraint in C02 conicts with ringing. At rst, this seems problematic|theconnection between a ringing doorbell and a pushed button seems to be independent ofthe connection between a pushed button and an occupied porch and so the composition56This example was suggested to me by Peter Ruhrberg.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 110should be allowed in all cases. However, the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 3.10 doesexplicitly include such a dependency|the type :ringing is an implicit backgroundcondition to the constraint pushed!occupied. This means that (within the contextmodelled by the given hierarchy) this constraint is only reliable in channel C2 whenringing does not hold of the appropriate token.57 In this light, the behaviour of thechannel theoretic logic seems perfectly reasonable for this example.3.6.2 Axioms of Conditional LogicEver since Stalnaker rst proposed the controversial Conditional Excluded Middle (CEM)as an axiom of his conditional logic, there has been disagreement as to which axioms areacceptable for conditional logics. Lewis' objection to Stalnaker's Uniqueness Assump-tion (which leads to CEM) led him to develop his System of Spheres model theoreticsemantics. This semantics is sound and complete with respect to a logic that invalidatesCEM, but contains other axioms which I consider objectionable. Nute (1980, 1984)reviews several important systems of conditional logic and critically evaluates the ac-ceptability of the axioms of the various logics. The rules and axioms considered by Nuteare summarised in Table 3.6.2.58 In the table, the symbols are interpreted as follows: !is the conditional connective;  is material implication; , is logical equivalence (withrespect to material implication|i.e. A, B =def (A  B ^ B  A)).
57The appropriate token is the bell connected to the button by some connection in C1. This is, ofcourse, a little vague|a more rigorous formal treatment requires dropping the simplifying assumptionthat all channels are reexive.58I have omitted axioms and rules concerned with modalities. For simplicity, I have also omittedNute's rules of substitution.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 111RulesRCE if A  B then A!BRCEA if A, B then (C!A), (C!B)RCEC if A, B then (A!C), (B!C)RCK if (A1 ^ ::: ^ An)  B then ((C!A1) ^ ::: ^ (C!An))  (C!B)AxiomsA3 ((A!(B  C)) ^ (A!B))  (A!C)MP (A!B)  (A  B)RT ((A ^ B)!C)  ((A!B)  (A!C))CA ((A!B) ^ (C!B))  ((A _ C)!B)CC ((A!B) ^ (A!C))  (A!(B ^ C))CEM (A!B) _ (A!:B)CG ((A!B) ^ (A!:B)), (A!(B ^ :B))CM (A!(B ^ C))  ((A!B) ^ (A!C))CS (A ^ B)  (A!B)CSO ((A!B) ^ (B!A))  ((A!C), (B!C))CV ((A!B) ^ :(A!:C))  ((A ^ C)!B)ID A!AMOD (:A!A)  (B!A)S* (:(A ^ B)!C)  ((:A!C) ^ (:B!C))SDA ((A _ B)!C)  ((A!C) ^ (B!C))ST10 (A!B), (::A!B)Table 3.6.2: Axioms and Rules of Inference discussed by Nute.Nute critically examines arguments for and against the above rules and axioms.Some of these axioms are (at least historically) of greater interest than others. CEM isthe characteristic axiom of Stalnaker's logic, and follows from his uniqueness assumption(i.e. whereby each world has a unique \nearest" world). MOD, CS and CV all hold inLewis' logic (as well as Stalnaker's). Of these, MOD and CS are clearly unsuitable for alogic of necessitation conditionals (i.e. conditionals that require some sort of connectionbetween antecedent and consequent). While many authors accept CS as a valid axiomfor simple conditionals (i.e. those not requiring a connection), Nute presents argumentsfor rejecting CS altogether (e.g. (Nute 1980, p. 68)).
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 112The axiom CV is another axiom that seems attractive, encoding a weakened formof Monotonicity. This axiom seems particularly attractive from the viewpoint of usingconditional logic as a basis for default reasoning. However, Nute (following Pollock(1976)) also rejects this axiom (Nute 1980, p. 69). Similarly, the axiom RT encodesa weakened form of Transitivity.59 This axiom is accepted by Nute, and is one of theaxioms in the conditional logic that forms the basis of Delgrande's (1988) logic of defaultreasoning.60Of the rules of inference, Nute rejects RCEA, mainly on the grounds that any logicthat contains both RCEA and either of SDA or S* must also support Monotonicity.This commits Nute to a non-classical conditional logic.61 Nute devotes much eortto arguing the case for non-classical logics of conditionals, based mainly on evidencesupporting the acceptability of axioms SDA and S*. Since possible-worlds semantics thattreat propositions as sets of worlds cannot distinguish logically equivalent propositions,standard possible-worlds treatments of conditionals are classical.62 Nute nds all theother rules of inference in Table 3.6.2 acceptable.The conditional logics of Mares and Fuhrmann (1993) and of Hunter (1980) have incommon the property that they are based on relevant logics.63 I see their approachesas being related to the channel theoretic model in that they are concerned with infor-mational links between antecedent and consequent64 and do not support axioms suchas MOD and CS. Mares and Fuhrmann's logic ConR and Hunter's logic of indicativesare both (relevantly) classical, in the sense that they support the relevant versions ofthe rules RCEC and RCEA. This is, of course, a much weaker criterion than standardRCEC and RCEA and Nute's (1980) simple proof that RCEA and SDA together lead toMonotonicity is actually invalidated when the implication in RCEA is relevant implica-tion. While it is unclear whether RCEA and SDA can be simultaneously accommodatedin a logic of conditionals that does not support Monotonicity, Hunter presents a case forthe rejection of SDA altogether using an example of the following schematic form:59This is perhaps more easily seen if RT is written as: ((A!B) ^ ((A ^ B)!C))  (B!C).60Delgrande's (1988) logic also happens to contain CV.61Following Chellas (1975), Nute denes a conditional logic to be classical if it supports the rulesRCEA and RCEC.62Nute uses a non-standard denition of substitution to avoid this problem.63Mares and Fuhrmann present both a Hilbert-style axiomatisation and a Routley-Meyer semanticsfor their logic. Hunter provides only Hilbert-style axiomatisations, one for a logic of indicatives and onefor a logic of subjunctives (for simplicity, I will limit the following discussion to the former of these).64As noted earlier, logicians working on relevant logic claim it to be a logic of information.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 113((A _ :A)!A)  ((A!A) ^ (A!:A)).More controversially, Hunter also supports Contraposition, which thereby requires himto reject CM, since he notes that both CM and SDA are inter-derivable in the presenceof Contraposition. ConR, on the other hand, contains CM (and does not supportContraposition).I will return briey to the adequacy of specic patterns of inference for conditionalswhen I evaluate the channel-theoretic logic. For now, I simply note that the validity ofsuch patterns has been disputed in the philosophical literature over many years, withsignicant disagreements and changes of generally accepted rules and axioms. The briefsummary of this section, however, provides a basis under which the patterns of inferencesupported by the channel-theoretic conditional logic can be discussed.3.6.3 Comparing the Channel-Theoretic Logic to Standard ConditionalLogicsInterpreting Standard Axioms and RulesThe rst issue to address in the evaluation of the channel theoretic model of conditionallogic is how the rules and axioms of standard conditional logics should be interpretedin the channel theoretic framework. A rigorous treatment of such an interpretation isfar from straightforward because of the contextual aspect introduced by a channel|i.e. dierent conditionals may be supported by dierent channels, even though thoseconditionals can be composed in some straightforward manner. This is complicatedfurther since any resulting conditional will generally be supported by yet another dif-ferent channel, one which somehow merges the contexts of the channels supporting theoriginal conditionals.65 To simplify matters, I will make the following assumptions.66Firstly, continuing the assumption made earlier, the token-level connections of channelsare assumed to be reexive. Without this assumption, the following comparison betweenthe channel-theoretic and standard conditional logics would not be meaningful since theway a conditional was \situated" (i.e. related to token-level connections) would have tobe taken into account. This allows me to eectively continue to ignore the token-level65I.e. a channel formed by serial or parallel composition is usually dierent to both the channels fromwhich it is composed.66Appendix B discusses the relaxation of these assumptions.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 114connections of channels, circumventing possible problems related to the interpretationof negated conditionals. Secondly, I consider only \at" axiom schemata|i.e. nestedconditionals and nested use of the material implication are ignored because of the sim-plication made earlier (but see Appendix B.1). Finally, I consider only axioms whoseconsequent is a conditional (i.e. the prominent connective in the consequent is the condi-tional operator). This rules out axioms SDA and S* from consideration|these axiomsare discussed separately later.A major dierence between a possible-worlds view of conditionals and the channeltheoretic model is in the treatment of context. For example, in Stalnaker's nearest-world semantics, an axiom such as CC is true in a world w if the consequent of CC(i.e. A!(B ^ C)) is true in w or if the antecedent (i.e. (A!B) ^ (A!C)) is false inw. The truth of the conditional sentences embedded in the antecedent and consequentof CC is determined by the worlds accessible from w, but each of these conditionals iseectively evaluated in the \same" context, since they are all evaluated at the same worldw under the same \nearest-world" function. In the channel theoretic model, each of theembedded conditionals of the antecedent may well be supported by dierent channelsC1 and C2. These channels may incorporate conicting background assumptions|forexample, C1 may support A!B under the assumption that :C holds, while C2 supportsA!C under the assumption that C holds. The appropriate \merger" of these channels(i.e. the one arrived at by the parallel meet operation) should not, in such a case,support the conditional A!(B ^ C).Clearly, I need some concept of \ the same context" in the channel theoretic modelbefore I can meaningfully discuss which axioms from Table 3.6.2 are supported by thechannel theoretic logic of conditionals. One possibility is to precisely dene what itmeans for two channels to capture the \same", or at least \compatible", contexts. Thiscould be done by examining the channels above them in the pertinent channel hierarchy,but I will take the simpler option of assuming that two channels provide the samecontext only if they are the same channel. From this it follows that, for the channeltheoretic model to support an axiom Ax of conditional logic, I require that, for everychannel C such that C supports each embedded conditional in the antecedent of Ax,some \appropriate" channel (see below) supports the consequent.6767I can restrict myself to the case where C is required to support all conditionals in the antecedent ofAx since each such antecedent contains only conjunctions of conditionals.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 115The other question to be addressed regards the appropriate channel C0 that supportsthe consequent of an axiom. Since the operations forming the basis of the channeltheoretic logic of conditionals \merge" channels, C0 need not be the same channel asthat supporting the conditionals in the antecedent. I could assume that channels areclosed under application of the operations,68 the same way in which logical channelsare, but I will instead take the view that an appropriate channel for the consequent ofan axiom is one that is obtained by the use of the channel operations on C (the channelsupporting the conditionals in the antecedent of the axiom) and any logical channel L.69So, for example, the channel theoretic model supports the axiom CA from Table 3.6.2since, for any channel C supporting A!B and C!B, the parallel composition of C withitself (i.e. (C k C)) supports (A _ C)!B.The above discussion can be made more precise by the following denition of whatit means for a channel hierarchy to support an axiom of conditional logic.70 In the fol-lowing, it is assumed that there is some mapping  that takes sentences of some logicallanguage L, in which the axioms of Table 3.6.2 are stated, to (structured) types|in par-ticular, the logical symbols (conjunction, disjunction and negation) are modelled by thecorresponding type-operations.71 It is straightforward (though slightly messy) to denesuch a mapping. Also, due to the simplication made earlier whereby all connectionsare reexive, the token-level is ignored, thereby greatly simplifying the denition.Denition A channel C supports a sentence S, written C j= S, if the following holds:1. C j= A ^ B i C j= A and C j= B;2. C j= A _ B i C j= A or C j= B;3. C j= :A i it is not the case that C j= A;4. C j= A!B i A!B 2 typ(C).72Given a channel hierarchy H and a channel C in H, let a(C) (the channels \accessible"from C) be the collection of channels that are obtained from C by use of the conditional68That is, I could assume that (C ; C) = C and (C k C) = C.69I can allow indiscriminate use of logical channels to prove axioms since these channels eectively donot participate in the channel hierarchy|i.e. they have no associated restricted context.70Note that the following denition is not fully general but captures the notions discussed above. Inparticular, while it may seem strange to dene the notion of a channel supporting a sentence such as:A, this is unproblematic since, given the sentences under consideration, A is never anything other thana conditional.71E.g., (A ^ B) = A ^ B, where the second use of ^ is type-conjunction.72As always, I have used the same symbol for the conditional connective of L and the channel-theoreticconcept of indicating relation|hopefully this will cause no confusion.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 116composition operations to C and any logical channel L (as described earlier).73 A hier-archy H is said to validate a sentence S, written H j= S, if the following holds:1. H j= A!B i L j= A!B for some logical channel L in H;2. if A and B do not contain any conditional connectives, thenH j= A  B i A!B 2 typ(L) for some logical channel L;3. if A or B does contain a conditional connective, thenH j= A  B i for every channel C in H, if C j= A then C0 j= B for some C0 2 a(C);4. otherwise,H j= A i C j= A for every channel C in H.In the above denition, an axiom is supported in a hierarchy if either it is supportedby a logical channel (i.e., a channel that models analytic information-ow), or it issupported by every channel in the hierarchy. The axioms of greatest interest are thoseof the form A  B, where A and B contain conditionals, and these are handled inthe way discussed above|i.e. if C j= A, then for some channel C0 accessible from C(and L) via the channel operations, C0 j= B. Notice that axioms such as CM, SDAand S*, i.e., axioms with a conjunction of conditionals in the consequent, are not reallyadequately handled by this denition since they involve conjunctions of conditionals inthe consequent of the axiom. These axioms are discussed below.The interpretation of rules of inference is straightforward given the above concept ofa hierarchy validating a logical sentence|if the premise of the rule is validated by thehierarchy, then so too must be the conclusion.Denition A channel hierarchy H is said to validate a rule of inference if the followingholds:if H validates the premise of the rule, then H also validates the conclusion.EvaluationGiven the interpretation of axioms and rules of standard conditional logics in the channeltheoretic model, one can determine which of those contained in Table 3.6.2 are validated.Of course, exactly which patterns of inference are validated by a particular model is73a(C) could be dened as the smallest collection of channels containing C and L and closed under theconditional channel operations.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 117dependent on the associated channel hierarchy. However, some patterns hold regardlessof the channel hierarchy, and it is this sort of result I am interested in. All non-trivialproofs are relegated to Appendix B.5.Consider rst some of the interesting axioms. I have already pointed out that CA isvalidated regardless of the hierarchy involved. If C is a channel containing constraints! and ! , then the channel (C k C) must contain the constraint ( _ )! sincethe denition of parallel join is unmodied in the presence of a channel hierarchy. Otheraxioms are just as easily seen to be invalidated in the channel theoretic interpretation.For example, CEM, CS and MOD all make claims that are not supported in the highlyintensional channel theoretic model of conditionals. (This is in agreement with therelevant logic models of conditionals (Hunter 1980; Mares and Fuhrmann 1993).) Also,ID is supported by any logical channel.Less obvious is the fact that any channel hierarchy satisfying the conditions of Section3.5 validates the axiom CC. Given a channel C containing constraints ! and ! ,it can be shown, using the Reliability condition, that the channel (C k C) contains!( ^ ) (see Appendix B.5). Also, it can be shown that Nute's ST10 is supported(again, see Appendix B.5). One axiom from Table 3.6.2 that isn't validated by thechannel theoretic model is CV. This is a form of weakened Transitivity that is supportedin many possible-worlds treatments of conditionals. However, the fact that a channelC fails to contain a constraint of the form !: does not prevent the possibility ofsome channel C0, such that C v C0, containing a constraint of the form 0! , where0?  . Thus the serial composition of a logical channel L, containing ( ^ )!, and C,containing ! , need not contain the constraint ( ^ )! . As discussed above, thisis in agreement with Nute (1980) and Pollock (1976), who provide various reasons forrejecting CV. The channel theoretic model does, however, validate Delgrande's versionof RT, which is also a weakened form of Transitivity (see Appendix B.5). This time,Nute agrees with the validity of this axiom.So far, the patterns of inference validated by the channel theoretic model have beenvery closely aligned to those argued for by Nute. However, an important deviation isprovided by the axioms SDA and S*. Consider SDA. What is required for a channelhierarchy to validate such a pattern of inference is for every channel supporting a con-straint with a disjunction in the antecedent to be able to be \decomposed"|i.e. anysuch channel C would have to be the parallel composition (specically, the parallel join)
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 118of two other channels. Such a constraint could be imposed on channel hierarchies, inaddition to those dened in Section 3.5. This would result in a rather attractive symme-try to a hierarchy|not only could any pair of channels be composed to form a channelin the hierarchy, but any channel would be decomposable to two other channels in thehierarchy. However, Hunter (1980) has argued that the pattern of inference representedby SDA should not be considered valid. Another axiom that would require the conditionthat channels be decomposable is CM. This is rejected by Hunter, since it is derivablefrom SDA using Contraposition, but is supported by Mares and Fuhrmann (who do notsupport Contraposition). While I cannot provide an independent counter-example forCM, I will not pursue this issue any further here, but leave it as an interesting possibleway in which the channel theoretic model may be extended.I now turn to the rules of inference in Table 3.6.2. It turns out the channel theoreticmodel validates both RCEC and RCEA making it a (relevant!) classical conditionallogic. Of course, this is not a problem since SDA is not validated in general. However,even if it was, logical equivalence in relevant logic is weaker than in classical, and Nute'sargument for rejecting RCEA in the presence of SDA is nullied. The relevant versionsof RCE and RCK are also validated. All these results are shown in Appendix B.5.3.7 DiscussionA channel hierarchy provides a parameter against which the patterns of inference of aparticular channel theoretic model of conditionals may vary|i.e. changing the hierarchymay result in dierent patterns of inference. The previous section was concerned withpatterns of reasoning that hold with respect to any channel hierarchy satisfying theconstraints dened in Section 3.5, such as Reliability and Consequent Consistency. Otherconstraints could be imposed on hierarchies, thereby guaranteeing other patterns ofreasoning across all such hierarchies. One possibility was mentioned above, whereby CMseems to require any channel to be decomposable into constituent channels. However, thefairly simple, natural conditions74 of Section 3.5 already ensure quite powerful patternsof reasoning for conditionals.The channel hierarchy framework introduced in this chapter is also exploited in each74By \natural", I mean that the conditions do not require more than should be required of any channelin general.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Conditional Logics 119of the following chapters. The importance of the framework is that it allows backgroundassumptions of a regularity to be made explicit enough so that they can be accounted forin a calculus of channels|as demonstrated in this chapter|while still allowing a channelto be used in inference independently of any hierarchy in which it is to be found. Thisis an important property if the framework is to provide an adequate model of situatedreasoning. This topic is further discussed in Chapter 5.A number of simplications were made in this Chapter, some of which are carriedover into later chapters. Ways in which some of these simplications can be removedare discussed in Appendix B, as are some possible extensions to the basic frameworkdescribed here. Chapter 6 also discusses improvements and possible modications to thechannel hierarchy framework and the general approach to obtaining a channel theoreticlogic of conditionals.
Chapter 4
A Channel Theoretic Model forReasoning with Generics
In the previous chapter, channel theory was used to provide an analysis of conditionalstatements. A conditional sentence was taken to be an assertion that a certain channelsupported some specied conditional information. In this chapter, I use channel theoryas the basis of an analysis of generic statements. Once again, my main concern is withproviding an adequate logic for reasoning with generics, but a channel theoretic view ofgenerics seems to provide some denite benets.Recent work in the AI and philosophical literature has been concerned with therelationship between logics of conditionals and logics of generics and default reasoning(e.g. (Boutilier 1992; Delgrande 1988; Morreau 1992a)). Similarly to conditionals,generics seem to fail to validate standard patterns of reasoning, such as Transitivity,Monotonicity and Contraposition.1 However, the move from conditional logic to defaultlogic is never as smooth as initial similarities suggest it may be, leading to what Morreau(1992a) refers to as \ghosts in the machine"|ad hoc additions to the machinery of theconditional logic that address some specic problem that arises in the resulting defaultlogic.2 The logic dened in Section 4.3 builds directly on the channel theoretic logic of1As is the case with conditional logics, salient counterexamples to Contraposition are hard to comeby. However, Kraus et al. (1990) have shown that for a certain class of non-monotonic consequencerelations, the inclusion of Contraposition leads to Monotonicity. Kraus et al.'s results are discussed inSection 5.3.1.2E.g. Delgrande's (1988) solution to the Irrelevance problem; prioritising predicates for circumscrip-tion (Lifschitz 1985). These are discussed below. 120
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 121conditionals of the previous chapter. It requires the addition of no extra machinery tothe logic itself. Instead, reasoning with generics is seen to require specic assumptions onthe associated channel hierarchy: namely, that any background conditions encapsulatedwithin it must be present in the given generics from which the inferences are drawn. Thisis a signicant shift from modifying the logic of reasoning itself, and seems to succinctlycapture an important dierence between acceptable logics of conditionals and logics ofgenerics.Before dening the logic of generics and default rules, I briey present a simplechannel theoretic analysis of generics. The major concern of a formal semantics ofgenerics is the possibility of exceptions and the problem of how to cater for them. Asdiscussed in previous chapters, this concern is one of the central features of channeltheory. A channel theoretic analysis of generics seems to oer several other benets|these are discussed through the use of several examples that have received some attentionin the literature. However, my main concern is to provide a logic of generics, based onthe framework for reasoning with conditionals developed in the previous chapter. Thislogic will be seen to satisfy many important properties; in particular, many desirablepatterns of reasoning are validated, such as those specied by Asher and Morreau (1991).4.1 The Semantics of GenericsThe analysis proposed below is based on the assertion that a generic sentence describesa regularity of some sort. This in itself is a fairly uncontroversial position to take|forexample, Krifka et al. (1995) (hereafter, referred to as TGB) assert that \a genericsentence states a law-like regularity". A more important facet of a channel theoreticanalysis is the use of a channel to provide a demonstrative content to a generic sentence,thereby providing a \context" within which the regularity can be relied upon. This seemsto address several issues that are problematic for other semantic accounts of generics.3The issue of greatest concern in the literature on the semantics of generics hasbeen the analysis of regularities themselves|i.e. what is it about the regularity un-derlying a generic sentence that makes it a regularity (in the face of possible counter-examples)? As discussed in Chapter 2, channel theory makes no reductionist claims3Some of the work described in this section was performed in conjunction with Sheila Glasbey andis reported in (Cavedon and Glasbey 1994).
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 122regarding regularities|i.e. the theory in no way provides an analysis as to when arelationship between types constitutes a regularity|but instead attempts to explainvarious problematic properties of regularities by providing a structural analysis of them.As such, the analysis of generics proposed below is not concerned with the question ofhow the regularity underlying a generic arises, but on showing that the channel theoreticview of a regularity addresses issues that have proved problematic for previous attemptsat a semantics of generics. Again, however, my main concern is with providing a channeltheoretic logic of generics rather than an explicit semantics at this point.4.1.1 Characterising Sentences and Kind-Referring NPsKrifka (1987) distinguishes two main families of generic sentences, which he calls I-generics and D-generics. In TGB , this same distinction is between characterising sen-tences and kind-referring NPs, respectively. The former sort of generic is one thatasserts a general property about individuals of a particular type,4 while the latter as-serts a property of a kind.5 As is generally the case with accounts of generics that areconcerned with providing a logic for reasoning with them, I will be solely concernedwith I-generics, or characterising sentences. Throughout, the use of the term \generic"is used to mean this particular sort, unless explicitly stated otherwise (in which case Iwill tend to use TGB 's terminology).Characterising sentences do not seem to be syntactically marked (at least, not inEnglish) in any particularly distinguishing way|there are many dierent syntactic formsin which a characterising sentence may appear. This includes the if ... then ... formassociated with conditional sentences|these generics are the sort that Barwise (1986)calls general conditionals. As such, I point out once again that the distinction I makein this thesis between \conditional sentences" and \generic sentences" is not based onany syntactic dierence. The analysis of this chapter is meant to cover sentences that\generalise" (as generics do) over individuals and situations, while the analysis of theprevious chapter is not intended to cover such sentences. However, the two sorts ofsentences|and the patterns of inference that seem valid for each|are closely related,which is a motivating factor behind the enterprise of modelling reasoning with genericsusing the same framework as that for modelling reasoning with conditionals. TGB4E.g. \Birds y".5E.g. \Dinosaurs are extinct".
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 123describes various diagnostic tests that may be applied to sentences so as to determinewhether a sentence is a generic or not.One particular sort of generic sentence that is perhaps worth distinguishing is theclass of habituals. This class includes sentences such as the following:\John smokes."\Mary smokes after dinner."TGB denes a habitual sentence to be a generic that quanties over situations (usingthe term informally). Since situations simply constitute another sort of individual, thispresents no special problem for the channel theoretic treatment and I will simply considerthe habituals to be a subclass of the characterising sentences in general. In particular,I will not distinguish them again and will often use a habitual as a supporting examplefor the general approach.4.1.2 Some Issues in the Semantics of GenericsThe semantics of generic sentences has proved to be a demon in the linguistic, philosoph-ical and AI literature for many years. The following issues are central problems in thesemantics of generics and are specically addressed by the channel theoretic analysis.ExceptionsThere are many important problematic issues that need to be addressed by a semanticsof generic sentences. The most obvious of these is the need to account for the possibilityof exceptions to the general rule. For example, the sentence\Birds y."is clearly acceptable as a generic, even though there are many non-ying birds|wholesubclasses of them in fact (such as penguins). While generics seem to involve some sortof quantication over individuals, this cannot be standard universal quantication. Infact, examples such as the following suggest that there is no simple quantier (such asmost) that is appropriate:\Turtles live a long life."
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 124This generic seems acceptable even though many (in fact, nearly all) turtles are eatenby predators while very young. Morreau (1992a) claims that the following generic wouldbe true\Potatoes contain vitamin C."even if all the potatoes in the world were boiled for so long that none of them actuallycontained any vitamin C at all.Various proposals for handling exceptions to general rules have appeared in boththe philosophical and AI literature. In particular, there is a large body of work onnonmonotonic or default reasoning which is relevant to the semantics of generics. Aparticular approach to default reasoning which has recently gained popularity is the useof modal logics of normality (the theses of Boutilier (1992) and Morreau (1992a) arenotable works in this area). Such logics involve quantication over \normal" individ-uals rather than all individuals, and thereby allow a sentence to be validated withoutrequiring all (or, in fact, any) relevant individuals to satisfy the property claimed forthem by the generic. One particularly interesting feature of these logics is that theyhave their basis in conditional logic, which is in common with the channel theoreticmodel presented below. As noted earlier, conditionals and generics seem to have manyproperties in common, especially if we focus on valid patterns of inference. It is there-fore to be hoped that a logic for reasoning with generics could be extracted from a logicfor conditionals. Boutilier's and Morreau's modal logics of normality are discussed insome detail in Section 4.1.4. The approach whereby generics are seen as quantifyingover \normal" individuals is often referred to as the normative approach. I will use thisterminology in the following.The Intensionality of GenericsThe discussion of exceptions contained examples that demonstrate that the truth of ageneric is at best weakly related to properties of the individuals with which it is con-cerned. In the channel theoretic treatment of regularities, a regularity is itself a primitivetype and the question of whether or not it is supported in a channel is independent ofthe behaviour of token-level connections related to it. Accounts of generics that in-volve quantifying over individuals can run into what Morreau (1992a) calls the problemof extensionality. For example, consider the following sentence (taken from (Morreau1992a)):
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 125\Elderly members of the club drink for free."If the club in question does not have any elderly members, then this should not constitutea sucient condition to validate this generic|there needs to be some sort of policywhereby the club's committee has decreed that any elderly members of the club will notbe charged for their drinks. However, an account of generics that simply quanties oversome (possibly restricted) set of individuals would validate a generic such as the oneabove if that set of individuals was empty. In particular, Morreau (1992a) points outthat accounts of generics based on circumscription (McCarthy 1980; McCarthy 1986)suer from this problem.A potential problem with taking the ne-grained approach whereby regularities areprimitive objects concerns inferencing with such objects. An adequate logic of defaultreasoning must allow (default) conclusions to be drawn about individuals. For example,if I know that birds y and am told that Tweety is a bird, then (in the absence of anyinformation to the contrary) I should be able to infer that Tweety can y.6 In accountsof generics based on some sort of quantication (such as circumscription), the propertiesof (normal) individuals are a direct consequence of the truth of the pertinent generic,and vice versa. For more intensional accounts, however, an extra assumption is required,which Morreau (1992a) calls maximal normality|i.e. an assumption that an individualis in some sense \normal" needs to be made before any information regarding thatindividual can be inferred via the generic in question. In the channel theoretic model,this sort of assumption characterises the move from a logic of generics to a logic ofdefault reasoning|i.e. there is no need for an assumption of normality to obtain a logicfor reasoning with generics, but such an assumption is required in Chapter 5 when Iextend the logic of generics to a system that is able to use generics to draw defaultconclusions about individuals.The Role of ContextThe fact that a generic can be seen as a statement as to what is \normally" the casecan be taken as a restriction to a particular context (i.e. restricting quantication to\normal" individuals). However, other contextual factors also seem to play a role inthe evaluation of generics, and these are not explained away so easily by the normative6Of course, I may have to withdraw this conclusion if I am later told that Tweety is a penguin.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 126account of generics. Consider the following example:\Chickens lay eggs."Of course, not all normal chickens lay eggs, only female ones|in fact, only female onesof a certain age. Accounts of generics that involve quantifying over normal individualsgenerally ascribe this problem to the issue of pragmatics|for example, Morreau (1992a)claims that this issue should be resolved when deriving the correct logical form of theabove sentence. However, another approach is to view the associated generic as onlybeing pertinent to a restricted collection of individuals, in this case, female chickens ofa certain age. The channel theoretic analysis described below allows this sort of view.It also seems that dierent, even conicting, generics can be acceptable in dierentcontexts. For example, consider the following:\Swans are white."In various parts of the world, this is an acceptable statement. However, in other parts,notably Australia, the following statement seems acceptable:7\Swans are black."In the modal logics of normality described in Section 4.1.4, this can be handled by thefact that the ranking of worlds (with respect to normality) is not an objective matterbut is dened with respect to a world. As such, with respect to world w, normal swansmay be white, whereas with respect to w0, normal swans are black. Proponents of thisview (such as Morreau (1992a) and Boutilier (1992)) take pains to point out that thereis no global sense of \normality": dierent agents (in dierent worlds) can have dierentviews as to what is \more normal".However, conicting sentences can sometimes be asserted in the same context. Forexample, Cavedon and Glasbey (1994) note that a sentence such as the following:\Mary smokes after dinner."(with the appropriate reading being the one that allows the inference that it is afterdinner from the information that Mary is smoking) can be followed by\She smokes before breakfast, too."7Certainly, (a suitable translation of) this statement seems acceptable to the people who lived inAustralia before the arrival of Europeans.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 127(with the appropriate reading being the one analogous to that for the previous sentence)without any apparent contradiction. In the standard normative account of generics,the normal Mary-smoking situations cannot be both before breakfast and after dinner.The fact that a single agent could consistently assert (simultaneously) both the abovehabituals suggests that the habitual itself has a context associated with it, and that thiscontext plays a role in its interpretation. In fact, we would expect that a \merging" ofthese contexts would support a sentence such as:\Mary smokes before breakfast and after dinner."(This is to be interpreted roughly as: \If Mary is smoking, then it is either before break-fast or after dinner".) The channel theoretic analysis of generics presented below ascribesa demonstrative content to a generic statement, providing a coherent interpretation ofthe above pair of habituals.Generics and TruthThere are two popular views of generics: a generic asserts a proposition that can be either true or false; a generic acts as a rule of (default) inference.In the literature dealing with the formal semantics of generics and default rules, the rstview is taken by proponents of circumscription (McCarthy 1980; McCarthy 1986) andmodal logics of normality (Boutilier 1992; Morreau 1992a), while the second is taken byproponents of Default Logic (Reiter 1980) and Update Semantics (Veltman 1993).A problem with the second view|generics as inference rules|is that it becomesdicult to meaningfully express the generics themselves in the logical language. Inparticular, none of the analyses based on that approach allows the representation ofnested generics (i.e. whereby a generic is embedded within the premise or conclusion ofsome other generic). However, as argued by Morreau (1992a), there seem to be sentenceswhich are naturally interpreted as nested generics; for example:8\Current medical theories predict that smoking leads to cancer."8This example was suggested to me by Carl Vogel.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 128This shortcoming|the inability to represent nested generics|seems to be a serious awfor the inference-rule interpretation of generics. Morreau (1992b) discusses the dividebetween the two viewpoints further, in particular showing that the valid patterns ofreasoning supported under the two dierent approaches cannot be reconciled.9Assuming that generics have truth values, the question arises as to what it is thatmakes a generic true. The simplest approach is to take the view that a generic is simplytrue or simply false|i.e. true or false \not in virtue of the properties of the individualsof those kinds, but somehow true [or false] all by themselves" (Morreau 1992a, pg. 49).Morreau's problem with this approach is that it does not seem to lead to a method forinferring default properties about individuals|e.g. if \Birds y" is simply true, thenit does not seem possible to use this to (defeasibly) infer that a given bird ies. Forexample, the channel theoretic logic of generics requires the denition of a \maximalnormality" condition in Chapter 5 before it can be used for default reasoning (aboutindividuals).10Patterns of ReasoningAs mentioned above, some classically-valid rules of inference|such as Transitivity,Monotonicity and Contraposition|are well-accepted to be invalid for generics and default-rules. In fact, there is a fairly close correlation between the rules that are invalidatedfor conditional logics and those that are invalidated for logics of generics and defaults,resulting in recent attempts to dene logics of default reasoning with a conditional logicbasis. An acceptable logic for reasoning with generics must invalidate these undesirablepatterns of inference.The complementary issue concerns patterns of inference that do seem valid for gener-ics. A sample list is presented by Asher and Morreau (1991). More generally, Morreau(1992a) discusses various properties that a logic of generics should satisfy. These, alongwith the relevant patterns of reasoning required by Asher and Morreau,11 are sum-9Koons (1993) shows that Morreau's results in this regard do not hold in the absence of Substitutionof Logical Equivalents, the rule whereby logically equivalent sentences can be substituted for each otherwithout aecting the truth of the embedding sentence.10One could take the view that a clean separation between the truth of generics and their use indefault reasoning is not a bad thing, however.11Note that some of Asher and Morreau's patterns of reasoning are relevant to a logic of defaultreasoning, i.e. for reasoning about the (default) properties of individuals. While this is related to a logicfor reasoning with generics, it requires the added mechanism of an assumption of maximal normality,
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 129marised in the following. Addition of Generics: This is exemplied by the following example, taken fromMorreau (1992a):\Lions are brown."\Lions are dangerous."\Lions are brown and dangerous."Morreau claims that this particular pattern of inference is not handled well bycircumscription. Graded Normality: Carlson (1977) claims that normality should come \in degrees"|an individual being \abnormal" in one respect should not necessarily lead to thatindividual being considered abnormal in other respects. For example, given thetwo sentences in the premise of the above example, if leo is an albino lion (i.e.Leo is an abnormal lion with respect to the rst generic), then Leo should stillbe considered potentially dangerous! Carlson expected Graded Normality to poseproblems for normative accounts of generics, as is the case for Morreau's logic ofgenerics (discussed below). Specicity: Also termed the Penguin Principle by Morreau, Specicity gainedpopularity in the AI literature regarding default inheritance networks (e.g. (Hortyet al. 1990; Touretzky 1986; Touretzky et al. 1987)). It involves the claimthat an inference involving two transitive generics can be overruled by a (morespecic) generic that contradicts the transitive conclusion. This is exemplied bythe following example:12\Penguins are birds."\Birds y."\Penguins don't y."Using Transitivity would allow the inference that \Penguins y". However, thespecic assertion of the third generic seems to prohibit such a conclusion.Specicity has proved problematic for all the major classical systems of defaultreasoning from the AI literature (e.g. Default Logic (Reiter 1980), Circumscriptionwhich is dened in the following chapter. At this point, the only patterns of inference that I considerare those that are concerned solely with the generics, or default rules, themselves.12This example demonstrates the invalidity of Transitivity for generics.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 130(McCarthy 1980) and Autoepistemic logic (Moore 1985)), leading to extensions ofthese frameworks whereby default rules are eectively ordered with respect to theirapplicability, simply in order to resolve the problem of specicity (e.g. hierarchicaldefault logic (Touretzky 1984), prioritised circumscription (Lifschitz 1985) andhierarchical autoepistemic logic (Konolige 1989)).13 As such, specicity presentsan important testbed on which to evaluate an adequate logic of generics. Irrelevant conditions: The problem of \irrelevant conditions" is a particularlythorny one for default logics derived from a conditional logic base. Standardconditional logics are extremely weak with respect to Monotonicity, invalidatingsuch inferences as the following:\Birds y."\Red birds y."In the absence of any link between a bird's colour and its ability to y, a logicfor defaults should be able to infer the second generic from the rst. Delgrande(1988) and Boutilier (1992) each need to add extra mechanisms to their logicsof conditionals before obtaining a logic of defaults that does not suer from thisproblem. Morreau (1992a) sees this as a serious shortcoming of their logics. Other patterns of reasoning: The following patterns of reasoning are taken fromAsher and Morreau (1991). They are those that are solely concerned with inferenceinvolving generic rules, rather than those involving the properties of individuals.(The symbol `!' denotes the generic operator; the symbol `j;' denotes defaultconsequence).Defeasible Transitivity: A!B;B!C j; A!C, but A!B;B!C;A!:C 6j; A!CDefeasible Monotonicity: A!B j; (A ^ C)!B, but A!B; (A ^ C)!:B 6j; (A ^ C)!B13These modications exemplify those attacked by Morreau (1992a) as being \ghosts in the machine".
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 131Graded Normality and Defeasible Transitivity: A!B;B!C;B!D;A!:D j; A!C, but A!B;B!C;B!D;A!:D 6j; A!DThese and other general patterns of inference are investigated below, after thedenition of the channel theoretic framework for reasoning with generics.4.1.3 A Dyadic Generic OperatorA very useful piece of notation for describing the semantics of generic sentences is thedyadic generic operator usually written GEN .14 The GEN operator was introducedbecause of problems with previous monadic operators, the main issue being that mul-tiple generic readings of some sentences could not be provided for using the monadicoperator.15 The general form of the operator is the following:GEN [x1; :::; xn; y1; :::; ym]((x1; :::; xn) ; 	(fx1g; :::; fxng; y1; :::; ym)).Written in this form,  is known as the restrictor and 	 as the matrix16. The notation(x1; :::; xn) means that the xi occur free in , and the notation 	(fx1g; :::; fxng) meansthat the xi possibly occur free in 	. The x1; :::; xn are variables bound by the GENoperator and y1; :::; ym are variables that are bound existentially within 	, so the abovecan be equivalently written as follows:GEN [x1; :::; xn; ]((x1; :::; xn) ; 9y1:::ym	(fx1g; :::; fxng; y1; :::; ym)).As an example of the use of GEN , consider the following habitual:\Mary smokes after dinner."This sentence is generally accepted to have (at least) two readings, one allowing theinference of the time from the knowledge that Mary is smoking (i.e. answering thequestion \When does Mary smoke?"), the second allowing an inference regarding whatMary does after dinner (i.e. answering the question \What does Mary do after din-ner"?). In the standard notation using GEN , these two readings are written as follows,respectively:14For example, see TGB (Section 2.3), although a number of authors have proposed similar concepts.15Recent work by Krifka (1995) attempts to relate issues such as intonation, focus and the variousreadings obtained for a given generic sentence.16C.f. generalised quantiers (Barwise and Cooper 1981).
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 132GEN [x; s; ](x = mary ^ smoking(x; s) ; after:dinner(s))GEN [x; s; ](x = mary ^ after:dinner(s) ^ in(x; s) ; smoking(x; s))where s is a situation, after:dinner(s) denotes that s occurs after dinner, and smoking(x; s)denotes that x is smoking in situation s. TGB contains numerous other examples il-lustrating the use of GEN to express the meaning of generic sentences. Of course, itshould be remembered that GEN does not provide a semantics for generics, since thererst needs to be some semantic interpretation of the operator itself. However, it doesprovide a convenient way of representing the meaning of a generic sentence, particularlywhen there is more than one possible reading for the sentence.4.1.4 Default Logical Semantics of GenericsWhile the GEN operator provides a convenient notation for expressing readings ofgeneric sentences, it does not address the issue of a formal semantics for generics. Sev-eral notable attempts at a semantics for generics have been made in the literature, butthe various issues described above have not been satisfactorily addressed by any oneapproach.17 My main focus in this brief discussion is on semantic accounts of gener-ics and default rules that lead directly to logics for reasoning about generics and withdefaults.4.1.4.1 Traditional AI Approaches to Default ReasoningThere are several formal approaches to default reasoning in the AI literature, the majorones being Default Logic (Reiter 1980), circumscription (McCarthy 1980; McCarthy1986) and autoepistemic logic (Moore 1985). These approaches are quite dierent intheir slant on the problem of default reasoning, even though there are several resultsthat demonstrate a close correspondence between the three (see (Lukasziwicz 1990) fora survey of such results). Default logic represents a default rule as a rule of inferenceinvolving a consistency test. For example, the rule \Birds y" is represented as follows:bird(x) : flies(x)flies(x) .1817TGB contains a brief overview of several approaches to the semantics of generics, and the associatedproblems.18Default rules that contain free variables are actually slightly problematic in default logic, but I willignore this fact for this presentation.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 133This rule roughly translates as follows: If x is known to be a bird and it is consistentto assume that x ies, then it can be inferred that x ies. Reiter's account of defaultlogic is a purely syntactic one, although there have been some attempts at constructinga model-theoretic semantics for it.19Autoepistemic logic is a modal theory of nonmonotonic reasoning that is basicallymeant to model an agent's reasoning about its own beliefs. An autoepistemic theory isa set of sentences formed from the usual connectives plus a modal operator L, where Lis to be interpreted as \ is currently believed". A default rule such as \Birds y" canthen be represented as follows:8x(Lbird(x) ^ :L:flies(x)  flies(x)),which translates roughly as: If x is believed to be a bird and it is not currently believedthat x cannot y, then x can y.20 The semantics of an autoepistemic theory T is givenby the notion of a stable set|T is stable if it satises the following:1. T is closed under logical consequence;2. if  2 T then L 2 T ;3. if  62 T then :L 2 T .21The conclusions supported by a set of premises A are those that are contained in allstable autoepistemic theories that contain A.22Circumscription is based on minimising the extensions of predicates. For simplicity,I will adopt the following notation: given a set of sentences  some of whose predicatesymbols are in P , CIRC(;P ) is a second-order sentence that minimises the extensionsof the predicates in P and allows all other predicates in  to vary.23 The predicates19Notably, Rounds and Zhang (1995) use Scott's domain theory to provide a semantics whereby adefault rule is interpreted as a semantic constraint on allowable information systems (which are themodels of domain theory).20The reason why all the premises and none of the conclusions must be preceded by the modal operatoris not straightforward|see (Konolige 1988) for some explanation.21Moore (1984) also provides a possible-worlds semantics based on S5.22See (Moore 1985) for precise details, or (Konolige 1988) for an alternative characterisation.23Circumscription has undergone several revisions since McCarthy's original formalisation. The orig-inal presentation in (McCarthy 1980) involved an innite set of rst-order sentences. However, this wasreformulated as a second-order sentence in (McCarthy 1986) since the original formulation was incom-plete with respect to the minimal-model semantics. A further problem required the introduction of thenotion of variable circumscription, whereby some predicates that were not minimised could be allowed to\vary" in their interpretation. Following Morreau (1992a), I simply allow all non-minimised predicatesto vary, which simplies the presentation and is sucient for representing generics. See (McCarthy1986) or (Etherington 1988) for further details of variable circumscription.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 134in P are said to be circumscribed. The consequences of CIRC(;P ) are perhaps moreeasily illustrated by the following denition involving preferred models.24Denition Let T be a rst-order theory, some of whose predicates are in P , and letM;N be rst-order models of T . M is preferred to N wrt P , written M P N , if1. M and N have the same domain and assignment to terms;2. if p is an n-ary predicate in P and M satises p(a1; :::; an), then so too does N .M is said to be P -minimal if there is no model M 0 such that M 0 P M andM 0 6= M . The consequences of CIRC(;P ) are the sentences that are true in everyP -minimal model of .Using circumscription, a generic such as \Birds y" is represented by the theoryCIRC(; fabg), where  is the following sentence:8x(bird(x) ^ :ab(x)  flies(x)).This can be interpreted as: \Any bird that is not abnormal ies". Since the predicate abis circumscribed, the only things considered to be abnormal are those that are logicallyentailed to be so, and so CIRC(; fabg) supports the conclusion flies(a) for any a suchthat bird(a) is a consequence of  and ab(a) is not a consequence of .25The formal systems briey described above were primarily designed for defeasiblereasoning|i.e. drawing default conclusions about individuals. However, since they areall designed to handle exceptions to default rules, they can be seen as potentially pro-viding a semantics for generics. Default logic has several immediate problems in thisrespect, emanating from the fact that it represents generics as inference rules. For exam-ple, this means that nested defaults cannot be represented, and there can be no logic forreasoning about the generics themselves. However, even the model-theoretic nonmono-tonic logics have their problems.26 For example, the circumscriptive representation ofthe following generic suers from the extensionality problem:24Actually, the equivalence of the syntactic version of circumscription with the preferred-models ver-sion relies on a (simple) niteness condition. For details, see (Etherington 1988).25Morreau (1992a) points out a number of problematic issues with the circumscription representationof generics. In particular, when diering ways of being \abnormal" need to be specied, dierentabnormality predicates eectively need to be used, which puts an onus on the user of the logic thatshould be taken care of by the semantic framework itself. There are also problems with the way multipleabnormality predicates interact|see (Morreau 1992a) for details.26Since circumscription is the more powerful and more widely proered as a possible semantics ofgenerics, I will discuss the problems with respect to it. Morreau (1992a) discusses these issues in somedetail.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 135\Elderly members drink for free."This is represented by the following sentence :8x(elderly(x) ^ member(x) ^ :ab(x)  drinks:free(x)).However, suppose there are no elderly members|let  be the sentence :9x(elderly(x) ^member(x)). It turns out that CIRC( ; fabg) j= |i.e. the above generic is truesimply by the fact that there are no elderly members at all. A further problem involveswhat Morreau calls the Irrelevance problem. From the premises8x(bird(x) ^ :ab(x)  flies(x))9x:flies(x)bird(tweety)the conclusion flies(tweety) is not obtained, even though the second sentence (i.e.,there is some non-ying individual in the universe) seems perfectly reasonable. Thisis because there are (minimal) models for which the set of individuals is a singletonset, and for such models tweety must be the non-ying individual.27 These specicproblems are not so much to do with circumscription. Rather, they concern the useof universal quantication and material implication in an attempt to model what ineect is a generalised quantier, i.e. GEN . As with other generalised quantiers, itseems that GEN cannot be adequately dened in terms of standard quantication andimplication.28There are also problems with the patterns of reasoning supported by these logics. Inparticular, none of them supports Specicity. There have been extensions of the basicsystems purposely designed to handle Specicity|e.g. ordered default logic (Touret-zky 1984), prioritised circumscription (Lifschitz 1985), hierarchical autoepistemic logic(Konolige 1989). However, this sort of extension is exactly what Morreau (1992a) dis-agrees with so strongly as ghosts in the machine. Specicity is, however, a standardpattern of inference supported by default inheritance networks. An inheritance networkis a directed acyclic graph, whose nodes are properties and for which an arc representsdefault inheritance. Although the expressive power of an inheritance network is fairlyinexible, the patterns of inference licensed by the path-based reasoning techniques are27Etherington et al. (1991) combat this problem by basically assigning a context, or scope of individ-uals, to default rules, which is very much in the spirit of the channel theoretic analysis. Etherington etal. view the notion of scope as fundamental to default reasoning, and use their formal system to tackleseveral other problematic issues arising in default reasoning.28C.f. Barwise and Cooper's (1981) work on generalised quantiers.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 136very powerful.29 However, default inheritance networks lack a comprehensive semanticinterpretation.304.1.4.2 Logics of NormalityAn important recent trend in the semantics of generics has involved what could becalled possible-worlds semantics of normality. The normative view of generics involvesthe claim that a generic sentence involves universal quantication over the \normal"individuals satisfying the antecedent. For example, the generic \Birds y" is seen asasserting \All normal birds y".31 Carlson (1977), for one, has raised several issuesthat he believes to be problematic for normative treatments of generics. The mostproblematic issue concerns the question of what constitutes a \normal" individual. Forexample, it could be that no bird is \normal" in all respects. This problem manifestsitself in examples such as the following:\Peacocks lay eggs."\Peacocks have bright feathers."It is only male peacocks that have bright feathers and only female peacocks32 that layeggs. Morreau (1992a), who is a recent proponent of the normative view, suggests thatthis problem is more a pragmatic one|the correct logical forms of the above genericsshould reect the fact that the quantication in the rst is restricted to male peacocksand in the second to female peacocks.33 However, it does seem acceptable to assert thefollowing:29There are some important limitations, however. For example, arcs can only be eectively com-posed transitively, which rules out Addition of generics (as described above). Also, no conclusionscan be obtained using the generics in a contraposed manner (although work by Padgham (1989) is anexception)|while Contraposition is not valid for generics, there are many instances where its use isreasonable. As with other AI formalisms for reasoning with defaults, inheritance networks were primar-ily designed for drawing default conclusions about individuals, rather than reasoning about the defaultrules themselves.30There have been some attempts however|e.g. (Bacchus 1989; Boutilier 1989; Stein 1992). Morerelevantly, Vogel (1995) provides a channel theoretic interpretation of default inheritance networks.31This is similar in viewpoint to the representation of generics using circumscription. However, thefollowing systems are more highly intensional and do not suer from the particular defects describedabove in the context of circumscription.32One may want to argue that female peacocks should really be referred to as \peahens"|i.e. theterm \peacock" only really applies to the male of the species. However, it is common enough to use themale term for a species to refer to both male and female individuals of that species. In particular, theabove sentences certainly seem acceptable.33The same sort of counter is made to combat the problems raised by generics such as:\Dutch are good sailors."where it is only Dutch sailors that are good sailors (i.e. not Dutch farmers).
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 137\Peacocks lay eggs and have bright feathers."This suggests that Morreau's approach is not such a reasonable solution.Other potential problems for modal logics of normality, and the normative analysisin general, are discussed by TGB and Carlson (1977). Carlson is concerned that thenormative analysis may not lead to a \graduated" view of normality|i.e. he showsthat normality seems to come in degrees (an individual may be normal in some respectswhile abnormal in others). In fact, Morreau's logic of generics has problems with thispattern of reasoning. TGB discusses examples that seem to require normality orderingsthat are unusual at best|for example, the sentence\Turtles are long-lived."requires a normality ordering whereby the \usual" situation (i.e. a turtle is killed bya predator very early in life) is less normal than one where a turtle avoids its earlydiculties and lives on to a ripe old age.The logics of normality I describe here are obtained from conditional logics. Ratherthan the worlds-accessibility function being interpreted as a \closest-worlds" function,however, it is seen as accessing \most normal" worlds.34 While Boutilier (1992) usesan accessibility relation, Morreau employs a worlds-selection function. In each case,the intention is to model an agent's \expectations" about what normally holds|theaccessibility relation represents an ordering of normality, while the selection functionselects worlds that are \normal" with respect to a given proposition. An importantaspect of these approaches is that in neither case is a \global" ordering of normalityinvolved|normality, whether seen as an ordering on worlds or as selecting a set ofworlds, is only dened relative to a world.35Boutilier's Logic of NormalityDelgrande's (1988) initial work on dening a logic of default reasoning from a Stalnaker-Lewis logic of conditionals was extended by Boutilier (1992) in his doctoral thesis.3634Strictly speaking, one should not talk about worlds that are \most normal" any more than oneshould talk about worlds that are \closest" (c.f. Lewis' (1973) arguments against Stalnaker's limitassumption). However, it does simplify the informal description to talk this way.35This is exactly analogous to \nearness", as used in possible-worlds interpretations of conditionalsentences.36Not only does Boutilier's logic allow nested conditionals (and therefore nested default rules) whereDelgrande's doesn't, Boutilier also shows that the \at" (i.e. non-nested) component of his logic contains
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 138Boutilier's basic logic of normality is a conditional logic based on the modal logic S4 ,with the worlds-accessibility relation interpreted as a normality ordering|a model ofhis logic is a model of (propositional) S4 with an extension to handle the conditionalconnective (interpreted as the generic operator), which I will denote by the symbol`!'.37 The relevant part of the denition is the following.Denition A CT4-model38 is a triple M = hW;R; k:ki, where W is a set of worlds, Ris a reexive, transitive binary relation on W W and k:k maps sentences of the logicto 2W . Support for the conditional A!B is dened as follows:M;w j= A!B i for all worlds w1 such that wRw1,(a) 9w2 : w1Rw2; M;w2 j= A and 8w3 : w2Rw3 M;w3 j= A  B; or(b) 8w2 : w1Rw2; M;w2 6j= A.As I stated earlier, the worlds-accessibility relation is interpreted as a normalityrelation|if wRv, then v is at least \as normal" as w. A!B is true at a world w if,in the limit of worlds increasingly \more normal" than w, B holds whenever A holds.39As a simple example, consider a model M , world w and sentence bird!flies, andsuppose there is a most normal bird-world w0 (i.e. wRw0 in M , M;w0 j= bird, andthere is no world w00 such that w0Rw00 and M;w00 j= bird)|then M;w j= bird!flies iM;w0 j= flies.40Boutilier extends CT4 by adding the extra condition that the accessibility relationbe connected|i.e. if wRv and wRu then either uRv or vRu. The resulting logic (CT4D)is equivalent to the modal logic S4.3. CT4D is clearly more powerful than CT4|in par-ticular, it satises the conditional axiom CV (a weak form of Monotonicity) and Krauset al.'s (1990) rule of Rational Monotonicity. In fact, CT4D proves to be a very powerfullogic of generics. By treating the assertions of Kraus et al. as conditional sentences,41Boutilier shows that CT4D is equivalent to their notional of rational entailment , asall theorems of Delgrande's logic, as well as some that are not supported by Delgrande (Boutilier 1992,Theorem 4.12). I will not describe Delgrande's logic here.37A sentence A!B can actually be expressed as 2(2:A _ 3(A ^ 2(A  B))) in Boutilier's logic,but Boutilier chooses to treat the conditional connective as a primitive.38CT4 is Boutilier's basic conditional logic, based on S4.39A special case of this is when there is some \maximally normal" world w1 accessible from w at whichA holds. In such a case, B must hold at w1. In the general case, however, there can be an innite chainof increasingly normal worlds accessible from w.40To be precise, I should also impose the condition that R is connected (to prevent there being othermaximally normal bird-worlds.)41Kraus et al.'s (1990) results are described in Chapter 5.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 139well as showing that it is equivalent to Pearl's (1988, 1990) probabilistic -entailment .However, the Irrelevance problem arises when Boutilier attempts to dene a system fordefeasible reasoning (about individuals) based on his logic of normality|e.g. flies isnot a (defeasible) consequence of bird!flies and bird ^ green.Boutilier attempts to overcome the problem of Irrelevance via the concept of inac-cessible worlds: a world w0 is inaccessible from w if it is not the case that wRw0.42In particular, Boutilier denes two new modalities reecting truth in all worlds andtruth in all less normal worlds, respectively, leading to the logic CO. The rst modal-ity is used to redene the conditional connective '!' in such a way as to account forthe property that the truth of a normative statement depends on all worlds, not juston normal worlds. The second modality is used to dene a new conditional connec-tive '>': a sentence A > B means that at most maximally normal A-worlds, at mostA ^ B is true. Boutilier proves that for any sentence  that is propositionally consis-tent with A ^ B, A ^ !B is a CO-consequence of (A!B) ^ (A > B). This leadsto a method for defeasible reasoning that avoids the Irrelevance problem. For example,(bird!flies) ^ (bird > flies) j=CO (bird ^ green!flies). However, Boutilier concedesthat the approach has its limitations (Boutilier 1992, pg. 93) and requires a preferencerelation on models so as to model Lehmann's (1989) system of rational closure andPearl's (1990) system of 1-entailment|these systems are Lehmann's and Pearl's ownextensions to their respective default logics, modied (using extra-logical techniques) inresponse to the Irrelevance problem.Morreau's Commonsense EntailmentMorreau's (1992a) thesis is a signicant contribution to the normative view of generics.As well as arguing extensively for the normative view as a viable foundation for thesemantics of generics, Morreau develops a logic of generics and default reasoning withmany attractive properties. One of Morreau's major concerns is for this logic to capturethe necessary patterns of reasoning for generics and defaults without any sort of adhoc treatment usually required for handling the more problematic aspects of defaultreasoning (e.g. ordering default rules so as to invalidate Specicity; solutions to theIrrelevance problem adopted by logics based on conditionals logics). Morreau is adamant42In CT4D, w0Rw holds for any such pair of worlds since CT4D can be characterised by totallyconnected accessibility relations, i.e. relations for which wRw0 or w0Rw for all worlds w;w0.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 140that a logic of generics should be based on independently motivated foundations, andthat the necessary properties and patterns of inference required of such a logic shouldfollow from these foundations.43Morreau's logic of Commonsense Entailment (CE) is basically a logic of normalityincorporating a dynamic revision process. The main function of this dynamic componentis normalisation|revising an information state s so that it is as \normal" as possible.This process is a very complex one, but is at the heart of commonsense entailment andhence warrants some discussion.The conditional logic of normality involves assigning a \selection" function to eachpair of world and proposition, where a proposition is represented as a set of worlds.Denition A CE-frame is a triple F = hW;D; i, where W is a non-empty set of worlds,D is a a non-empty set of individuals, and  :W  2W!2W .Basically, (w; p) contains those worlds that support (wrt w) all that \normally"holds when p holds. For example, if w is a world that supports the proposition \Birdsy" and p is the proposition that some bird b is a bird, then (w; p) contains only worldswhich support the proposition that b can y. Given that b may not be a \normal" bird,then w may not be contained in (w; p). However, the following condition|i.e. that pnormally holds whenever p holds|can be safely imposed on the selection function:Facticity: (w; p)  p.Another important condition that Morreau imposes on the worlds-selection function isthe following.Dudley Doorite:44 (w; p [ q)  (w; p) [ (w; q).The interaction of this constraint with other properties of the logic leads to a versionof Specicity being supported as a valid pattern of inference. Denoting the genericconnective by the symbol `!' (as above), satisfaction of generic sentences is dened asfollows.Denition A base CE-model is a quadruple M = hW;D; ; k:kM i, where hW;D; i isa CE-frame and k:kM interprets predicate symbols. Support for a conditional sentence43As will be seen below, Morreau is not quite successful|in particular, his logic cannot deal withstandard patterns of Specicity.44The strange name for this condition is due to Morreau (1992a). I could not track down his motivationfor it.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 141! is dened as follows:M;w j= ! i (w; kkM )  k kM .This denes a base model in Morreau's system, and a (monotonic) logic of normalityis obtained by dening validity and consequence in the standard way. The full systemof commonsense entailment involves a defeasible notion of consequence, which requiresthe process of normalisation. Morreau describes the process of defeasible reasoning asinvolving the following abstract steps:1. Assume the premises in question, and no more;2. Assume individuals to be \normal", if this can be done consistently;3. Check if you are then forced to assume the conclusion.The rst step requires updating an information state with a set of sentences (i.e. thepremises); the second step involves normalising the resulting state; the nal step requireschecking whether the normalised information state supports the conclusion.The basis of an information state is a set of worlds.45 Updating a state s (relativeto a model M) by a formula  is via the following update operation: s+ = s\kkM .Denition A CE information model (or simply CE-model) is a tuple h2W ;D; ; k:k;+i,where hW;D; ; k:ki is a base model. An information model M (based on base modelM 0) and information state s are said to support a sentence , written M; s j= , iM 0; w j=  for all w 2 s.Morreau shows that a canonical information model can be constructed and the restof this presentation restricts attention to this model (much the same way that Morreaudoes), allowing models to be ignored and focus to be restricted to information states.The process of assuming only a given set of premises   involves starting with theempty information state  (which can be taken to be the set of all possible worlds|thisstate satises all and only the logical truths) and updating it, via the + operator, witheach sentence in  . The process of normalising the resulting state s with respect to aproposition p is dened as follows, where (s; p) = Sw2s (w; p):N (s; p) = 8<: s n (p n (s; p)) if s \ (s; p) 6= ;s otherwise.45This is a fairly standard technique, and is also employed by Veltman (1993).
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 142This operation requires some intuitive explanation. The worlds in (s; p) are worldswhich are \normal" with respect to p and s|i.e. everything that normally holds whenp holds (wrt worlds in s) holds in this information state. If this state, which is somehow\maximally normal" with respect to s and p, is inconsistent with the current state s,then the normalisation of s is s itself. However, if it is consistent, then the normalisationof s is formed as follows: (p n (s; p)) is the set of worlds in which p holds but which arenot normal wrt s and p; N (s; p) is formed by removing such worlds from s|i.e. N (s; p)is s with all the non-normal p-worlds removed. As Morreau puts it, \Normalisationstrengthens an information state by adding the assumption that to the extent that someproposition p holds, p holds along with everything which is normally the case where pholds" (Morreau 1992a, pg. 104).The normalisation process is more complicated than this, however. Since an indi-vidual may be a representative of several kinds, each of which is the premise of somegeneric, the normalisation process must be iterated until a xpoint is reached|i.e. astate s for which N (s; p) = s for each proposition p. Furthermore, the order in whichpropositions are used in the normalisation process matters, so the normalisation opera-tion has to be iterated in all possible ways|i.e. using all permutations of the pertinentpropositions.46 This leads to the following denition.Denition An information state t is accessible from a state s just in case there is someordinal  and sequence fsg of information states such that:1. s0 = s;2. for each successor ordinal  < , there is a p such that s+1 = N (s; p);3. for limit ordinals   , s = S< s; and4. s = t.Given the discussion above, the state t is of interest when it is a xpoint of thenormalisation operation (with respect to all propositions p). The third step in Morreau'soutline of default reasoning|i.e. checking whether one is forced to accept the conclusion,having assumed the premises (and no more) and as much \normality" as is consistent|is performed by checking all normalisation xpoints accessible from the state s thatconsists of the empty state updated by the given set of premises (i.e. s = +  ).46The pertinent propositions are basically the premises (instantiated in their arguments by all possibleindividuals) of any conditional sentence in a relevant theory   of commonsense entailment|the followingdenitions should be relativised to such a  , but I have glossed over this for the sake of simplicity.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 143Denition A set of sentences   is said to commonsense entail , written   j , i forany xpoint s accessible from +  , M; s j=  (where M is the canonical model).The process of normalisation is a powerful one and overcomes the problems of Irrel-evance so prevalent in other approaches to default reasoning based on conditional logicsof normality. Normalisation eectively involves performing a consistency check on aninformation state s and then assuming s to be \as normal as possible". Any informationthat is \irrelevant" to some premise p cannot prevent the inference of a conclusion thatis deemed to normally follow from p. In particular, we have the following entailment:8x(bird(x)!flies(x)) j 8x(red(x) ^ bird(x)!flies(x)).Appendix C.1 shows in detail how this entailment is obtained in commonsense entail-ment, thereby illustrating the process described above.Morreau's logic of generics is a powerful one and leads directly to a logic of de-fault reasoning (i.e. allowing defeasible conclusions about individuals to be drawn).The possible-worlds framework ensures that it is appropriately intensional, avoiding theproblem suered by circumscription whereby asserting the fact that there is some non-ying individual prevents the inference that the bird tweety ies (as discussed above).Morreau (1992a) also shows that many of the desirable patterns of reasoning, such asdefeasible modus ponens (including the case where one generic is nested inside another)and a weakened form of Transitivity, are supported. When the Dudley Doorite con-straint is imposed on the normal-worlds selection-function, the resulting logic satisesthe following weakened form of Specicity, called Taxonomic Specicity:(t)8x((x)   (x))8x( (x)!(x))8x((x)!:(x):(t)Of course, this is isomorphic to the standard Penguin example, and (correctly) allowsthe inference that a given penguin cannot y. This is an important property. How-ever, if the material implication in the above is replaced by the generic conditional (i.e.8x( (x)   (x)) is replaced by 8x((x)! (x))), thereby obtaining standard Speci-city, then Morreau's logic is no longer able to make the inference that :(t) holds.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 144However, as shown by the student example (see Section 4.3.5), this pattern of reasoningalso seems intuitively valid. Morreau (1992a) discusses a scheme whereby normalisationcan be prioritised, but this is simply introducing a \ghost in the machine"|exactlyanalogous to that which he so strongly criticises in circumscription and other systemsthat require meta-logical additions in order to capture intuitively valid patterns of rea-soning. Morreau's basic logic also does not support Graded Normality|in fact, one ofCarlson's (1977) original qualms about the normative interpretation of generics was thatit would have problems with the concept of normality coming \in degrees".Morreau's logic of Commonsense Entailment is clearly powerful and captures manyintuitive properties of generics and their valid patterns of reasoning, as well as providinga fairly comprehensive account of generics within the viewpoint that generics quantifyover normal individuals. However, the model-theory associated with CommonsenseEntailment is extremely complex, and the fact that such central patterns of inference asSpecicity and Graded Normality are not validated seems to suggest that the accountis lacking in some crucial way.4.2 A Channel Theoretic Analysis of GenericsGeneric sentences describe regularities: this claim is the basis for the channel theoreticmodel of generics. Of itself, this claim is uncontroversial enough|for example, TGBdescribes a generic sentence as stating a \law-like regularity". The main diculty indening a semantics for generics has generally involved the attempt to provide a deni-tion of regularity that caters for exceptions and the other issues raised in Section 4.1.2.This issue|of reducing the concept of regularity to other \primitive" concepts|is, ofcourse, not addressed by channel theory: in channel theory, a regularity is a channel-type and is taken to be a primitive concept of the theory, as discussed earlier. However,channel theory does provide features in its account of the nature of regularity which areimportant in relation to the problematic issues in the semantics of generics.4.2.1 A Simple Semantics for GenericsA generic describes a regularity; a channel supports a regularity. The channel theo-retic analysis of conditionals of the previous chapter involved taking a channel to bethe demonstrative content of a conditional. The channel theoretic analysis of generics
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 145involves a similar move|the demonstrative content of a generic sentence is taken to bea channel while the descriptive content is taken to be a channel-type, or constraint (i.e.a regularity). The demonstrative content associated with a generic seems to play an im-portant role in some of the problematic issues in the analysis of generics, as is discussedbelow. The intensional nature of channel-types means that other problematic issues|todo with the independence of the truth of a generic from the properties of associatedindividuals|are avoided. In particular, this leads to a view of generics being simplytrue (in a situated way) in the manner described in Section 4.1.2|i.e. of themselves,rather than because of the properties of the associated individuals. This requires an as-sumption of maximal normality before a logic that uses generics for defeasibly reasoningabout the properties of individuals can be obtained|this is the topic of Chapter 5.The most important property of channels that makes them suitable as a basis fora semantic analysis of generics is the fact that they allow exceptions. In the channeltheoretic model, an exception (using the term informally) to a regularity can occur inone of three ways: by not being part of the classications with which the channel C isconcerned; by corresponding to a token that is a pseudo-signal in C; by correspondingto a connection that is an exception47 in C. These dierent possibilities, and the varioussorts of exceptions they seem to account for, are discussed in Section 4.2.2, as is thechannel theoretic model's behaviour with respect to the other issues raised in Section4.1.2.The channel theoretic analysis of generic sentences is very similar to the analysisof conditional sentences presented in Section 3.1.1. In particular, a generic sentenceinvolves a claim about the structure of a particular channel. In the case of a generic,however, the claim only concerns the type-level regularity supported by the channel.Denition The content of a generic sentence is an Austinian proposition of the form(C : ), where C is a channel and  is a constraint (i.e. a channel-type). If G is aclassication that classies channels by constraints, then for C 2 tok(G) and  2 typ(G),(C : ) holds in G i  2 typ(C).As can be seen from the denition, whether or not a channel C supports a generic is47It is unfortunate that the term \exception" is used in channel theory in this technical sense. When Italk of an exception to a regularity, I will typically be using the term in its informal sense|i.e. meaningsome sort of counter-example to a general rule. If I want to get at the technical meaning of the term, Iwill usually explicitly refer to a connection being an exception. Hopefully, this will resolve any potentialconfusion.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 146independent of the properties of individuals related to that generic|all that matters iswhether or not C contains the appropriate type (i.e. supports the associated regularity).While this skirts the most problematic issue in the analysis of generics (or regularitiesfor that matter)|i.e. providing a reductionist account for them|one can take theviewpoint that the channel theoretic model is consistent with any particular accountof regularity one may wish to provide. However, the standard situation theoretic andchannel theoretic view of regularities is that they are irreducible components of theworld and should therefore be primitive objects of the theory.As a simple illustration of the above idea, consider the archetypal example of ageneric: \Birds y". This sentence makes a claim about some48 channel C : B ) Fthat typ(C) contains a constraint of the form bird!flies. Given a classication G whichclassies channels by channel-types (i.e. constraints), (C : bird!flies) will hold inG. Note that C supports bird!flies regardless of the properties of individual bird-tokens|in particular, some bird-tokens will not be contained in tok(B), some will bepseudo-signals in G, some will be involved in connections (of the form b 7! b) that areexceptions in C, while birds that are \normal" (with respect to the above generic) willbe involved in connections in G that are classied by the constraint bird!flies.As mentioned earlier, this analysis makes generics simply true or simply false. Thequestion that arises is: what is it that makes a generic sentence true/false? B&S takethe view that (certain) regularities are part of the natural order of things. Under thisview, a generic is true with respect to a channel C if it describes a regularity thatactually holds in the world (at least, within the context of C). This is actually notof great importance to the current enterprise. Since this chapter is primarily aboutreasoning with generics, then my primary concern is with consequence|i.e. given theassertion that some channel C supports some regularity , what other information canbe derived? In particular, what other generics can be inferred given the generic thatasserts that (C : ) holds? I turn to the topic of a logic of generics in Section 4.3.An account of generics related to the one described here is provided by ter Meulen(1986). Ter Meulen discusses the use of situation theoretic constraints as the basisof a semantics for generics, focussing on the way in which what she calls recalcitrantsituations|i.e. situations that are counter-examples to a generic|do not necessarily48Exactly which channel the sentence makes a claim about is, of course, not determined by the channeltheoretic model. This issue was discussed (in the context of conditional sentences) in Section 3.1.1.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 147undermine the general rule (represented by a constraint). As here, a constraint is takento be a primitive entity, with its truth being independent of the properties of the asso-ciated individuals. Similarly to Barwise's (1986) account of conditionals, ter Meulen'sanalysis of generics can be seen as a precursor to the channel theoretic analysis, using thenotion of conditional constraint. The semantics of a generic sentence has no demonstra-tive content in ter Meulen's account, of course, and ter Meulen also does not provide anysort of logic of generics|her main concern is in providing a situation theoretic analysisof generics that accounts for exceptions.4.2.2 Properties of the Channel Theoretic SemanticsIn this section, I discuss some of the important properties of the channel theoreticanalysis of generics, focussing particularly on the issues raised in Section 4.1.2.ExceptionsAn exception to a generic is an individual that satises the antecedent of the genericbut does not satisfy the consequent. This may occur in one of three ways in the channeltheoretic model. It should be stressed that the choice as to which of the three categoriesan exception falls into is a subjective one|an utterer of a generic sentence may make herutterance based on a model that represents an exception in one way, while the hearer ofthe utterance may construct a model that represents the \same" exception in a dierentway.49 The choices involved in the representation of exceptions are further discussed inChapter 5.Token is not contained in the antecedent classication.Let C : C ) L be the channel about which the generic \Chickens lay eggs" makes aclaim. This sentence asserts that C contains a regularity  whose antecedent classiestokens as chickens and whose consequent classies tokens as egg.layers. There aremany exceptions to this generic of course, such as sick chickens, baby chickens andvery old chickens. However, there is a noticeable large class of chickens that constitutecounter-examples, namely, male chickens. It could be argued that the class of malechickens is not meant to be covered by the above generic|i.e. only female chickens49A formal account of this form of relativism could be constructed using the channel theoretic modelof dialogue of Healey et al. (1993, 1994).
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 148are relevant. This viewpoint is provided by the channel theoretic model, whereby theclassication C contains only female chicken tokens|i.e. for each t 2 tok(C), t is afemale chicken. Of course, there is no commitment to such a view|there may be otherchannels C0 : C 0 ) L050 involving the same regularity but for which tok(C) containssome male chickens|such chicken tokens are either pseudo-signals or are contained ina connection that is an exception in C0.Declerk (1991) raises a similar point when he discusses the way in which genericsquantify over \relevant" individuals. Note, however, that restriction to relevant indi-viduals cannot be a sucient condition for supporting a generic claim|\Birds don'ty" does not seem supported if attention is restricted to penguins and emus only. Thechannel theoretic analysis still requires a regularity to hold between the relevant typesfor the corresponding generic sentence to be supported.Token is a pseudo-signal in the channel, orToken is involved in a connection that is an exception in the channel.The question relating to whether a counter-example to a generic should be treated as apseudo-signal or an exception in a channel is not an easy one to answer. In attemptingto address it, it seems as if epistemic issues must be addressed|i.e. if an individualis \expected" (by the agent being modelled) to contradict the general rule, then thatindividual should correspond to a pseudo-signal; otherwise, the individual should corre-spond to an exception in the channel. For example, consider again the generic \Chickenslay eggs" and the channel C0 : C 0 ) L from above, where C 0 contains chickens that donot lay eggs (as well as the usual chickens that do). A male chicken c, where c 2 tok(C 0),seems most naturally represented as a pseudo-signal in this channel. However, a femalechicken c0, where c0 2 tok(C 0), that is sick and therefore temporarily a non-egg-layingspecimen seems more naturally represented as an exception|i.e. there is a connectionc0 7! c0 2 tok(C0), but c0 7! c0 does not fall within the domain of the regularity describedby the given generic.I stressed in Section 2.3.4 that whether a particular counter-example is best viewedas an exception or as a pseudo-signal is very much dependent on the specic view that isbeing modelled. In the channel theoretic model of generics, the dierence does not in anyway matter|the sole concern is that exceptional individuals (i.e. counter-examples to ageneric) can be naturally represented within the channel theoretic framework. In a more50In general, C will be a subchannel of C0.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 149comprehensive treatment of generics in a dialogue situation, particularly if dealing withspeaker/hearer dierences and the way each dialogue participant handles a counter-example, the distinction between exceptions and pseudo-signals may take on greaterimportance. This is particularly so because of the way default inference is dened inChapter 5|an individual that is \known" to be a counter-example to a default rule(e.g. a bird that is known to be a penguin) must be represented as a pseudo-signal toprevent the rule from being applied to that individual. The task of developing a modelof dialogue involving generic sentences is left as a topic for future research.Generics and TruthIn Section 4.1.2, I briey discussed Morreau's (1992a) arguments for taking the con-tent of a generic to be a proposition rather than a rule of inference. In the channeltheoretic model, the content of a generic is taken to be an Austinian proposition, i.e.the proposition that some given channel supports a specied regularity. The fact thatthis proposition is endowed with a demonstrative content does not detract from the ad-vantages enjoyed by propositional accounts of generics over inference-rule accounts. Inparticular, nested generics are handled by this analysis in much the same way as nestedconditionals were handled in Section 3.1.2|i.e. by allowing the classication linked bya channel to be the classication G from the denition in Section 4.2.1.The way in which the channel theoretic model handles nested generics can be illus-trated by once again considering the following example:\Current medical theories predict that smoking leads to cancer."It is not the case that every medical theory makes the above prediction|for example,some medical theories are not concerned with such issues (e.g. those concerned withthe treatment of malaria), while research funded by a tobacco company may lead toa theory that smoking is in no way linked to an onset of cancer. Similarly, smokingdoes not always lead to cancer. This nested generic can be represented in the channeltheoretic model by way of a channel C : M ) G, where M classies theories as beingmedical theories. The descriptive content of the generic is a regularity  2 typ(C)whose antecedent is a type medical:theory that classies medical theories and whoseconsequent is another regularity 0 2 typ(G), where 0 is a regularity linking a typethat classies individuals as being smokers to a type that classies individuals as having
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 150cancer (or as being future cancer suerers).51Pseudo-signals or exceptions in the channel C are medical theories that do not predictthe link between smoking and cancer. For example, if (t : medical:theory) holds in Mbut there is no connection in tok(C) involving t, then t is a pseudo-signal in C|i.e.t is not related to a channel that supports a smoking{cancer regularity (e.g. if t isnot concerned with cancer or smoking-related diseases). Alternatively, if t 7! C0 is anexception in C, then t is linked (in C) to a channel C0, but C0 does not support thesmoking{cancer regularity. Now suppose t 7! C0 is classied in C. By the Principleof Harmony (Section 2.3.3), C0 must support the regularity that smokers are prone tocancer|i.e. (C0 : 0) holds in G. However, C0 may itself contain exceptions|even thoughthe general prediction (that smoking leads to cancer) is made, it need not predict thatevery smoker will contract cancer (or indeed that any smoker will contract cancer).This example suggests that the channel theoretic analysis allows a coherent treatmentof nested generics. However, as was done with conditionals, I will ignore nested genericsfor the rest of this chapter. The important point is that the channel theoretic frameworkallows an interpretation of nested generics without requiring any extension.As mentioned earlier, the channel theoretic analysis leads to a view whereby genericsare simply true or simply false. This is because the channel-types (i.e. regularities) aretaken to be primitive objects of the theory. The consequences for the channel theoreticmodel as a system for default reasoning are discussed in Chapter 5. However, the viewof regularities as primitive also means that the extensionality problem of Section 4.1.2is trivially avoided. Consider again the example from before:\Elderly members drink for free."This generic is supported in a channel C i C contains a type  that corresponds tothe appropriate regularity. It makes no dierence whether or not there are any elderlymembers of the club; what matters is whether or not there is a regularity of the requiredform. The issue that is not addressed is what it is that makes this regularity hold|whether it is some rule of the club, or whether it is \normal" practice of the club'sbarman not to charge elderly members for their drinks. This is not the concern ofchannel theory|regularities are part of the fabric of the world and need not (indeed,perhaps can not) be reduced to more primitive concepts.51This is probably over-simplistic, but is sucient for the purposes of illustration.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 151The Role of ContextIn Section 4.1.2, I briey discussed how some generics seem to be asserted with respectto a particular background or context.52 In the channel theoretic analysis, a context isprovided by the channel that plays the demonstrative content of a given generic. Therole of context alleviates the problems with the examples given in Section 4.1.2. Forexample, \Chickens lay eggs" can be considered to be restricted to a context in whichthe only tokens are healthy female chickens of an appropriate age|i.e. the utterer ofthis generic would intend a channel satisfying this property as the demonstrative contentof his utterance. Examples such as \Dutch make good sailors" are handled similarly|inthis case, the intended context is one such that only sailor-tokens undergo consideration.This simple idea seems to oer the potential of quite a powerful analysis, especiallywhen conicting generics are involved. For example, consider the conicting pair ofgenerics involving peacocks from Section 4.1.4. These can be assertible at the sametime, yet involve disjoint sets of individuals (i.e. only male peacocks have bright tailfeathers and only female peacocks lay eggs). A speaker that asserts both would (oneassumes) be talking about dierent channels, each supporting a dierent regularity about(certain) peacocks. Each channel would be \reliable" in that it need not contain anyconnections that are exceptions, but each would have a number of pseudo-signals|i.e.the bright.feathers channel (call it Cf ) would have all the female peacocks as pseudo-signals while the egg.layers channel (call it Ce) would have all the male peacocks asexceptions. Now consider the following generic, which I consider to be acceptable:\Peacocks lay eggs and have bright feathers."This seems to be an assertion regarding the channel (Cf k Ce)|i.e. the parallel composi-tion channel. This channel would have lots more pseudo-signals|in fact, one may arguethat all peacock tokens are pseudo-signals in this channel since no peacock both lays eggsand has bright feathers. However, the above generic is still supported by this particularchannel. Normative approaches to the truth of generics, however, have problems withexamples of this sort|since the normative analysis reduces generics to quanticationover normal individuals, generics of the above form are universally invalidated since no\normal" peacock both lays eggs and has bright feathers.52\Context" here is taken to mean the channel which the generic describes and not the context thespeaker nds herself in when she asserts the generic.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 152The role of the demonstrative content in the channel theoretic analysis seems tooer some very interesting insights into the information carried by generics and theway they are used. In particular, it seems that an interesting account of disagreementbetween speaker and hearer as to the channel described by a generic (thereby resulting inmisunderstanding in the tokens to which a generic is applicable) could be accommodatedin a channel theoretic model of dialogue (involving generics) along the lines of (Healeyet al. 1993; Healey and Vogel 1994). This is discussed in Section 6.2 as a topic for futureresearch.Patterns of ReasoningThe rest of this chapter is dedicated to dening a channel theoretic logic for reasoningwith generics. A number of patterns of reasoning, including the test principles of Asherand Morreau (1991), are examined below and found to be satised by the channel theo-retic logic. Such patterns include Graded Normality and Specicity. Graded Normalityis supported since dierent generics involving the same premise may yet be supportedby dierent channels|an individual that is an exception to the general regularity of onechannel need not be an exception to a regularity supported by the other. Specicity,in particular, is considered an important test principle for logics of defeasible reasoningsince it proves so troublesome to the traditional model-theoretic accounts from the AIliterature.4.3 A Channel Theoretic Logic of GenericsIn this section, I dene a system for reasoning about generics, based on the channeltheoretic system for reasoning about conditionals of the previous chapter.4.3.1 From Logics of Conditionals to Logics of GenericsOne of the starting premises for the work described in this section is that a systemfor reasoning with generics and defeasible rules can be based on a system for reasoningabout conditionals. In the previous chapter, I developed a system for reasoning aboutconditionals based on the use of a hierarchy of channels to capture the notion of \implicitbackground conditions". I take this framework for conditional logic as the starting point
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 153for the logic of generics and default reasoning.Previous work in the AI and philosophical literature investigating the relationshipbetween conditional logic and the logic of generics includes that of Delgrande (1988),Boutilier (1992) and Morreau (1992a). The rst two of these suer from a problem with\irrelevant conditions"|standard logics of conditionals are more sensitive to implicitbackground assumptions than logics of default reasoning. For example, given the condi-tional \If tweety is a bird then tweety can y", one cannot then infer \If tweety is a redbird then tweety can y" in standard possible-worlds conditional logics. However, giventhe generic \Birds y", we certainly expect to be able to infer \Red birds y" (unless,of course, it is known as a rule that red birds happen to have non-ight qualities). Del-grande and Boutilier each introduces a modication to his logic in order to address thisproblem.The channel theoretic system for reasoning about generics or default rules (denedbelow) avoids the Irrelevance problem by appealing to the following fundamental ob-servation regarding the relationship between conditionals and generics. By restrictingjust what can be encoded as a background assumption and therefore be used to blockcertain inferences, the channel theoretic system of conditional logic can be strengthened.In particular, a condition that is \irrelevant" to a given regularity will not be encodedas a background assumption to that regularity.Fundamental Observation: Reasoning about generics is basically the same asreasoning about conditionals, under the added proviso that all background assump-tions are implicitly contained in the given set of regularities.As an example, consider the standard example demonstrating the failure of Mono-tonicity for conditionals:\If there is sugar in the coee then it tastes good"\If there is sugar and diesel-oil in the coee then it tastes good".It should be possible to assert the rst conditional above without necessarily inferringthe second. This turns out to be the case in the conditional logic of Chapter 3 due tothe (assumed) implicit background condition that the coee tastes good if there is sugarin it and there is no diesel-oil in it. In a standard default logic, however, the secondsentence above is a consequence of the rst, in the absence of information that forces a
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 154conclusion to the contrary.53 However, the addition of the sentence\If there is diesel-oil in the coee then it tastes bad"should be enough to block the undesired default inference.The above example illustrates the way in which a system for reasoning about gener-ics is obtained from the channel theoretic conditional logic. Given a set of generics, ordefault rules, a channel hierarchy is constructed from them. Explicit and implicit coun-ters to the given generic rules are extracted and incorporated into the channel hierarchyin such a way that the resulting conditional logic supports reasonable patterns of in-ference for generics. Herein lies the inherent dierence between conditional and defaultreasoning|the latter is simply conditional reasoning under the added assumption thatall the information relevant to the hierarchy is explicitly represented in the initial set ofdefaults rules. Any conclusions that can be drawn, given the represented information,can be feasibly drawn by default. Conditionals, however, invalidate some inferenceseven if there is no explicit background assumption countering the inference. As such,standard logics of conditionals are weaker than is appropriate for a logic of defaults orgenerics; in particular, this leads to the problem of Irrelevance experienced by Delgrandeand Boutilier. The Irrelevance problem is avoided by the channel theoretic system since(by the Fundamental Observation above) irrelevant conditions cannot be used in theconstruction of an appropriate channel hierarchy for a given collection of generics.The denition of an appropriate channel hierarchy for a given collection of channels(supporting a corresponding collection of generics) is based on identifying generics whoseconsequents mutually conict|e.g. if two constraints are of the form ! and !: ,then : is inserted as a background assumption to the former while : is inserted asa background assumption to the latter.54 This is similar to Pollock's (1987) use ofdefeaters of a default rule, i.e. propositions whose truth undermine a default inference.For example,  is a rebutting defeater to ! above since if  holds, then it providesevidence for doubting that  can be inferred from . The relation between Pollock'srebutting defeaters and the appropriate channel hierarchy for a system of generics isroughly as follows: if  is a defeater for ! then : is inserted as a backgroundassumption to ! . Pollock also considers undercutting defeaters to be an important53If this seems counter-intuitive, it is only because we are biased into rejecting the second sentencedue to an a priori belief that coee with diesel-oil in it tastes bad.54Actually, the construction is more complicated than this, as is seen below.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 155(though traditionally neglected) concept in a logic of default reasoning|an undercuttingdefeater to ! is a proposition that provides a reason for denying that ! is aregularity. Undercutting defeaters are ignored in the current setting|in particular,I would need to be able to represent the negation of generics to be able to handleundercutting defeaters.55 Further investigation of the relation between the constructivedenition of a channel hierarchy (below) and Pollock's framework of default reasoningis a possible topic for future research.564.3.2 Notation and SimplicationsBefore presenting the denition of an appropriate channel hierarchy for a given collectionof generics, I review some of the simplications and notational conveniences made earlier,as well as more explicitly dene others that are tacitly introduced above.Firstly, as I have done so far, I will tend to identify connections and constraints withtheir endpoints (i.e. the tokens and types they connect) and will tend to consider onlyreexive channels and signalling relations. Also continuing from the previous chapter,I will tend to ignore the token level of channels|this level plays eectively no partin the system for reasoning about generics (although it assumes greater importance inChapter 5). In particular, in the denition of a channel hierarchy, I assume existenceof superchannels (which encode the background assumptions of given generics) withoutspecifying the signalling relations of such channels. These signalling relations are par-tially constrained by the subchannel denition, but are otherwise irrelevant to the logicof generics.57Secondly, the representation of generics within the channel theoretic framework issimplied via a couple of assumptions: I assume that each generic is supported by a sep-arate channel and that there is a single classication A which all such channels connect.The second of these assumptions helps to \decontextualise" the logic of generics, whichis useful when ensuring that certain patterns of reasoning are validated.58 Also, I will55Since any channel is itself a classication, this could possibly be done in the extended frameworkalluded to in Appendix A.2.56Also of interest is Nute's (1993) Defeasible Prolog, a computational interpretation of default reason-ing based on Pollock's ideas.57The maximal normality condition of Chapter 5 constrains these signalling relations further, in thecontext of using the associated channels to (defeasibly) reason about the properties of individuals.58For example, if a pair of generics were respectively supported by channels C : A) B and C0 : A0 ) B0where either A 6= A0 or B 6= B0, then these channels could not be composed so as to obtain a channel
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 156treat all regularities supported by channels as defeasible|any \strict" or \taxonomic"informational relationships (i.e. those that do not have any possible counter-examples)are represented via the appropriate type-entailment relation and as a constraint in alogical channel.59Finally, the current framework does not treat complex expressions involving gener-ics, such as conjunctions of generics, negations of generics and nested generics. Ofcourse, since a channel is itself a classication, such expressions could be modelled inthe extended classication theoretic framework alluded to in Appendix A.2.4.3.3 Constructing a Channel HierarchyA logic for reasoning about generics is obtained from the logic of conditionals of Chap-ter 3 simply by dening a method for constructing a channel hierarchy from a givencollection of channels, and it is this task to which I now turn. The choice of hierarchyis important|as was discussed in Chapter 3, changing the hierarchy alters the patternsof inference obtained. Rather than exhaustively analysing all possible variations on rea-sonable patterns of reasoning involving generics, I present a simple denition of channelhierarchy and show that the logic of generics thereby obtained supports the desirableproperties and patterns of inference discussed in Section 4.1.2.60Given an initial collection of generics (represented by a collection of channels andthe regularities they contain), background assumptions for these generics are obtainedsimply by considering which rules have conicting conclusions. Basically, if ! and!: are regularities applicable to the same connection, then : is a backgroundassumption to the rst and : is a background assumption to the second. Thereis a slight qualication needed, however|if, say, individuals that are of type  aregenerally also of type  (i.e. there is a regularity of the form !), then : can-not be a background assumption to the rst regularity since an individual t beinga  carries the information (at least potentially) that it is also a  . For example,while :penguin can be considered a background assumption behind the regularitybird!flies, one would not consider :bird to be a background assumption behind thesupporting the obvious new generic.59I return to this particular issue in Section 4.4.2.60In this chapter, I only consider patterns of inference involving generics, or default rules. Inference in-volving defeasible reasoning|i.e. using default rules to draw conclusions about individuals|is discussedin the following chapter.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 157regularity penguins!:flies since it is nothing to do with a penguin's bird-ness thatprevents it from ying. In general it is not only the given regularities that have to bechecked for conict but also serial compositions of them|even if !: is obtainedby transitively combining other regularities, then : should be inserted as a back-ground assumption to ! . For example, if king:penguin!penguin is used to obtainking:penguin!:flies, then :king:penguin needs to be inserted as a background as-sumption to bird!flies. However, in this example, transitive closure also obtains theregularity king:penguin!flies, but :king:penguin should not be inserted as a back-ground assumption to penguin!:flies. The fact that a king penguin is a penguin isnot a sucient condition to block :king:penguin being inserted as a background as-sumption here|for example, penguins are birds but :penguin is still a reasonable back-ground assumption to bird!flies. However, the link between king:penguin and flies isobtained only via transitive composition with penguin!bird|it is for this reason that:king:penguin is ruled out as a reasonable background assumption to penguin!:flies.To achieve full generality in the following denition, the given set of channels shouldalso be closed under applications of parallel composition and contraposition before de-termining the defeaters. However, this complicates the denition and for the meantime Irestrict attention to serial composition, which is enough to (theoretically, at least) modelthe power of default inheritance networks. I discuss the application of contrapositionand parallel composition in Section 4.4.Denition Let S be a collection of channels containing a logical channel L.61 Let T (S)be the collection of channels obtained by closing S under standard serial composition.The kernel default channel hierarchy for S is the smallest hierarchy K of channels con-taining S such that:for each channel C1 : ! in S and each channel C2 : ! 0 in T (S) such that ? 0, K contains a channel C01 : ( ^ :)! , where C1 vf C01 and f(! ) =( ^ :)! ; unless either1. there is a channel C : ! in T (S); or2. C2 is formed by a composition involving a channel C0 : !, for some .Note that the hierarchy obtained via the above denition is only a \kernel"; a fulldefault hierarchy is obtained by closing such a kernel under the channel operations|61For the rest of the chapter, I will tend to neglect to mention L and simply take its presence forgranted.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 158this is dened below. The above denition is, I believe, fairly straightforward (giventhe discussion before) except for the second proviso, which is illustrated by an examplebelow. A default channel hierarchy is meant to capture all the background conditionsof a given set of channels with respect to the information given|i.e. not all feasiblebackground assumptions are captured by this hierarchy, but only those that can beinferred from the initially given collection of regularities. This is the sort of behaviourrequired of a logic of generics or default rules.To illustrate the properties of the above denition, consider the standard penguinexample:\Birds y."\Penguins are birds."62\Penguins don't y."These generics are represented by the following collection S of channels and associatedconstraints:C1 : bird!fliesC2 : penguin!birdC3 : penguin!:flies.By denition, the kernel default hierarchy for S contains a channel C01 : (bird ^:penguin)!flies such that C1 v C01|i.e. :penguin is an implicit assumption behindthe constraint bird!flies. Notice that :bird is not an implicit assumption behind theconstraint penguin!:flies|it can't be that non-bird penguins are the ones that can'ty since penguins are birds to start o with! This is captured by the rst proviso inthe denition|i.e. the kernel default hierarchy does not contain :bird as an implicitassumption to penguin!:flies because C2 contains the constraint penguin!bird.Now suppose we add the generic\King penguins are penguins."63to the above collection of generics and the channel and constraintC4 : king:peng!penguin62Actually, this generic is taxonomic and does not have any exceptions. Given the discussion in Section4.3.2, it could be represented as a constraint in the logical channel. However, so as not to detract fromthe illustration, I simply represent it as a normal regularity|it makes no dierence to this example(although it may do for others, as is illustrated in the Multiple Inheritance example in Section 4.3.7).63This is a taxonomic assertion rather than a generic, but again this is ignored for illustrative purposes.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 159to S. The corresponding kernel hierarchy extends the previous one by the additionof a channel C001 : (bird ^ :king:peng)!flies, where C1 v C001.64 The other impor-tant property of this hierarchy is that the second proviso in the denition above isrequired to ensure that :king:peng is not inserted as a background condition to theconstraint penguin!:flies. The reason for this is the following. There is a channel(C4 ; C2 ; C1) 2 T (S) containing the constraint king:peng!flies. Since flies?:flies,then king:peng seems prima facie to be a background assumption to penguin!:flies.However, the possibility of a regularity between king:peng and flies arises only be-cause of the regularities between king:peng and penguin, and between penguin andbird|i.e. :king:peng cannot be an implicit assumption underlying the constraintpenguin!:flies because it is only via the property whereby king penguins are penguinsthat the conicting regularity king:peng!flies arises. This is exactly the sort of casethat the second opt-out clause in the denition is meant to cover. The kernel defaulthierarchy obtained from S is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
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................................................... ........... ...............................................................................C2 : penguin!bird C1 : bird!flies
C01 : (bird ^ :penguin)!flies C001 : (bird ^ :king:peng)!fliesC3 : penguin!:fliesC4 : king:peng!penguinFigure 4.1: Channel Hierarchy for King Penguin Example
4.3.4 Inferring GenericsIn the previous section, I dened the concept of a kernel default channel hierarchy,which eectively captures the background conditions associated with a given collectionof channels. A kernel hierarchy is extended to a full default hierarchy by closing it64It could be argued that the previous channel hierarchy already contains :king:peng as an implicit as-sumption to the constraint bird!flies since :penguin is a background assumption and every king:pengtoken must also be a penguin token. However, this view requires the channel-operations of Chapter 3to be modied so as to obtain a suitable logic for generics, and my intention is to not modify them atall. Hence, all implicit background conditions need to be explicitly represented at some place in thehierarchy if they are to have an eect on the permitted patterns of inference.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 160under the channel operations, while ensuring that the following constraints of Section3.5 are satised: Antecedent Background and Consequent Background. Recall thatthese constraints ensure that the representation of background conditions are symmetricbetween antecedent and consequent of channel-types.65Denition Let S be a collection of channels and K the corresponding kernel defaulthierarchy. The full default channel hierarchy based on S is the smallest channel hierarchyH containing K such that:1. H is closed under the conditional channel operations;2. H satises the Antecedent Background and Consequent Background Constraints.Given this denition of a channel hierarchy, inference of new generics from an initialcollection is basically via the channel operations that are used to dene it. These are theconditional channel operations of Chapter 3, used without modication|i.e. the onlydierence between the logic of generics and the logic of conditionals is that the channelhierarchy for the former is of a particular specied form.Denition Given a collection of channels S, the collection S 0 of channels defeasiblyobtained from S consists of the channels in H, where H is the default channel hierarchybased on S. I write S j; C for C 2 S 0.It is hopefully clear that the dierence between a logic of generics and a logic of condi-tionals resides only in what is acceptable as a channel hierarchy. In particular, in Chapter3, a logic of conditionals is dened only with respect to some channel hierarchy (whichis assumed to satisfy certain conditions, including Antecedent and Consequent Back-ground Conditions), whereas the logic of generics requires a hierarchy to have specicproperties. So, unlike previous attempts at dening logics of generics from conditionallogics, the channel theoretic logic dened here eectively involves no modication to thelogic of conditionals on which it is based|there is only a shift in perspective in that alogic of generics involves the assumption that any implicit background conditions to thegiven regularities are themselves extracted from those regularities themselves. This iscaptured by the use of a default channel hierarchy based on some specied kernel.To be able to reason about the (default) properties of individuals using constraints,an assumption of maximal normality is required; otherwise, there is nothing to con-strain the appearance of pseudo-signals and exceptions in channels. For example, if I65The role of the other constraints of Section 3.5 is briey discussed later.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 161know that tweety is a bird and I have no other information regarding tweety, this stilldoes not prevent tweety from being a possible pseudo-signal in the channel containingthe constraint bird!flies. Chapter 5 introduces a maximal normality property thatunderlies a system of defeasible reasoning.66 Note that the inference of a new generic isnonmonotonic in the sense that we may have S j; C without necessarily having S 0 j; C,even when S  S 0.4.3.5 Some ExamplesAt this point, I turn to some simple examples to illustrate properties of the channeltheoretic logic of generics before returning to the general patterns of inference of Section4.1.2. For each example, I present a diagram which displays the relevant part of thedefault channel hierarchy.Penguin exampleThe rst example I illustrate is the standard penguin example. This demonstrates howSpecicity is obtained|i.e. a \direct" generic overrides one that is obtained via a serialcomposition. The initial set S of channels is as follows.C1 : bird!fliesC2 : penguin!birdC3 : penguin!:flies.The kernel default channel hierarchy for S is depicted in Figure 4.2.Some of the more interesting channels and constraints obtained by applying the(conditional) channel operations to the channel hierarchy include the following:67C3 : flies!:penguin(C1 ; C3) : bird!:penguinC1 : :flies!:bird.These derived channels and constraints correspond to the following generic sentences.66An important dierence between Morreau's (1992a) process of normalisation and the maximal nor-mality assumption of the following chapter is that the process of normalisation is also used in Morreau'smodel-theoretic denition of the truth of generics and not just in the inference of (default) propertiesof individuals. This dierence is because of Morreau's reductionist account of generics, reducing thesemantics of generics to quantication over normal individuals.67Recall that C3 is the contraposition channel of C3.
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.......... ............C 01 : (bird ^ :penguin)!flies
C1 : bird!fliesC2 : penguin!birdC3 : penguin!:fliesFigure 4.2: Channel Hierarchy for Simple Penguin Example\Things that y (typically) aren't penguins"\Birds (typically) aren't penguins"\Things that don't y (typically) aren't birds".(I should mention my use of the word \typically" in the above generics. If this word isomitted, particularly from the third sentence above, then it is not so obvious that theresulting generics do indeed follow from those originally given. However, I am tryingto capture a rather strong notion of consequence for generics (matching that consideredacceptable by the AI literature); in particular, all the above are deemed consequences byLifschitz (1989). Inserting \typically" makes the inference more reasonable and avoidsthe particular linguistic quirks with which I am not concerned.)Non-taxonomic penguinsThe previous example actually demonstrates the validity of what Morreau calls theTaxonomic Penguin Principle. This is an instance of Specicity in which one of theregularities that makes up the composite (overridden) regularity is taxonomic, or strict|i.e. the general rule cannot have any exceptions. For instance, every penguin is a bird|there can be no exception to this rule. A standard example from the literature thatillustrates the standard Penguin Principle, in which all regularities are defeasible, is thefollowing:\Students are adults."\Adults are employed."\Students are not employed."
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 163It is generally agreed that the third generic here overrides the conclusion (that studentsare employed) obtained by transitively composing the rst two. It should be clear thatthe channel theoretic logic handles the general Penguin Principle in exactly the sameway as it handles the Taxonomic Penguin Principle|i.e. there is nothing in the treat-ment of the penguin example above that relies on the penguin!bird regularity beingexception-free. Morreau's (1992a) logic of commonsense entailment, on the other hand,does not handle this example satisfactorily|the transitive conclusion is not overridden.Morreau deals with this problem by extending his normalisation process so that it isprioritised|some predicates are normalised in preference to others. This is reminiscentof the approach to Specicity taken within the traditional AI frameworks for defaultreasoning, and is very much an ad hoc addition of the sort that Morreau disparages.Some of the generics inferred from the above three using the channel theoretic systemare the following:\Employed people generally aren't students."\Adults generally aren't students."\People who aren't employed generally aren't adults."Nixon diamondA second important class of example is the classic Nixon Diamond.\Quakers are normally pacists"\Republicans are normally not pacists".These sentences give rise to the following channels:C1 : quaker!pacifistC2 : republican!:pacifist.The pertinent part of the associated default channel hierarchy is illustrated in Figure4.3.From this hierarchy, the following two generics are obtained:\Quakers that are not Republicans are normally pacists"\Republicans that are not Quakers are normally not pacists".These are the only generics of any interest that are obtained. Perhaps surprisingly, nochannel supporting a generic of the following form is obtained:





C 01 : (quaker ^ :republican)!pacifistC 02 : (republican ^ :quaker)!:pacifistC2 : republican!:pacifist
Figure 4.3: Channel Hierarchy for Nixon Diamond Example\Quakers are normally not Republicans"(or the converse) since the background conditions of C1 conict with those of C2. Myintuitions aren't completely clear on this one; however, Lifschitz (1989) does not list thisamongst the required inferences.King PenguinsFinally, consider the following extension of the Penguin example, illustrating the use ofthe two provisos in the denition of default channel hierarchy (this example is isomorphicto the usual \Royal Elephant" example of the default inheritance literature).The generics to be modelled are the following:\King penguins are penguins."\Penguins are birds."\Birds y."\Penguins don't y."These are represented via the following set S of channels:C1 : king:peng!penguinC2 : penguin!birdC3 : bird!fliesC4 : penguin!:flies.The default channel hierarchy associated with S is shown in Figure 4.4.
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C1 : king:peng!penguin C3 : bird!flies C4 : penguin!:flies
C03 : (bird ^ :penguin)!flies
C2 : penguin!bird C003 : (bird ^ :king:peng)!flies
C04 : (penguin ^ :king:peng)!:flies
Figure 4.4: Channel Hierarchy for King Penguin ExampleThe channel C003 is inserted into the above hierarchy because a channel containingking:peng!:flies is contained in T (S). There is also a channel in T (S) contain-ing the constraint king:peng!flies. However, this channel is the serial compositionof a number of channels, one of which is C2, so by the denition of default channelhierarchy there is no channel in the hierarchy playing the same role as C003 for C4|-i.e. :king:peng is not inserted as a background condition to C4. From the hierarchy,(C1 ; C4) : king:peng!:flies is obtained by serial composition. Note that if :king:penghad been inserted as a background condition to C4, then this generic would not havebeen inferred.4.3.6 Patterns of Inference RevisitedIn this section, I show that the desirable patterns of inference described in Section 4.1.2are supported by the channel theoretic logic of generics. For a comparison to be madebetween the channel theoretic logic and more standard logics, I need to ignore the roleplayed by the supporting channels, of course, as was done with the logic of conditionalsof Chapter 3. Given the discussion of Section 4.3.2, this is done by (i) assuming that allchannels (reexively) link the same classication and (ii) existentially quantifying overchannels. This second point can be made more precise as follows.6868The concept of the channel theoretic logic of generics supporting a pattern of inference is pretty muchequivalent to the concept of the channel theoretic logic of conditionals supporting a rule of inference(Section 3.6.3), given the denition of `j;'.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 166Denition The channel theoretic logic of generics validates the pattern of inferenceA1!B1...An!BnA!Bif for channels C1; :::; Cn containing constraints69 A1!B1 ; :::; An!Bn respectively thereis a channel C such that fC1; :::; Cng j; C and C contains the constraint A!B.It will be convenient to extend the notation involving `j;' to involve constraints,rather than channels. In particular, I will sometimes write f1! 1; :::; n! ng j;! as an abbreviation for the following: there exist channels C1; :::; Cn; C such thatfC1; :::; Cng j; C and 1! 1 2 typ(C1); :::; n! n 2 typ(Cn); ! 2 typ(C).Given the above interpretation of the patterns of inference as they occur in standardlogics of generics, I now turn to the patterns summarised in Section 4.1.2.SpecicityI showed in Section 4.3.5 how the standard penguin example is handled. In general,f! ; !g j; ! , but f! ; !; !:g 6j; ! .70 It is easily seen why thisis so|: conicts with the consequent of ! , so : is inserted as a backgroundassumption of ! , thereby preventing the conditional serial composition of C1 and C2from containing the constraint ! .Irrelevant conditionsThe problem of Irrelevance is one that proves thorny to accounts of default reasoningbased on logics of conditionals. Morreau's (1992a) process of normalisation ensuresthat he avoids this particular problem. The problem does not arise for the channeltheoretic logic because of the assumption that all background conditions to the givenconstraints are contained within the constraints themselves. That is, any conditionthat is \irrelevant" (in the sense that it is not mentioned explicitly in the given setof constraints) will not be part of the background conditions of those constraints and69Recall that the *-operator (introduced in Section 3.6.3) maps sentences of some propositional lan-guage to corresponding types.70This also shows that Defeasible Transitivity is supported by the channel theoretic model.
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ect on the channel operations or on the patterns of inferencesupported. So, for example:fbird!fliesg j; (bird ^ red)!flies.However, if there happened to be a regularity between an object being red and aninability of it to y, then this inference would no longer hold; i.e.fbird!flies; red!:fliesg 6j; (bird ^ red)!fliessince in this case, :red would be inserted as a background condition to bird!flies inthe default channel hierarchy.71Graded Normality and Defeasible TransitivityGraded Normality is an important requirement for a logic of generics. In the chan-nel theoretic system, this property is easily obtained since an exception in one channelneed not be an exception in any other channel. Hence, even if Leo is an albino lion (e.g.Leo 7! Leo is an exception in the channel C1 containing lion!brown), he need not be anexception to the generic asserting he is dangerous (e.g. (Leo 7! Leo : lion!dangerous)may hold in channel C2).The interaction of Graded Normality with Defeasible Transitivity is also not a prob-lem for the channel theoretic framework. Given S = f! ; !;  !; !:g, :is inserted as a background assumption to  ! but not as a background assumptionto  ! . Hence, the serial composition of ! with  ! is permitted, while theconditional serial composition of ! with  ! is blocked. That is, S j; ! butS 6j; !.Other patterns of inferenceSo far, I have examined several important patterns of inference from the literatureon generics and default reasoning to show that the channel theoretic logic of generics71This example illustrates the use of Defeasible Monotonicity. In general, f! g j; ( ^ )! , butf! ; ( ^ )!: g 6j; ( ^ )! . The second pattern of inference does not hold because :( ^ ) isinserted as a background assumption to ! in the default channel hierarchy, preventing the conditionalserial composition with the constraint ( ^ )! from the logical channel. Note that by the denition,: is not inserted as a background condition to ( ^ )!: because of the presence of ( ^ )! inthe logical channel (i.e. the rst proviso in the denition in Section 4.3.3 covers this case).
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es many important properties, as far as its inferential behaviour is concerned. InChapter 3, a wide variety of axioms and rules of inference from standard conditionallogics were examined as a way of measuring the power of the channel theoretic logic ofconditionals. Not all of these are universally accepted of course, and I discussed someof the arguments in favour of rejecting those that were not supported by the channeltheoretic logic.In the default reasoning literature, there are a number of important pieces of workthat discuss patterns of reasoning that a nonmonotonic consequence relation shouldsatisfy (e.g. (Gabbay 1985; Makinson 1989; Kraus et al. 1990; Kraus et al. 1990;Lehmann 1989)). These patterns include some of those that are considered unacceptablein a logic of conditionals (e.g. Rational Monotonicity (Kraus et al. 1990) is eectivelyequivalent to the axiom CV, which Nute (1980) rejects as a suitable axiom in a logic ofconditionals). These lower bounds on nonmonotonic consequence relations provide animportant set of tests to which the channel theoretic logic of generics can be put. I willdescribe them in detail, and analyse the channel theoretic logic in light of them, afterdening a logic of default reasoning in Chapter 5.4.3.7 Further ExamplesIn this section, I present further examples illustrating the patterns of inferences sup-ported by the channel theoretic logic of generics. Some of these examples are takenfrom collections of \benchmark problems" of default reasoning (e.g. (Delgrande 1992;Lifschitz 1989)), although I am still only concerned with the inference of new defaultrules at this point.Multiple inheritanceThis example, taken from (Lifschitz 1989), is an extension of the Nixon diamond exam-ple. \Quakers are normally pacists"\Republicans are normally hawks"\Pacists are normally politically active"\Hawks are normally politically active"\Pacists are not hawks".




C2 : republican!hawkC1 : quaker!pacifist C5 : pacifist!:hawk
C01 : (quaker ^ :republican)!pacifistC02 : (republican ^ :quaker)!hawk C002 : (republican ^ :pacifist)!hawk
Figure 4.5: Partial Channel Hierarchy for Multiple Inheritance ExampleThe more interesting channels that can be constructed from the original ones arethe following:(C1 ; C3) : quaker!active(C2 ; C4) : republican!activeC002 : (republican ^ :quaker)!hawk.The interesting point of this example is that we do not obtain the analogous constraintto the last one above, with the roles of republican and quaker reversed|i.e. there is nochannel in the hierarchy supporting the constraint (quaker ^ :republican)!hawk.73The reason for this is that the contrapositive channel to C5 is not used when construct-ing the hierarchy (under the current denition of a default channel hierarchy)|it is thepresence of C5 that results in channel C002 being added to the default channel hierarchy(by denition), but without the contraposition of C5, we do not obtain an analogous72Actually, the last of these is meant to be a strict relationship|i.e. one with no exceptions. I willtreat it as a generic for now, but will comment on this point later.73This conclusion is the only one required by Lifschitz that the system does not obtain.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 170background channel for C1, which is what is required for inferring the missing generic.The use of Contraposition (and Parallel Composition) in the construction of a defaultchannel hierarchy is discussed in Section 4.4.3. Note, however, that the regularity sup-ported by C5 is actually meant to be a \strict" one (i.e. it is not defeasible). If thisregularity had been represented within the logical channel (as discussed in Section 4.3.2)then the contraposition of the regularity would have been available in the construction(since logical channels are closed under all the (standard) channel operations) and theabove problem would have been averted.King penguins revisitedConsider again the example involving king penguins from Section 4.3.5, and suppose thefollowing channel is added to the initial set S of channels:C5 : king:peng!bird.In this case, there is a channel C 2 T (S) containing the constraint king:peng!fliessuch that C that is not formed from a composition involving C2 (C is formed fromthe (standard) serial composition of C5 and C3). Hence, the resulting default channelhierarchy does contain a channel C04 : (penguin ^ :king:peng)!:flies, such thatC4 v C04. The presence of this channel prevents the conditional serial composition of C1with C4, and the desired generic\King penguins don't y."is not obtained.In standard inheritance reasoning, the link from king:peng to bird is considered tobe redundant|any information that can be inferred along it can also be inferred alongthe composition of the links corresponding to C1 and C2. One could also argue that thelink C5 is eectively redundant within the channel theoretic framework|e.g. it could beargued that C5 is just the serial composition of C1 and C2|and C5 being asserted as achannel in its own right does not prevent it being the case that C5 = (C1 ; C2). I believethat this argument carries some weight and would resolve the problem since the secondproviso in the denition of default channel hierarchy would then apply. However, I willnot press this point any further here.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 1714.4 Extensions to the LogicIn this section, I consider some possible extensions to the logic of generics dened above.Note that the logical machinery itself is not modied by any of these extensions|i.e.the channel operations remain equivalent to those dened in Chapter 3. The discussionof this section centres around increasing the representational power of the logic (e.g.representing strict, or taxonomic, relationships in a more natural way) and constrainingthe denition of a default channel hierarchy so that a more satisfactory logic results.4.4.1 Representing the Dyadic GEN OperatorThe dyadic GEN operator was introduced to account for certain generics with multiplereadings. For example,\Mary smokes after dinner."has (at least) two readings, which can be represented respectively as follows:GEN [x; s; ](x = mary ^ smoking(x; s) ; after:dinner(s))GEN [x; s; ](x = mary ^ after:dinner(s) ^ in(x; s) ; smoking(x; s)).These two readings eectively involve interchanging the antecedent and consequent andthe distinction between the two is thereby easily accounted for in the channel theoreticanalysis.74More generally, however, GEN involves parameters or variables which are not boundby the generic quantier, as discussed in Section 4.1.3. For example, consider the fol-lowing generic, taken from TGB :\Typhoons arise over this part of the Pacic."Again, this generic has (at least) two readings which can be represented as follows:GEN [x; y](typhoon(x) ; this:part:of:the:Pacific(y) ^ arose:in(x; y))GEN [x; y](this:part:of:the:Pacific(x) ; typhoon(y) ^ arose:in(y; x)).In each of the above representations, the variable y is existentially quantied|e.g. inthe rst, given a (normal/typical) typhoon x, there is required to be some y such that74The denition of situation theoretic objects which adequately represent the types described by therestrictor and matrix of each of these semantic forms is outside the scope of this thesis. However see(Cavedon and Glasbey 1994).
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 172y is in \this part of the Pacic" and x arose there. We would like to be able to modelthis behaviour within the channel theoretic framework. One possibility is to use theframework described in Section A.3, incorporating situation theoretic parameters. Inthe treatment of parameters described in that section, any parameters which are con-tained only in the consequent of a constraint are eectively existentially quantied. Forexample, the rst of the above generics involving typhoons could be seen as describing achannel containing a constraint of the following form, where all types are situation-types:typhoon(X)!this:part:of:the:Pacific(Y ) ^ arose:in(X;Y )Given the treatment of parameters within the channel theoretic setting the genericdescribing this constraint could be paraphrased as follows:\In (normal) situations, for any typhoon there is somewhere in this part of thePacic such that the typhoon arose there."Under this interpretation, the generic quantication involves situations rather thantyphoons|I am unclear as to whether this makes any signicant dierence linguisti-cally.A potential alternative approach, suggested to me by Robin Cooper, is to use n-arytypes rather than parameters. Consider again the rst reading of the above genericinvolving typhoons. This can be seen as describing a channel containing a constraint ofthe following form:typhoon!arose:in:this:part:of:the:Pacific.75The type typhoon is a unary type that classies tokens as being typhoons while the typearose.in.this.part.of.the.Pacic is a binary type classifying a pair of tokens ht; pi exactlywhen p is in \this part of the Pacic" and t arose there. While this constraint does notinvolve any explicit quantication, its behaviour seems to involve implicit quanticationof the sort required of the GEN operator. For example, consider a \normal" typhoontoken t. If t is a normal token (with respect to the above constraint) then t is involvedin a connection t 7! ht; pi that is classied by the constraint. But this would requirethere to be some \this part of the Pacic" token p such that t arose there|i.e. while tis generically quantied, p is eectively existentially quantied, which is the behaviourrequired for modelling the GEN operator.75It is more general to view the consequent of this constraint as a conjunction of two types but itslightly simplies the discussion to treat it as a single binary type.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 173The investigation of the use of n-ary types in constraints to obtain the quantica-tional behaviour required of the GEN operator is a topic for further research.4.4.2 Strict LinksWhile an important tenet of channel theory is that any regularity can have exceptions,taxonomic relationships are exceptionless. Such relationships can be represented usingthe type-entailment relation. For example, \Penguins are birds" can be represented viathe type entailment bird A penguin|this would ensure that any token in the classi-cation A that was classied by the type penguin would also be classied by the typebird. Given the discussion in Section 4.3.2, such type-entailment relationships are alsorepresented in any appropriate logical channel associated with a kernel default channel.76To allow a more consistent treatment of generics, however, exceptionless regularities arehandled in the same way as those with exceptions. This requires the denition of a strictchannel.77Denition A channel C : A) B is strict, written C!, if none of the tokens of A arepseudo-signals and none of the tokens of C are exceptions to any of C's types.An important property that a logical channel possesses is that it eectively doesnot participate in a channel hierarchy|for a logical channel L, if L v C then L = C.This condition is also required of strict channels.78 Logical channels are also requiredto be closed under the channel operations. Since a strict channel does not have anybackground conditions encoded into it, then contraposing it or composing it with itselfis equivalent under the standard and conditional operations. Further, the discussion ofthe following section ensures that contrapositions of strict channels are available whenconstructing a kernel hierarchy (alleviating the problem with the Multiple Inheritance76In logical accounts of default reasoning, such taxonomic relationships are simply represented via amaterial implication. Default inheritance networks do not generally allow strict inheritance links (anexception is the work by Horty and Thomason (1988)). As should become clear below, if all taxonomicrelationships were represented via type-entailment and logical channels, then the problem identied inthe Multiple Inheritance example in Section 4.3.7 is avoided.77In his early presentation of channel theory, Barwise (1993) denes the concept of a constraint ! being absolute on a channel C, meaning that ! had no pseudo-signals with respect to C. Since theconcept of a connection being an exception in a channel does not exist in Barwise's formulation, absoluteconstraints are exactly those for which there are no counter-examples. Barwise uses the notation c :  !! to denote the fact that ! is an absolute constraint.78Actually, it need not be|since a strict channel C! contains no pseudo-signals or exceptions, anybackground assumptions encoded via a super-channel have no eect on C!.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 174example of Section 4.3.7).4.4.3 Tightening the Hierarchy|Contraposition and Parallel Compo-sitionIn the denition of a kernel default hierarchy, it was necessary to consider the (standard)transitive closure of channels when determining the defeaters of a constraint|i.e. whendetermining which types needed to be inserted as background conditions to a givenconstraint. This necessity was illustrated by the King Penguin example. However, itwas noted that it was also necessary to close the channels under contraposition andparallel composition if an adequate logic is to be obtained. For example, consider thestandard Penguin example but suppose that the \Penguins don't y" generic is replacedby \Flying things aren't penguins":C1 : bird!fliesC2 : penguin!birdC3 : flies!:penguin.The kernel hierarchy for this example does not require any background conditions tobe inserted for C1. When one then applies the conditional operators, C1 and C2 can beserially composed to yield a channel that contains the constraint penguin!flies.To ensure that :penguin is inserted as a background condition to channel C1, thecontraposition channel C3, which contains penguin!:flies, needs to be involved in theconstruction of the kernel hierarchy. For similar reasons, parallel composition also needsto be involved, leading to the following revision of the denition of a kernel channelhierarchy.Denition Let S be a collection of channels containing a logical channel L. Let T (S)be the collection of channels obtained by closing S under standard serial and parallelcomposition and standard contraposition. The kernel default channel hierarchy for S isthe smallest hierarchy K of channels containing S such that:for each channel C1 : ! in S and each channel C2 : ! 0 in T (S), such that ? 0, K contains the channel C01 : ( ^ :)! , where C1 vf C01 and f(! ) =( ^ :)! ; unless either1. there is a channel C : ! in T (S); or2. C2 is formed by a composition involving a channel C0 : !, for some .
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 175This revised denition of a kernel hierarchy serves to make the logic weaker|sincethere are potentially more constraints (formed by parallel composition and contrapo-sition) in T (S), then there are potentially more defeaters to each constraint. Hence,there are potentially more background conditions inserted into the hierarchy, and there-fore potentially fewer new constraints that can be inferred via the conditional channeloperations. As a specic illustration, the example above (containing flies!:penguin)will now have :penguin inserted as a background assumption to C1, preventing theunwanted transitive inference.4.4.4 Strengthening the Logic by Constraining the HierarchyIn Chapter 3, I showed how a channel hierarchy could be constrained to satisfy certainconditions, thereby ensuring that certain patterns of inference were supported by thechannel theoretic logic of conditionals. So far, the only such constraints I have imposedon a default hierarchy is that it satises the Antecedent and Consequent BackgroundConditions. If the other conditions are also imposed, particularly Reliability and Con-sequent Consistency, then the logic of generics will be similarly strengthened. In fact, itturns out that these conditions are needed if the logic of default reasoning of Chapter5 is to satisfy all of Kraus et al's (1990) required patterns of defeasible reasoning. Thisissue is discussed in Chapter 5.79Of course, the logic of generics as it stands is dependent on the denition of a kerneldefault hierarchy|changing this denition would result in some dierent patterns ofinference being supported while others would become invalidated. The current deni-tion is a fairly simple one, designed to reect the Fundamental Observation that thebackground conditions to a set of generics or default rules are somehow implicitly con-tained in that set. Revisions to the denition of a default hierarchy may well result ina logic of generics that better captures intuitively acceptable patterns of inference, butthis is not of great concern to me here. The main contribution of the channel theoreticlogic of generics is to show that the framework in which the logic of conditionals wasconstructed (in Chapter 3) can be easily modied to accommodate a logic suitable forgenerics without any modication to the \logical" operations themselves. The fact that79Actually, I will take a rather dierent approach to ensuring that conditions similar to Reliability andConsequent Consistency are satised|i.e. I will instead impose conditions on the signalling relations ofchannels.
A Channel Theoretic Model for Reasoning with Generics 176the resulting system satises the important test principles described above shows thatit is a useful one for reasoning about generics.4.5 DiscussionThe simple channel theoretic analysis of generics provided in this chapter addressessome important issues that have proved problematic to other accounts. In particular,the context (i.e. channel) supporting the regularity corresponding to a given genericseems to play an important role. Most importantly (to the current enterprise) is thata logic for reasoning about generics was obtained without a need to reduce the truthof generics to relationships involving individuals. This logic was obtained directly fromthe channel theoretic conditional logic of the previous chapter by incorporating a simplerestriction on appropriate channel hierarchies.The fact that the truth of a generic does not involve individuals (in the currentanalysis) means that an extra mechanism|an assumption of maximal normality|isrequired before the system dened in this chapter can be used for defeasibly reasoningabout the properties of individuals. This is the topic of the following chapter.
Chapter 5
A Channel{Theoretic Model ofDefault Reasoning
In the previous chapter, I showed how the channel-theoretic framework for reasoningabout conditionals could be modied to obtain a system for reasoning about generics.Since a channel-type (with which the descriptive content of a generic is associated) isa primitive object, this treatment eectively takes generics to be simply true or simplyfalse (with respect to some channel). Morreau (1992a) notes that such treatments donot directly lead to a logic for reasoning defeasibly about the properties of individualsusing generics|an extra assumption of \normality" is required.In this chapter, I dene a condition that enforces an agent's expectations about achannel (in particular, the pseudo-signals and exceptions associated with a channel) tobe \maximally normal"|i.e. an individual is not treated as an exception to the ruleunless the given evidence requires that it be so. The denition of such a condition leadsto a logic for default reasoning, obtained from the system for reasoning about generics ofthe previous chapter. Some extra machinery is required since default reasoning is linkedto an agent's expectations or limited set of knowledge|i.e. the set of valid inferenceslicensed by default inference is dependent on an agent's epistemic state, not just on theway the world is. This requires a notion of projection: given some information (i.e. acollection of propositions) that an agent holds in some epistemic state, a set of channelsis used to \project" that information so as to infer further information. This conceptwas dened in Section 2.3.6 (S&B (1993) dene a similar concept).177
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 1785.1 PreliminariesBefore dening the formal concepts required for the channel-theoretic model of defaultreasoning, I briey discuss some important conceptual issues.5.1.1 Contextual Default ReasoningIn Section 5.2, a maximal normality condition is dened which, when imposed on achannel hierarchy,1 results in a system for reasoning defeasibly about tokens and thetypes they satisfy. This condition is dened with respect to a given hierarchy|whethera token is \normal" or not in a channel is determined by comparing what is knownabout the token to the implicit background conditions of the channel.The resulting model of default reasoning corresponds to a methodology of contextualor situated reasoning. The maximal normality denition ensures that for any channel Cin which some token t is a pseudo-signal, there is some superchannel C0 of C in which t isnot a pseudo-signal.2 This channel C0 can be seen as the \most appropriate context" inwhich to reason about the token t, given the initial collection of information involving t.This corresponds to \reasoning at a level"|an agent does not use the whole hierarchywhen reasoning but rather reasons with some particular channel at some appropriatelevel of the hierarchy.The methodology of situated reasoning that suggests itself involves an agent \choos-ing the appropriate level" in a hierarchy and reasoning with the regularity at that level.The factors aecting the choice of appropriate level are not easily determined. Onepossible factor is the information available to the agent. For example, since movingup a hierarchy in general involves moving to a channel involving a richer collection oftypes, an appropriate level in a hierarchy is one in which the initially given informationuses only types available at that level. These issues are discussed in Section 5.4 and aredemonstrated in an approach to AI's qualication problem.1Actually, the condition is imposed on a hierarchy of links which is obtained from a hierarchy ofchannels.2This is not quite true for reexive channels, since information known about t may conict with aconsequent of a constraint in C.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 1795.1.2 The Need for NormalitySuppose there is a channel C : A) B supporting the regularity that birds y|i.e.typ(C) contains the constraint bird!flies. Now further suppose that A supports theinformation that tweety is a bird|i.e. (tweety : bird) holds in A. From Section 2.3,we know that for this information to carry the information that tweety ies via C,there needs to be a connection tweety 7! tweety in tok(C). As discussed in Chapter4, whether or not a generic is supported by C is independent of the properties of theassociated individuals. In particular, there is no requirement imposed on tweety that itparticipate in any such connection in tok(C), even if nothing more is known about tweetyother than that (tweety : bird) holds, even if it is known that tweety can y! This iseectively an occurrence of the potential problem discussed earlier, whereby accounts ofgenerics based on \simple truth" may not lead to a system for default reasoning aboutthe properties of the associated individuals. This occurs because the fact that somegiven regularity holds|in this case, that birds y|does not provide any informationabout the associated individuals.The solution to this problem is via some normality assumption|i.e. an assump-tion that individuals are normal except in circumstances where they are known not tobe so. This is analogous to processes in other logical treatments of generics, such asnormalisation in Morreau's Commonsense Entailment or the circumscription of abnor-mality predicates. An important dierence is that the normality assumption is not builtinto the logic for reasoning about generics themselves|the truth of generics is separatefrom the processes involved in using generics to reason defeasibly about individuals. Inthe channel-theoretic model, an exception to a rule corresponds either to an individ-ual that does not participate in a connection or to a connection that does not behave\normally"|i.e. pseudo-signals and exceptions to channel-types. In the frameworkdescribed below, I will draw a distinction between when an abnormal individual corre-sponds to a pseudo-signal and when it participates in an exception. This distinction isbased on the denition of inference using links (see Section 2.3.2).Reasoning defeasibly with generics generally involves reasoning with incomplete in-formation. For example, if tweety is classied as being a bird, but it is unknown whatsort of bird tweety is, then it is reasonable to conclude that tweety ies. However, if itis known that tweety is a penguin then this is no longer a reasonable inference. As such,the process of default inference cannot be based directly on channels since the inference
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 180from (tweety : bird) to (tweety : flies) may rely on a connection tweety 7! tweety (inthe channel containing bird!flies) that is not there. Instead, the model of defaultreasoning dened below requires an agent to construct an information link L (basedon the channel C supporting the \Birds y" regularity) which is then used to draw thedefault conclusion. It is this link L that satises the maximal normality property|i.e.that there are as few pseudo-signals as possible. The normality condition is formallydened below after the process of inference using links is described.5.1.3 An Intuitive Interpretation of Maximal NormalityThe term \normality" has been used a number of dierent ways in this thesis. In Chapter2, I discussed how Barwise and Seligman (1993) consider a connection being classiedby a constraint as signifying that \normal conditions" are in place. In the previouschapter, I surveyed Boutilier and Morreau's logics of \normality". And in this chapter,I dene a notion of \maximal normality" which is required for default reasoning aboutindividuals. These concepts are related.The logics of normality described in the previous chapter make use of normalityorderings on worlds|i.e. worlds are ordered in increasing normality.3 A world w ismore normal than another w0 if w satises more of the expectations of what normallyholds. For example, if \Birds normally y" is asserted, then (in the absence of otherinformation) a world in which birds y is deemed more normal than one in which theydon't.Normality in the sense used by S&B is related but slightly dierent. To S&B , \nor-mality" reects those conditions that are in place when a given connection is classiedby a given constraint in some particular channel. The normal conditions in this senseare all those conditions that are required to be in place so that the type of information-ow licensed by the channel could successfully take place for that particular connectionand constraint. Of course, it is impossible to list all such conditions so we must besatised with knowing they are in place when the information-ow successfully occurs.The \agent's expectations" comes into play by the way she carves the world up intochannel-tokens and channel-types|if a channel contains a constraint  and connectionc, then the agent \expects" that conditions are normal, i.e. that the information-ow3This is a slight simplication, of course, as is apparent from the discussion from Section 4.1.4.However, this abuse is acceptable in the current informal setting.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 181involving this connection and constraint takes place. The link corresponding to thischannel would support the corresponding inference via the model of inference describedin Section 2.3.6.The notion of maximal normality dened below takes the channel-theoretic notionof normality and incorporates the usual default reasoning assumption that \things areas normal as possible". As will be seen, this eectively involves assuming that a givenconnection is classied by a constraint unless the given information|i.e. the informationthat makes up the premise of the default inference|conicts with this assumption. Ofcourse, the channel theoretic model of inference involves links rather than channels, sothe assumption of maximal normality involves assuming that a link's signalling relationcontains all relevant pairs except those that would lead to the inference of conictinginformation.4 The way in which this condition is dened is actually less circular thanthis informal description suggests and is based on a default hierarchy and the subchannelrelation. However, the intuitions underlying the denition below can be thought of inthe above terms.5.1.4 Pseudo-Signals and Exceptions AgainChannel theory allows for two major sorts of errors: pseudo-signals and exceptions.Some of the conceptual dierences between these two types of errors were discussed inSection 2.3.4. However, whether an error-token should be classed as an exception ora pseudo-signal is at best vague, and a counterexample could be best represented asan exception in one view of the world but as a pseudo-signal in another (equally valid)view. When dealing with inference, however, making a token a pseudo-signal is the onlyway in which to prevent that token from being involved in an inference (assuming thatthe token satises the antecedent of the constraint in question) since inference proceedsalong a connection and hence an exception will license inference (even if the conclusionis an erroneous one). As such, tokens that are \abnormal" with respect to the agent'spoint of view|which is what is modelled by the maximal normality condition below|will need to be pseudo-signals. For example, if tweety is known to be a penguin, thentweety will be a pseudo-signal in the channel containing bird!flies. The crucial pointis that I want to model reasonable inference: if an agent knows that tweety is a penguin,4I originally used a denition very similar to this in an early channel-theoretic framework for modellingReiter's Default Logic (Cavedon 1993).
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 182then the agent should not infer that tweety can y.A comprehensive model of situated default reasoning still has use for the conceptof exceptions. The logic of defaults below models what an agent infers, based on cer-tain information. For example, if tweety is a penguin then htweety; tweetyi will becontained in the maximally normal signalling relation associated with the link L sup-porting penguin!:flies, leading to the inference that tweety does not y. However, iftweety happens to have a jetpack strapped to his back, then he may indeed be able toy. In this case, the connection involving tweety|i.e. the connection corresponding tothe above signalling relation tuple|would be an exception in the channel correspondingto L and the inference that tweety is unable to y would be an erroneous one. Since achannel hierarchy may be incomplete|i.e. it may be that not all possible backgroundassumptions to a channel are represented in a given default hierarchy|some of the re-sulting default inferences may be incorrect, even when all information necessary for acorrect inference is available.5 That said, exceptions will be pretty much ignored for therest of this chapter, which is concerned with \reasonable inference".5.2 A Logic for Default ReasoningIn this section, I present the formal concepts of the model of default reasoning. Beforedoing so, however, I review and extend some of the concepts relating to inference viainformation links (see also Section 2.3.6).As usual, I assume a number of simplications in what follows. These are basicallythe same as those described in Section 4.3.2 and are used to \decontextualise" the systemof default reasoning so as to allow direct comparison with more standard logics of defaultreasoning. In particular, all channels and links are assumed to be reexive (i.e. link aclassication to itself) and it is assumed that there is only a single (global) classicationA with which all channels and links are concerned.5That is, even if I know that tweety is wearing a jetpack, if I don't know that this will allow him toy then I will infer that (being a penguin) he can't.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 1835.2.1 Inference via Information LinksIn Section 2.3.6, I dened the process of inference, which is based on information links.Such information links are based on channels, in that the constraints and signallingrelation of a link L are derived from the types (i.e. regularities) and connections of somechannel C. Given a link L and collection of propositions 	, the predicted inferencesfrom 	 supported by L are denoted by ConsqL(	). Inference via a link in this way issaid to induce a classication B from 	; alternatively, ConsqL(	) is the projection of	 along L. These concepts are all dened in Section 2.3.6.Given the notion of inference via information links, what remains to be providedis the property of the particular links that are used in a channel-theoretic model ofdefault reasoning. These links are based on the channels of a default hierarchy, asdened in the previous chapter, but are required to satisfy a condition that enforces acondition of maximal normality, as dened below, on the signalling relations of thoselinks. I need to dene several concepts related to links before dening the frameworkfor default reasoning. The rst of these is a sublink relation, analogous to the conceptof a subchannel relation (see Section 3.3.1).6 One prior piece of notation I need is thefollowing: for a tuple h;  i, ante(h;  i) =  and succ(h;  i) =  .Denition Let L : A !! B and L0 : A0 !! B0 be information links and let f be a functionfrom L^ to L0 ^ 7. L is a A0;B0 {sublink of L0 wrt f , written L f;A0;B0 L0, if1. A 6 A0, B 6 B0;2. L_  L0 _ ;3. for all h;  i 2 L^ ,  A0 ante(f(h;  i)) and succ(f(h;  i)) B0  (where f(h;  i) 2 L0 ^ ).8The concept of a link hierarchy mirrors that of a channel hierarchy. Of course, thereis no classication relation associated with a link so there are fewer conditions requiredof a pair of links related by sublink than of a pair of channels related by subchannel.The following result is a useful aside.Proposition 5.2.1 For any channels C and C0, if C vf C0 then Link(C) f Link(C0).6The denition of an information link, and the related terminology, was presented in Section 2.3.2.7Recall that L^ is the indicating relation and L_ the signalling relation of the link L.8Note that this condition is exactly analogous to the last condition of the denition of subchannel.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 184Proof See Appendix D. 2To obtain a logic of default reasoning from the system for reasoning about generics,I actually need to derive a link hierarchy from a particular channel hierarchy|i.e. givena default hierarchy, an appropriate link hierarchy is obtained from it.Denition Given a channel hierarchy hC;Fi (where C is a collection of channels andF is a collection of functions) the sublink hierarchy constructed from hC;Fi is denedas follows:1. the collection of links in the hierarchy is fLink(C) j C 2 Cg;2. the collection of functions required for the sublink relation is as follows: for allchannels C1; C2 in C such that C1 vf C2, f 0 is the function such that f 0(h1;  1i) =h2;  2i i 1! 1 2 typ(C1), 2! 2 2 typ(C2) and f(1! 1) = 2! 2.3. Link(C1) f 0 Link(C2) i C1 vf C2.It is easily shown that the above denes a valid hierarchy of information links, givena valid hierarchy of channels to begin with. Moving from a default channel hierarchyto a corresponding hierarchy of links is the rst step in dening a system for defaultreasoning. The central step involves the imposition of a maximal normality conditionon the signalling relations of these links, modelling the property of default reasoningwhereby as many consistent conclusions as possible are drawn. This is discussed in thenext section.5.2.2 Maximal NormalityI have already discussed how an assumption of maximal normality|i.e. the assumptionthat individuals are as normal as possible|is required to extend the logic of generics ofChapter 4 to yield a system appropriate to defeasibly reasoning about the properties ofindividuals. In this section, I discuss some of the properties that a normality conditionshould intuitively possess, given the channel hierarchy framework for reasoning aboutgenerics. I also dene a specic normality condition.In the channel-theoretic model of generics, a channel-type (i.e. constraint) representsa rule which is generally reliable but which may contain exceptions. Some of the casesin which an exception occurs is captured by the way in which the channel C supportingthe rule is related to other channels within a given channel hierarchy. Individuals that
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 185are exceptional with respect to the regularity correspond to either pseudo-signals orexceptions in C. In the framework for default reasoning, I deal with links rather thanchannels and an individual for which a regularity is inapplicable (with respect to somegiven information) is a pseudo-signal in the link corresponding to the channel supportingthat regularity. If the system for default reasoning is to infer as much as consistentlypossible about individuals, then it seems that pseudo-signals should occur only in thefollowing sorts of cases: Given information conicts with information that would be inferred.For example, in the standard penguin example, if one is told that tweety is a birdand that tweety doesn't y, then tweety should be a pseudo-signal in the linkwhose indicating relation corresponds to the constraint bird!flies. Inheritance from separate premises would conict. In this case, we havetwo dierent links that potentially lead to conicting conclusions. For example, ifin the penguin example one is told that tweety is both a bird and a penguin, thentweety should be a pseudo-signal in one of the two links respectively supportingbird!flies and penguin!:flies.The rst of these cases is taken care of by ensuring that a token is a pseudo-signalif its being otherwise would lead directly to a conclusion that conicts with the giveninformation. That is, given a link L : A !! A whose indicating relation supports theconstraint ! , if (t : ) and (t : : ) both hold in A, then t should be a pseudo-signalin L, since otherwise L would support the inference of (t :  ), which conicts with(t : : ).The second case above is blocked by considering the sublink hierarchy that is ob-tained from a default channel hierarchy. In a hierarchy of links (or channels), thebackground conditions of a particular link L are made explicit in some link L0 of whichL is a sublink|i.e. L f L0. The constraints in L0 that correspond to those in L|forexample, suppose f(h;  i) = h0;  0i|are more \rened" versions of those in L. In par-ticular, h0;  0i may explicitly contain a type that is an implicit background assumptionto h;  i. Any such background condition must be one that conicts with the succedentof some other regularity, given the denition of a default channel hierarchy in Chapter 4.For example, the background assumptions to the constraint bird!flies are going to betypes of the form : such that there is some constraint !:flies in some other link. Assuch, a token t for which (t : bird) holds should be a pseudo-signal to this constraint if
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 186(t : ) holds, where : is a background assumption to the constraint bird!flies. Suchbackground assumptions are determined by searching upwards in the link hierarchy.9These intuitions lead to the following denition.Denition Let L : A !! A be an information link (which is part of a link hierarchy)containing a constraint ! , 	 a collection of propositions (formed from the tokensand types of A), and t 2 tok(A) a token such that (t : ) 2 	. The pair ht; ti is said tobe internally inappropriate to the signalling relation L_ wrt 	 if either:1. (t :  0) 2 	 and  ? 0, or2. there exists a link L0 such that L f L0, where f(h;  i) = h0;  0i, and (t : ) 2 	,where  ?0.Later, in Section 5.3.2, I also dene the concept of external inappropriateness andtake a connection to be inappropriate if it is either internally or externally inappropriate.I will sometimes abbreviate the way I refer to the above concepts by saying a tuple isinappropriate in a link L, rather than in the signalling relation of L. Also, I will referto a tuple that is not inappropriate in L as being appropriate in L.The concept ofmaximal normality is dened as follows. I have used a biconditional|i.e. if and only if|to reect that the concept dened corresponds to maximal normality.This reects the intuition that defeasible reasoning involves inferring as much informa-tion as is (consistently) possible.Denition A collection L of links arranged in a sublink hierarchy is said to be maximallynormal wrt 	 (a collection of propositions) if for each link L : A !! A in L and eachtoken t 2 tok(A), ht; ti is contained in the signalling relation L_ if and only if L is alogical link10 or ht; ti is appropriate to L_ .A pair ht; ti being inappropriate in a link L does not mean that t is a pseudo-signal inL since t may fail to satisfy the antecedent of any constraint supported by L. However,the converse clearly holds: if t is a pseudo-signal in L then ht; ti is inappropriate in L.Further, if (t : ) holds for some h;  i 2 L^ , then t is a pseudo-signal in L if and onlyif ht; ti is inappropriate in L. (This last property plays an interesting role in Section9Due to mutually conicting constraints being handled via the channel hierarchy, the bias (i.e.towards \more specic" information) required to obtain the Specicity Principle is automaticallysupported.10By logical link, I mean that L is a link corresponding to a logical channel. Notice that this meansthat logical links contain no pseudo-signals.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 1875.4, where I outline a methodology for reasoning defeasibly under the channel hierarchyframework.)While a collection of links is required to be maximally normal for it to be used as thebasis for default reasoning, there is no guarantee that the hierarchy of links obtainedfrom a given default channel hierarchy is itself maximally normal, since there is noguarantee that the channels in the hierarchy satisfy any related condition. Hence, givenan arbitrary collection of links, we require a maximally normal version of it.Denition Let L be a collection of links arranged in a sublink hierarchy and 	 a col-lection of propositions. The maximally normal version of L wrt 	 is a collection oflinks L0 exactly like L, except possibly in the signalling relations of the links, where L0is maximally normal wrt 	.It can be shown that if L is a given hierarchy of links constructed from a defaultchannel hierarchy,11 then the maximally normal version of L preserves the hierarchy, inthat the sublink relation is mirrored in the way illustrated by the following result.Proposition 5.2.2 Let D = hL;Fi be a link hierarchy and let D0 = hL0;Fi be a maxi-mally normal version of D. Further, let L1; L2 2 L, where L1 f L2, and let L01; L02 2 L0be the links corresponding to L1; L2 respectively. Then L01 f L02.Proof See Appendix D. 2As an example of the above denitions, consider the standard penguin example. Thedefault channel hierarchy (ignoring the token-level) for this example is shown in Figure4.2 in Chapter 4. The corresponding sublink hierarchy (again ignoring the signallingrelation) is illustrated in Figure 5.1.Consider a bird token tweety and suppose that (tweety : bird) holds, and that isall. htweety; tweetyi is not inappropriate to L1 and so htweety; tweetyi must be inthe signalling relation of L1 (assuming that the collection of links in the gure satis-es maximal normality). This leads to an inference of (tweety : flies). (Note thathtweety; tweetyi is not inappropriate in L3 since (tweety : penguin) does not hold.)Now suppose that (tweety : :flies) holds. In this case, htweety; tweetyi is inappropri-11The restriction to a default channel hierarchy is required as otherwise the result may not hold|forexample, the denition of sub-link allows a link L to possibly contain a type that does not correspondto any type in a sublink L0 of it, which may result in the maximally normal version of L0 not being asublink of L. This should be made clear on examination of the proof of the following result.
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.......... ............L1 : (bird ^ :penguin)!flies
L1 : bird!flies L3 : penguin!:fliesL2 : penguin!birdFigure 5.1: Link Hierarchy for Penguin Exampleate in L1, and tweety is therefore a pseudo-signal in this link, preventing the inferenceto (tweety : flies). Similarly, if instead (tweety : penguin) holds, then htweety; tweetyiis inappropriate in L1 by virtue of penguin conicting with one of the background con-ditions of L1 as represented in L01. In this case, htweety; tweetyi is not inappropriatein L3 and is therefore contained in the signalling relation of that link, leading to theinference of (tweety : :flies).5.2.3 Default Inference SystemsI am now able to dene the channel-theoretic system for defeasible reasoning. The basisof the system is the logic of generics of Chapter 4, which is used to obtain a defaultchannel hierarchy from an initial collection of channels. Given such a default hierarchy,a corresponding hierarchy of links is extracted. This collection L of links is used as thebasis for defeasibly reasoning about tokens (i.e. individuals)|given a collection 	 ofpropositions, each link in L is required to satisfy maximal normality and the informationprojected from 	 via L is the information defeasibly inferred.Denition Let 	 be a collection of propositions and S12 a collection of channels withcorresponding default channel hierarchy H, and let L be the sublink hierarchy constructedfrom H. The default inference system based on S and 	 is the link hierarchy D that isthe maximally normal version of L wrt 	.It can be quite easily shown that there is a unique default inference system based ona given collection of channels S and collection 	 of propositions.13 Defeasible inference12As usual, I assume that S contains an appropriate logical channel.13Without giving all the details, the outline of the proof is as follows. Under the assumption that
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 189from the information supported by 	 is performed by projecting 	 via the maximallynormal hierarchy D.Denition Let 	 be a collection of (Austinian) propositions and S a collection of chan-nels each supporting a generic or default rule. The collection of default consequencesof 	 wrt S is given by f(t : ) j (t : ) 2 ConsqD(	), where D is the default inferencesystem based on S and 	g.I use the notation 	 j;S p to denote that p is a default consequence of 	 wrt S.5.2.4 Some ExamplesAt this point, it is useful to illustrate the concepts dened so far by considering somesimple examples. Note that most of the logical machinery in a default inference systemresides in the logic of generics|i.e. the system by which new channels are obtainedfrom the given ones by way of the conditional channel operations dened in Chapter3. The maximal normality condition is simply used to ensure that each token appearsin the signalling relations of the pertinent links when they should, ensuring that thecorresponding individual is inferred (via projection) to possess some property.PenguinsThe standard penguin example was used to illustrate the channel theoretic logic ofgenerics in Section 4.3.5. The collection of channels S given initially (i.e. correspondingto the given generics) contains the following:C1 : bird!fliesC2 : penguin!birdC3 : penguin!:flies.The default channel hierarchy (illustrated in Figure 4.2) also contains the followingchannels:there is one unifying classication (which xes the collection of tokens and types for the whole sys-tem), only the denition of a kernel default hierarchy (Section 4.3.3) allows for any non-determinismin the properties of a default system, since the token-level connections of the channels encoding thebackground conditions are unrestricted. However, the signalling relations of all links in a default systemare completely determined by the maximal normality condition.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 190C3 : flies!:penguin(C1 ; C3) : bird!:penguinC1 : :flies!:bird.The links in the sublink hierarchy corresponding to the default channel hierarchy containthe obvious indicating relations corresponding to the constraints of these channels. Thedefault inference system must also satisfy maximal normality, with respect to somecollection 	 of propositions.For the rst instance of this example, suppose that we have a token tweety thatis classied as being a bird|i.e. (tweety : bird) 2 	. The pair htweety; tweetyi isinappropriate only in the link Link(C1)|i.e. that whose indicating relation containsh:flies;:birdi. Hence, tweety is not a pseudo-signal in the maximally normal versionof any of the other links, which allows the following conclusions to be drawn: (tweety :flies); (tweety : :penguin)|i.e.:f(tweety : bird)g j;S (tweety : flies)f(tweety : bird)g j;S (tweety : :penguin).Now suppose that (tweety : :flies) also holds in 	. In this case, htweety; tweetyi isinappropriate in Link(C1) (as well as in Link(C3) and Link(C1)) so tweety is a pseudo-signal in the maximally normal version of this link and the conclusion (tweety : flies)is not drawn. If the only given information is (tweety : :flies), then htweety; tweetyiis no longer inappropriate in Link(C1) and the following is obtained:f(tweety : :flies)g j;S (tweety : :bird).If the only information given initially is (tweety : penguin), then htweety; tweetyi isinappropriate in Link(C1) and the required conclusions are obtained:f(tweety : penguin)g j;S (tweety : bird)f(tweety : penguin)g j;S (tweety : :flies).However, if (tweety : flies) is added to the premise, then only the rst of these isobtained.Multiple InheritanceThe extended version of the standard Nixon Diamond example was described in Section4.3.7. The collection S of given channels contains the following:
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 191C1 : quaker!pacifistC2 : republican!hawkC3 : pacifist!activeC4 : hawk!activeC5 : pacifist!:hawkand the corresponding default hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 4.5. This hierarchy alsocontains the following channels:(C1 ; C3) : quaker!active(C2 ; C4) : republican!active.Let nixon be a token regarding which the following information is known: f(nixon :quaker); (nixon : republican)g.14 The pair hnixon; nixoni is inappropriate in bothLink(C1) and Link(C2) (due to channels C01 and C02|see Figure 4.5) and therefore noconclusion is obtained as regards whether nixon is a pacifist or a hawk. However,hnixon; nixoni is inappropriate in neither of Link(C1 ; C3) nor Link(C2 ; C4) and hencethe following conclusion is obtained:f(nixon : republican); (nixon : quaker)g j;S (nixon : active).The interesting point to note from this example is that the reasoning corresponds tothat termed skeptical (as opposed to credulous) in the inheritance networks literature(e.g. (Touretzky et al. 1987)). Skeptical reasoners are only able to draw conclusions thatfollow \unambiguously" in the sense that two distinct readings of the network cannotbe obtained. For example, a credulous reasoner could be used to infer that nixon is apacifist, or it could be used to infer that nixon is a hawk, but not both conclusions atonce. Skeptical reasoning corresponds to allowing only conclusions that follow in all de-fault extensions when using Reiter's Default Logic, or all stable autoepistemic extensionswhen using autoepistemic logic, or all models when using a model-theoretic nonmono-tonic logic, such as circumscription or commonsense entailment. The channel-theoreticsystem reasons skeptically because of the way default hierarchies are constructed|sinceall potential background conditions are inserted when the succedents of constraints con-ict then the pertinent pairs of the signalling relations will be inappropriate to all such14I haven't been explicit about it before, but it should be noted that the incorporation of a logicalchannel ensures that the form in which information is presented does not aect the behaviour of thelogical system. In particular, if the initial set of propositions is f(nixon : republican ^ quaker)g thenthe same conclusions are reached.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 192constraints.Graded NormalityA nal simple example serves to demonstrate that Graded Normality is supported atthe level of individuals|i.e. an individual that is abnormal in one respect need not beabnormal in any other. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, this property is supported due tothe fact that dierent generics are supported by dierent channels, and a token can bea pseudo-signal in one channel without it necessarily being a pseudo-signal in any other.To illustrate, let S be a collection of channels containing the following:C1 : lion!dangerousC2 : lion!brownand let 	 be the following collection of propositions: f(leo : lion); (leo : :brown)g. Thetuple hleo; leoi is inappropriate in Link(C2) but not in Link(C1), which means that leois a pseudo-signal in the maximally normal counterpart of Link(C2) but not in that ofLink(C1)|i.e.:f(leo : lion); (leo : :brown)g j;S (leo : dangerous).5.3 Evaluating the Logic of DefaultsIn this section, I present some results which help to establish the patterns of reasoningsupported by the channel theoretic logic of default reasoning.5.3.1 Nonmonotonic Consequence RelationsRecent work in the AI literature has been concerned with the investigation of non-monotonic consequence relations. In the spirit of Tarski's work dening the minimalconditions that a consequence relation for a (classical) logic should satisfy, several au-thors have dened general conditions that a nonmonotonic consequence relation shouldsatisfy (e.g. (Gabbay 1985; Makinson 1989; Lehmann 1989; Kraus et al. 1990; Freundet al. 1991; Freund and Lehmann 1993)).15 Gabbay (1985) argued that Tarski's con-15Also of interest is Shoham's (1987) characterisation of nonmonotonic logics using the notion ofpreferred models: i.e. Shoham shows that dierent nonmonotonic logics can be characterised by dening
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 193dition of Monotonicity should be dropped in favour of a condition he called CautiousMonotonicity (see below). Probably the most extensive investigation of nonmonotonicconsequence relations and their properties has been performed by Lehmann and hiscolleagues (e.g. (Lehmann 1989; Kraus et al. 1990; Freund et al. 1991; Freund andLehmann 1993)), and it is this work on which I will base the following discussion. (Inthe following, I will use KLM to refer to (Kraus et al. 1990) and FLM to refer to(Freund et al. 1991)). KLM and FLM give both syntactic and model-theoretic charac-terisations of the conditions that they require of nonmonotonic consequence relations,but I will discuss only the syntactic characterisations here since these are more readilyutilised for analysing the properties of the channel-theoretic default logic.KLM 's syntactic characterisation of nonmonotonic consequence relations is via Gent-zen-style sequents and the specication of minimal conditions that such relations mustsatisfy. A conditional assertion is a syntactic object of the form A j B, where A andB are sentences of some language and `j' denotes nonmonotonic consequence. Theintended interpretation of such an object is \from A, one may sensibly conclude B".Minimal conditions on consequence relations are specied in the following denition.Note that a nonmonotonic consequence relation is assumed to be dened on top of someminimal monotonic consequence relation|monotonic consequence is denoted by `j='.As usual, I use `' to denote material implication and `,' to denote logical equivalence.Denition (KLM) A preferential consequence relation is characterised by the followingconditions:Left Logical Equivalence (LLE) j= A, B A j CB j CRight Weakening (RW) j= A  B C j AC j BReexivity (Re) A j AAnd A j B A j CA j A ^ Corderings between models and dening validity via truth in minimal models rather than in all models.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 194Or A j C B j CA _ B j CCautious Monotonicity (CM) A j B A j CA ^ B j CKraus et al. argue that each of the above conditions is acceptable for nonmonotonicconsequence and illustrate this using various examples. They also show that preferentialrelations can be characterised using preferential models, which impose an ordering onpossible assignments to predicates, similar to Shoham's (1987) notion of preferred model.FLM further investigates nonmonotonic consequence relations and in particular arguesthat nonmonotonic consequence should also satisfy the following condition.Denition (FLM) A rational consequence relation is a preferential consequence relationthat satises the following extra condition:Rational Monotonicity (RM) A j C A 6j :BA ^ B j CKLM contains several revealing results regarding rational relations and the RMcondition in particular. For example, they introduce the following conditions and provethe theorem below.Weak Transitivity (WT) A j B B j C B 6j :AA j CWeak Contraposition (WC) C ^ A j B C 6j BC ^ :B j :ATheorem 5.3.1 (FLM) For preferential relations, Rational Monotonicity is equivalentto Weak Transitivity, and implies Weak Contraposition.This result is of some interest in the context of conditional reasoning. If, as FLMclaim, rationality is a reasonable condition to require a consequence relation to satisfy,then the above result demonstrates why Contraposition and Transitivity are generallyconsidered tenable patterns of inference: the \weak" versions of these rules are valid
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 195for rational relations, and are equivalent to the standard versions under fairly generalconditions.In the following sections, I will show how default consequence, dened with respect tochannel-theoretic default systems, measures up against the KLM and FLM principles.These principles are not satised by all logics of default reasoning16 but do provide auseful generic testbed. Note, however, that these principles are not all well suited to alogic of generics or default reasoning that can involve dierent contexts. For example,And would be an unreasonable pattern of inference if the premises were supported indierent contexts. (This is one of my reasons for the simplifying assumption that allchannels link the same classication to itself).5.3.2 Strengthening NormalityIn Section 3.5, a number of conditions were dened which, when satised by a channelhierarchy, guarantee that certain axioms and rules of inference of traditional conditionallogics are supported by the channel-theoretic system dened in Chapter 3. I arguedthere that these conditions were reasonable ones to expect a channel hierarchy to satisfy,regardless of the logical properties consequently enjoyed by the framework.The channel hierarchy conditions can be partitioned into two classes: the symmetryconstraints, consisting of the Antecedent Background, Consequent Background, ParallelSubchannel and Serial Subchannel Constraints; and the reliability constraints, consist-ing of the Reliability and Consequent Consistency Constraints. This partition is basedon the observation that the symmetry constraints are basically concerned with ensuringthat a channel hierarchy is symmetric (in the way it encodes background assumptions)between antecedents and consequents and that a hierarchy interacts smoothly with thechannel operations; while the reliability constraints are directed at ensuring that chan-nels are not inherently unreliable in the manner demonstrated in Section 3.5. Anotherimportant dierence is that a hierarchy that doesn't satisfy the symmetry constraints canbe modied to one that does, without changing its fundamental properties, by addingcertain channels if necessary. Based on this last property, I will henceforth assume thatany default channel hierarchy satises the symmetry constraints.16In particular, Zhang and Rounds (1993) argue that Cautious Monotonicty should not be validatedby a logic of default reasoning. On the other hand, Boutilier (1992) has shown that his logic CT4 denesa preferential consequence relation while his logic CT4D denes a rational consequence relation.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 196The Reliability and Consequent Consistency Constraints, as they are dened in Sec-tion 3.5, are concerned with the \internal" reliability of channels, ensuring that thetypes linked by constraints in a given channel are not such that the channel is guar-anteed to contain exceptions. However, since the default logic dened here has been\decontextualised" so as to allow direct comparison with more standard principles ofdefault reasoning, the reliability constraints need to be generalised so as to apply acrossmultiple channels. For example, consider the Reliability Constraint, which requires twoconstraints with the same antecedent to have non-conicting background assumptions.In Section 3.5.5, the Reliability Constraint was only required where such pairs of con-straints were from the same channel. However, consider again the peacock exampledescribed earlier which involves (dierent) channels C1 and C2, respectively supportingthe following regularities:peacock!bright:featherspeacock!lays:eggs.These regularities have conicting background assumptions|i.e. the rst involves theassumption that a peacock is male while the second involves the assumption that thepeacock is female. As such, the (default) inference that a given peacock both has brightfeathers and lays eggs should not be allowed.Of course, I do not want to rule out channels of this form, which would be the case ifReliability was required of the corresponding hierarchy.17 Rather, I wish to ensure thatinference behaves properly|i.e. that the associated signalling relations of the maximalnormal links do not lead to the inference of an incoherent collection of information.The current version of normality is not strong enough to ensure this for all cases. Forexample, in the peacock example, if all that is known about the individual pat is thatit is a peacock|i.e. f(pat : peacock)g is the premised information|then there is noconict with the background assumptions of either of the above regularities. Hence, thetuple hpat; pati is not inappropriate (by the denition in Section 5.2.2) in either of thelinks L1 or L2 supporting these regularities and therefore leads to the inference that patboth lays eggs and has bright feathers. Coupled with links corresponding to generics\Peacocks with bright feathers are male" and \Egg-laying peacocks are female", this17Even if I were to impose Reliability and Consequent Consistency on hierarchies, then it would bemuch preferable to determine the conditions which a collection S of channels had to satisfy so as toensure that the default hierarchy corresponding to S satised Reliability, rather than to simply requireall default hierarchies to satisfy Reliability.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 197could further lead to the inference that pat is both male and female.This problem is rectied by the following denition of external inappropriateness.This concept plays a similar role to Reliability and Consequent Consistency, but worksacross channels and involves the token level. Other than the fact that it involves morethan one channel, the following concept is similar to that of internal inappropriatenessdened previously.Denition Let L1 : A !! A and L2 : A !! A be information links (which are part of somelink hierarchy) such that h;  i 2 L1̂ and h; i 2 L2̂ . Further, let 	 be a collectionof propositions formed from the types and tokens of A and let t 2 tok(A) be such that(t : ) holds in 	 and either (t : ) also holds in 	 or  A  . The pair ht; ti is said tobe externally inappropriate to the signalling relations L1̂ and L2̂ wrt 	18 if:1. ht; ti is internally inappropriate in neither L1 nor L2 wrt 	;2. there exist links L01; L02 such that L1 f1 L01, L2 f2 L02, where f1(h;  i) = h0;  0iand f2(h; i) = h 0; 0i, and either 0? or  0? or 0?  0.ht; ti is said to be externally inappropriate in L1 (wrt 	) if there is some channel L2such that ht; ti is externally inappropriate in L1 and L2 (wrt 	).(The type-level conditions specied in the above denition are illustrated in Figure5.2.) The condition that the tuple is not already internally inappropriate in one of thelinks ensures that normality is indeed maximal|i.e. if ht; ti is internally inappropriatein L1, then it will not support the corresponding inference and so the inference sup-ported by L2 can take place without fear of a contradictory conclusion being reached.Similarly|also for reasons of maximising normality|the only occasions in which exter-nal inappropriateness needs to be imposed upon two links is if the antecedents of thelinks are actually satised (or if the antecedent of one is satised and the antecedent ofthe other is entailed by the information thereby inferred). For example, there is no needfor tweety 7! tweety to be externally inappropriate in links supportingpeacocks!bright:featherspeacocks!lays:eggsif tweety is not a peacock.Having dened the above concept, the concept of inappropriateness is extended as18I will often abbreviate this by saying \ht; ti is externally inappropriate in L1, L2".
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...................................................... ......................................................L1 : ! 
L01 : 0! 0f1 f2L2 : !
L02 :  0!0
0? or  0? or 0?  0Figure 5.2: Conditions resulting in external inappropriatenessfollows: ht; ti is inappropriate in L^ wrt 	 if either ht; ti is internally inappropriate inL^ wrt 	 or ht; ti is externally inappropriate in L^ wrt 	. Given this redenition ofinappropriateness, the denition of maximal normality is unchanged|it simply involvesthis extended version of inappropriateness.Finally, as was done with the Reliability Constraint in Section 3.5.5, the denitionof external inappropriateness is generalised to cover the case whereby more than twolinks are mutually conicting.Denition Revised external inappropriateness: Let L1 : A !! A, ..., Ln : A !! A beinformation links such that h1;  1i 2 L1̂ , ..., hn;  ni 2 Ln̂ . Further let 	 be acollection of propositions formed from the types and tokens of A and let t 2 tok(A) besuch that (t : 1) ,..., (t : k) all hold in 	 and (k+1 ^ ::: ^ n) A ( 1 ^ ::: ^  k).The pair ht; ti is said to be externally inappropriate to the signalling relations L1̂ ,...,Ln̂ wrt 	 if:1. ht; ti is internally inappropriate in neither L1 nor ... nor Ln wrt 	;2. there exist links L01, ..., L0n such that Li fi L0i for all i, fi(hi;  ii) = h0i;  0ii forall i, and Vi i, where i is either 0i or  i, is an inconsistent type.The intuitions behind this denition are identical to those for the simpler denitionabove; the revised denition simply acknowledges that a given set of types may bemutually conicting even when no pair from this set is pairwise conicting.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 1995.3.3 Channel Theoretic Consequence RelationsA consequence relation is a collection of pairs of sentences. By constraining the setof initial information (on which default reasoning is performed) to be a singleton set,j;S|where S is a collection of channels|can similarly be seen as a relation betweenpropositions, dened as follows:19p j;S q i q 2 ConsqD(fpg), where D is the default inference system based on Sand fpg.Whether one would want to call j;S a consequence relation is debatable since it is nota relation between sentences; however, j;S is a relation that models inference in thechannel-theoretic framework, and this is the important property. For convenience, I willcall such a relation a default inference relation.The KLM conditions on consequence relations can be modelled in the channel-theoretic setting by dening analogous conditions that a \reasonable" default inferencerelation should satisfy. By interpreting propositional connectives via type operations,20the KLM principles can be given a channel-theoretic interpretation in a straightforwardmanner. This is illustrated by the modication of LLE below. The other principles aresimilarly modied to obtain a collection of constraints applicable to default inferencerelations. As usual, standard material implication is modelled by inference via thelogical link. The fact that (a : ) j;S (a :  ) is supported by the logical link L|i.e.ha; ai 2 L_ and h;  i 2 L^|is written as follows: (a : ) j)L (a :  ). I will drop thesubscripts from j; and j) when this causes no confusion.Revised LLE: (a : ) j) (a : ) (a : ) j) (a : ) (a : ) j; (a : )(a : ) j; (a : )This condition is interpreted in the following way: if a given relation j; satises theconditions above the horizontal line, then it must also satisfy the condition below theline. The other principles of preferential and rational consequence relations are similarlymodied. The central result of this section is that the channel-theoretic model of defaultinference satises the conditions corresponding to the KLM principles associated with19Since I have assumed 	 is always a singleton set of the form fpg, I will tend to write `p j;S q' ratherthan `fpg j;S q'.20This can be done since the signalling relations are reexive|e.g. (a : ) ^ (a :  ) holds i (a :  ^  )holds, where the rst instance of `^ ' denotes proposition-conjunction and the second is type-conjunction.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 200preferential consequence.Theorem 5.3.2 For any collection S of channels, j;S satises all the conditions cor-responding to the principles required of preferential consequence relations.Proof See Appendix D. 2This result shows that the progression through the conditional channel operations,the specic denition of a default hierarchy, and the imposition of a normality con-dition leads to a model of default reasoning satisfying important principles regardingwhich inferences are supported. Unfortunately, the extension to rational relations is notstraightforward|since the principle of Rational Monotonicity involves the assertion thata pair of sentences is not in a consequence relation, then a proof that Rational Mono-tonicity is supported is more problematic.21 However, the intuition behind the denitionof a kernel default hierarchy (Section 4.3.3)|whereby a type  is a background conditionof a constraint with antecedent  only if there is a constraint linking  to :|shouldbe sucient to ensure that Rational Monotonicity is supported. While I conjecture thatthe channel-theoretic system of default reasoning models rational consequence relations,this problem unfortunately remains open at this stage.5.4 Towards a Methodology for Situated Default Reason-ingIn this section, I propose a methodology for default reasoning that represents a subtlevariation to the usual approach. The methodology is based on the hierarchical channeltheoretic framework I used throughout the thesis. The work described in this section isstill embryonic at this stage, but seems to oer an interesting avenue for future investi-gation.Default reasoning is usually thought of as reasoning with incomplete information.By contrast, the methodology I outline here can be thought of as reasoning with incom-plete, or approximate, constraints. I have described before how inference via a channelor link is inference at some \level of approximation"|there may be a channel higher up21Actually, Lehmann (1989) shows that if the logical language is restricted so that negations of con-ditional assertions are disallowed, then preferential consequence is equivalent to rational consequence.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 201the hierarchy which is potentially \more reliable" than the chosen one, but the agentmakes a particular choice (with respect to which channel to use for a particular inference)based on the chosen level being considered appropriate for the task at hand.22 This viewleads to a methodology for default reasoning which involves a subtle shift from the morestandard view but seems to oer the potential for a more natural interpretation of com-monsense reasoning. At this point, I only sketch the ideas for such a methodology andoutline how it relates to the formal model of default reasoning described in this chapter.Section 5.4.3 provides a bit more detail to the basic ideas within the framework of thequalication problem in AI planning (George 1987b), which is traditionally handledusing default reasoning (e.g., see Shoham (1988)). A more comprehensive investigationof the methodology is earmarked in Section 6.2 for future research.5.4.1 Outline of the MethodologyThe methodology relies on a hierarchy of channels supporting various constraints. Asusual, for channels C, C0 such that C v C0, C0 is more reliable than C in that a connectionc that is an exception in C need not be an exception in C0, yet every connection c0that is a token in both channels and is an exception in C must also be an exceptionin C0. In the particular model of default reasoning I have in mind, each level in thehierarchy corresponds to a particular \renement" of a regularity|moving up a levelin the hierarchy involves adding conditions to the antecedent and/or consequent ofconstraints, thereby resulting in a more informative version of the associated regularity.23Given certain information which is to be used as the premise of some inference, thechoice arises as to which level in the hierarchy is the most appropriate for the inference.This choice involves a trade-o. Using a channel higher up in the hierarchy results in alower likelihood of error, since the connection in question is less likely to be an exception.However, choosing a channel lower in the hierarchy results in simpler reasoning, sincethe classications linked by the subchannel will have a less discriminating set of types22The way such a decision is made is, of course, a non-trivial problem! The main issue to be consideredinvolves the trade-o between a simpler constraint (i.e. one in a channel further down the hierarchy)and thereby simpler inference, versus a more informative constraint (i.e. one in a channel higher up thehierarchy) and thereby increased reliability in the form of fewer exceptions. This trade-o is discussedin the following but is by no means resolved.23Note that while I talk of the constraint from higher up the hierarchy as being a \more informedversion" of the other, I should stress, as I have throughout, that both constraints correspond to bonade regularities in their own right.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 202than those linked by the super-channel.Consider the following simple example. The generic \Birds y" describes a channelC containing a constraint of the formbird!flies.The associated hierarchy also contains a channel C0, such that C v C0, supporting aconstraint of the formbird ^ :penguin!flies.Given an individual tweety and information (tweety : bird), one must decide whetherto project this information using the link Link(C) or the link Link(C0). This eectivelyinvolves choosing whether the connection tweety 7! tweety should be in tok(C) or onlyin tok(C0). If (tweety 7! tweety) 2 tok(C) and Link(C) is used for the inference, thenthere is a greater chance of the connection being an exception and the projection leadingto an erroneous conclusion. However, it would also allow the inference to (tweety : flies)without having to consider whether or not tweety is a penguin.In the spirit of default reasoning, the choice of appropriate channel is made byconsidering what other information is known about tweety. If (tweety : penguin) holds,then clearly C0 is the more appropriate channel. This leads to the following notion ofadequacy.24Denition Given a collection 	 of propositions, a channel C : A) A is adequate withrespect to 	 if for each (t :  ) 2 	, t 2 tok(A) and  2 typ(A).A channel C is adequate with respect to a collection 	 of propositions if the associatedclassication A contains all the types and tokens that are used in the propositions in	|eectively, the \language" of A is rich enough to represent all the propositions of	. To ensure that the simplest channel is chosen, the appropriate channel for a giveninference is taken to be a minimal adequate one for the propositions in question.By requiring the appropriate channel to be adequate, the potential problem withpenguins is ruled out|if (tweety : penguin) is known to hold, then the channel C con-taining bird!flies is not deemed appropriate. The model of default reasoning this leadsto is one of choosing the context (i.e. channel) that is most appropriate to the problem24I will continue to adopt the simplication that all channels are reexive. The following denitionwould have to be revised if this simplication was lifted.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 203at hand and reasoning monotonically within that context. This seems to lead to a morenatural approach to commonsense reasoning, which is demonstrated by application tothe qualication problem in Section 5.4.3.Of course, the above outline of a methodology for defeasible reasoning is just that|an informal outline. It could be that any gains|conceptual or computational|aresimply balanced by the burden of determining the appropriate (i.e. minimal adequate)channel on which to base the inference. In practice, it seems that we make choices asto which level of discrimination is most appropriate in ways that may be impossible tocapture formally. However, at this point I believe that the approach has the potentialto lead to a procedure for reasoning with incomplete information that is more naturaland possibly more computationally ecient than those based on more standard defaultlogics.5.4.2 Relation to Maximal Normality ModelAn important property of the methodology for defeasible reasoning I have outlined isthe way in which it relates to the concept of maximal normality of Section 5.2.2.25In fact, the methodology suggested itself from the maximal normality denition ratherthan independently. As above, the discussion here is an outline of an idea which requiresfurther investigation.The maximal normality condition requires each connection in each channel of a hier-archy to be (internally) appropriate. A connection t 7! t is inappropriate, with respectto some given information (t : ), if ?0 for some channel C0 such that C v C0 and 0is the antecedent of a constraint in C0.26 Informally speaking, channels higher up thesubchannel ordering have to be checked before determining whether a connection c isto be included in the token-set of a given channel or not. Of course, if c is includedin tok(C), then it will support an inference via Link(C) (assuming that the source isclassied by the antecedent of the constraint) regardless of whether it supports an infer-ence via Link(C0) for any super-channel C0 of C. This corresponds to the case where the\simpler" channel is used to perform a defeasible inference in the methodology above.25For simplicity of this discussion, I will only consider the initial denition of maximal normality|i.e.that involving internal inappropriateness only (but see the comment in Appendix B.2).26The inappropriateness condition also involves the consequents of constraints but, again for simplicity,I restrict discussion to antecedents here.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 204Consider now the case of t 7! t being inappropriate in C. It must be the case that(t : ) holds, as does the property described in the previous paragraph. In this case,t 7! t is not inserted as a token of C since it is inappropriate. However, t 7! t is, bydenition, not inappropriate in C0 since (t : 0) cannot hold, where 0 is the antecedentof the oending constraint in C0. This corresponds to C0 being the adequate level in thehierarchy in which to reason about the information at hand. An example helps to makethis more explicit.Consider the usual penguin example, with C containing the constraintbird!fliesand C0 containing the constraintbird ^ :penguin!fliesand suppose that (tweety : bird) and (tweety : penguin) hold. In the methodology out-lined above, C is inadequate with respect to this information since it does not deal withinformation related to the type penguin.27 Similarly, the connection tweety 7! tweetyis inappropriate in C because information known about tweety conicts with the an-tecedent of the constraint in C0. Hence, tweety is a pseudo-signal in C|i.e. the connec-tion tweety 7! tweety is, by denition, not contained in tok(C).The procedure does not exactly match the abstract denition. For example, if the in-formation (tweety : :penguin) was known, then the connection tweety 7! tweety wouldnot be inappropriate in C but C would be inadequate with respect to this information.In this case it would of course be safe, and appropriate, to use C as the channel on whichto base the inference regarding tweety's ying abilities. This suggests that the denitionof adequacy should take into account whether the given information is \relevant"|i.e.whether having that information is good reason for choosing a higher level in the hi-erarchy as the most appropriate one. However, this would complicate the adequacydenition somewhat.27I am tacitly assuming that the type penguin is not contained in the type-set associated with theclassication A linked by C. This assumption is formalised in Section 5.4.3.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 2055.4.3 An Application of Default Reasoning: The Qualication Prob-lemIn this section, I sketch out in more detail the methodology for default reasoning outlinedabove by considering the qualication problem from the AI planning literature (e.g.(George 1987b; Ginsberg and Smith 1988)), whereby not all necessary preconditions ofan action can be easily specied. The solution to this problem is usually cast in terms ofsome version of default logic. I originally formulated the approach below independentlyof any other result described in this thesis|in fact, it was the rst problem for which Iused the concept of a hierarchy of channels|but have since come to see it as a particularinstance of the more general methodology described earlier.28 It is hoped that furtherwork on this problem will strengthen the claim that channel theory, and particularly thehierarchy framework described in this thesis, provides a powerful unifying framework forreasoning about conditionals, defaults and plans.In the simple model of events I employ here, an event is simply a connection betweentwo situations. This is consistent with the standard AI formal representation, based onMcCarthy and Hayes' (1969) situation calculus, whereby an event involves a transitionbetween world states, which are instantaneous snapshots of the world. Representingand reasoning about events is an important area of AI research and much work hasbeen dedicated to providing adequate representations of events, their preconditions andeects, and related issues such as causation and synchronisation, within the situationcalculus framework (e.g. see (George 1987b; Allen et al. 1990).29 The representationof events I dene below ignores most of these issues, focussing solely on the qualicationproblem.Outline of a Simple Model of EventsIn the standard AI model of events, each event has associated with it a number ofpreconditions and postconditions (or eects). If pre(e) denotes the preconditions of anevent e and post(e) the postconditions, then the general interpretation given them isthe following:28A related approach to the qualication problem, within a classical logic framework extended by anotion of context, has recently been proposed by Bouquet and Giunchiglia (1994).29A particular problem that has achieved notoriety is the frame problem, but I will not be tacklingthat here.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 206If e occurs in a state in which all of pre(e) hold, then the resulting state immedi-ately following the performance of e will satisfy all of post(e).The situation calculus is a framework devised for formalising this constraint. It isbasically a sorted rst-order logic with three sorts: uents (terms that denote conditionson world states), events and situations. For example, a formula representing the aboveconstraint could be written as follows:8e8s((8p(pre(e; p)  holds(p; s)) ^ occurs(e; s))  8p(post(e; p)  holds(p; succ(s))))where pre(e; p) denotes that p is a precondition of e, post(e; p) denotes that p is apostcondition of e, occurs(e; s) denotes that e occurs in s, holds(p; s) denotes that pholds in s, and succ(s) denotes the successor state of s. (Lifschitz (1987) outlines ageneral methodology for representing constraints of the above form in the situationcalculus.)The channel-theoretic model of events I use here is a very simple one.30 An event isa connection in a particular channel. Dierent channels correspond to dierent event-types, with a given connection corresponding to a particular instance of that event-type.For example, there may be a Move channel such that every connection in tok(Move)corresponds to a \move" event. I will assume that all sources and targets of event-connections are situations, ensuring a correspondence with the view described abovewhereby events involve transitions between situations. A channel-type is the constraintbetween the corresponding event-type's pre- and post-conditions. I will call such atype an event-description. For example, if the MoveA channel models the event-type ofmoving object A from the door to the window, then the corresponding constraint couldbe of the form(at(A; door) ^ :heavy(A))!at(A;window).Of course, to represent more general event-types I would have to make use of parameters.However, for simplicity, I will consider only non-parametric objects.A sequence of events is modelled via serial composition of channels|the complexevent-type is the composition of the two channels while the complex event is the connec-tion that results from composing the connections corresponding to the original events.3130There are obvious parallels between this simple model of events described and Barwise's (1993)channel-theoretic model of Hoare logic.31For simplicity, I will assume that standard composition, rather than conditional composition, isappropriate. However, if it is assumed that the source and target of an event-connection are alwaysdistinct (this would be the case if every event had some eect on a situation), then these two forms of
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 207It should also be possible to use some form of parallel composition to model concurrentevents. However, this is more problematic than sequential events and I do not pursueit here. Causation (i.e. the occurrence of one event causing the occurrence of another)and ramication (i.e. side-eects of an event) can be modelled using other channels.The fact that the target situation of an event is the temporal successor32 of the sourcesituation can also be modelled using a channel T , whose collection of tokens ranges overall events, and which contains a constraint that indicates temporal succession betweensource and target. Enforcing frame axioms|i.e. axioms that state that nothing changesduring the performance of an event except for those conditions contained in the postcon-dition of the event|is more problematic. One approach is to have an extra constraint ineach event-channel, indicating that (for each connection) the target supports all the in-formation supported by the source except for that which contradicts the postconditionsof the related event-type (given by the consequent of the corresponding constraint). Itis not clear exactly how this would be stated and it would certainly require the useof parameters or n-ary types.33 In any case, I will not pursue these issues at all|myconcern here is to outline a solution to the qualication problem using the methodologyfor defeasible reasoning described earlier.The Qualication ProblemThe qualication problem concerns the issue that it is impossible to completely list allthe conditions that need to hold for an action or event to be performed successfully (i.e.to have the desired eects). For example, if I turn the ignition key in my car, it usuallystarts. However, it may not do so on one particular morning for any of a number ofreasons: for example, the battery may be at or disconnected, or the starter-motor maybe burnt out, or the engine may be ooded. This problem is, of course, well known tophilosophers and accounts for the nonmonotonicity of conditional sentences (e.g. \If Istrike the match then it will light" does not hold if the match is wet, or the matchboxis wet, or the match has already been used, etc.). In Chapter 3, I dened a frameworkcomposition are equivalent anyway.32Requiring an event to involve discrete temporal succession is, of course, a simplication. However,this suces for the purposes of the current discussion.33George et al.'s (1993) partial logical framework for reasoning about action allows for dierentevents to occur simultaneously, with some of these events being \unknown" to the agent. In particular,this means that the world may change in unexpected ways while an action is being performed and, oncompletion of that action, no conditions can be assumed to hold except for the postconditions of theaction just performed. Dropping frame axioms achieves a similar eect.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 208for reasoning about conditionals in which the background assumptions underlying aconditional are represented via a hierarchy of channels. This is the obvious approach totake in addressing the qualication problem within the channel theoretic framework.34The usual approach to qualication involves the use of a default logic in some way.For example, consider the approach taken by Shoham (1988). It is not necessary todescribe Shoham's particular nonmonotonic logic of chronological ignorance, but simplyto outline his approach. Shoham formalises actions using a temporal logic augmentedwith a modal operator `2', where 2 represents \ is known". In Shoham's framework,the rule for striking a match is represented as follows:352holds(holding:match; s) ^ 2occurs(strike:match; s)^:2holds(wet:match; s)^:2holds(wet:matchbox; s)^:2holds(used:match; s) ^ ::: 2holds(lit:match; succ(s)).The nonmonotonic aspect of Shoham's logic ensures that :2 is a consequence of atheory whenever 2 is not.There are a couple of problems with Shoham's solution (and the default logic ap-proach in general). To reason about the eect of an action, an agent still needs to workthrough a checklist of possible contingencies|the background assumptions still need tobe explicitly listed and the agent cannot reason about whether an action will be success-ful without considering each of these assumptions. The default logic ensures that it isenough to not have information that the assumptions are violated, rather than requiringinformation that the assumptions are not violated. However, this still does not seemreasonable. When I turn the key to start my car, I do not wonder whether the batteryis at, and|not having information to the contrary|assume that it is not. I turn thekey and expect (hope!) the car to start.36 In Shoham's formalisation, the regularity34After all, an event channel can be seen as supporting a particular sort of conditional sentence. Forexample, the Move channel of the previous section supports conditionals of the form:\If in situation s A is at the door and A is not heavy, then (after performing the move event) in situations0 A is at the window."35I have modied the language slightly so that it is more consistent with the situation calculustreatment. However, this is not signicant. (For some reason, Shoham treats events as if they werepropositions.)36In some situations, for example, cold mornings, the expectation may be lowered and I may decideto explicitly consider some background assumptions.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 209representing the behaviour of the strike.match or start.car events explicitly incorporatesthe background assumptions. However, a more realistic approach is to use a regularitythat has such background assumptions as implicit, unstated conditions|i.e. if I strikethe match, then it will light. A regularity such as this is fallible, of course|it may bethe case that one of the background assumptions is violated, even though I do not knowit|but it is reliable enough to be dependable in normal situations. Of course, this isexactly what the channel theoretic solution provides: a means of modelling reliable yetfallible event behaviours.In the next section, I dene a framework for using fallible regularities to reasonabout events based on the channel hierarchy framework that I have used throughout thethesis. I then outline a methodology for reasoning about the expected eects of events,including the possibility of an event failing to have its expected eect.A Channel Theoretic ModelAn event-channel is a channel E : A) A whose tokens are connections between twosituations s and s0 such that s0 is the temporal successor of s, and whose constraintslink preconditions of the associated event-type to postconditions of that event-type. Amodel of an event-type is a collection of event-channels arranged in a channel-hierarchy.Moving up the hierarchy corresponds to \rening" the description of the event-type, i.e.making implicit background conditions explicit. For example, one channel for startinga car may contain a constraint of the formkey:turned!car:startedwhereas a channel higher up the ordering may instead contain the constraintkey:turned ^ battery:ok!car:started.This is, of course, the way in which I have used channel hierarchies to encode implicitbackground assumptions throughout the thesis. The following denitions serve to cap-ture the intuition that each level in a hierarchy captures a particular approximation (i.e.using a restricted set of types) of a regularity,37 and that moving up the hierarchy allows37Strictly speaking, I don't like to think of any of the channels in a hierarchy supporting an \approx-imation" of some regularity whose \correct" form is contained higher up the hierarchy. Each channelsupports a regularity|the fact that a superchannel supports a more robust version of that regularitydoes not detract from the original one being a regularity in itself. I have tried to stress this pointthroughout the thesis. That said, the particular language I have used is (while potentially misleading)
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 210the set of types to be extended and therefore results in a more accurate approximationof the regularity.The rst denition ensures that moving up a level makes a regularity more informa-tive.Denition A channel C : A) B is redundant in a hierarchy if for all constraints 2 typ(C) and some distinct subchannel C0 : A0 ) B0 such that C0 < C, it is the casethat ante() 2 typ(A0) and succ() 2 typ(B0).Intuitively, a channel C is redundant if there is a subchannel C0 in the hierarchy suchthat the types available to C0 are sucient to represent the constraints in C. This ensuresthat any new level in the hierarchy \adds" information, in that at least some regularityhas had a new type|one that wasn't available at any level below that channel|addedto its antecedent or consequent. This is intended to capture the notion of a channelbeing a representation of a regularity at a particular \level of approximation".The second denition ensures that moving up a level \conservatively extends" theregularities|i.e. each regularity at a given level is identical to the corresponding regu-larity at any lower level if restricted to the types available at the lower level.Denition A channel C : A) B is conservative in a hierarchy if for each constraint 2 typ(C) and each distinct subchannel C0 : A0 ) B0 such that C0 <f C, there is aconstraint 0 2 typ(C0) such that f(0) =  and1. ante(0) = ante(), or ante() = (ante(0) ^ ) for some  2 (typ(A) n typ(A; ));2. succ(0) = succ(), or succ() = (succ(0) _  ) for some  2 (typ(A) n typ(A0)).The nal restriction required is that the same set of events (i.e. connections betweensituations) is the subject of all the channels in the hierarchy|i.e. each channel in amodel of an event-type ranges over the same collection of events.Denition An event-model M for an event-type is a hierarchy of channels (event-channels) fE1; E2; :::g, where E i : Ai ) Bi, such that1. tok(E i) = tok(Ej) for all i; j;2. no E i is redundant; and3. every E i is conservative.rather convenient.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 211Given the intuitive interpretation of an event-model, it seems reasonable to assumethat the hierarchy satises certain other conditions. For example, every pair of chan-nels should have a common subchannel|this prevents one event-model from containingevent-channels corresponding to dierent event-types. Further, one may want to denemeet and join operations on channels and require the hierarchy to be a complete lattice.However, I will not impose any such requirements.Given two event-models, serial composition leads to a new event-model (with theoriginal channel hierarchies eectively merged). Thus, given a number of event-models,a full hierarchy of event-channels can be obtained via repeated composition. I will notdescribe this process in detail here but simply note that sequences of events can bemodelled in exactly the same manner as \primitive" events.38Reasoning about the eects of events is, of course, a matter of prediction. In thechannel-theoretic framework, this is modelled by projection along information links, inthe manner described in Sections 2.3.6 and 5.2.1. As described above, choosing a link(with which to reason with) from a link hierarchy requires determining the appropriatelevel in the hierarchy. This was informally captured using the concept of adequacy.Inference then proceeds via that link. Once again, I use the following notation: given alink L and proposition (s : ), I write (s : ) j;L (s0 :  ) i there is a link L (in somegiven collection) such that hs; s0i 2 L_ and h;  i 2 L^ .Denition Let E be an event-type with associated event-model M and (s : ) a propo-sition. The predicted eects of an event of type E in s is the collection of propositions	 dened as follows:	 = f(s :  ) j (s : ) j;Link(E) (s :  ), where E 2 M is the minimal adequateevent-channel for g.The appropriate level in a hierarchy is determined by the notion of adequacy. How-ever, choosing the premise proposition|i.e. determining which facts about the initialsituation should be checked before being able to predict the outcome of an event with anycondence|is an extremely problematic issue and well outside the scope of the model de-scribed here. For example, when I go out to my car in the mornings, I tend not to checkwhether the battery is connected (i.e. I don't check whether (s : battery:connected)holds). However, if I came across an old rusted model in an out-of-the-way barn, I may38As well as the serial composition of event-channels, a full channel hierarchy would contain channelsthat modelled causation and ramication of events, as outlined earlier.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 212well want to check the battery connection (as well as other things!) before trying toturn the engine over.Failure and RecoveryWhen using an approximation of a regularity to reason (defeasibly) about the eects ofevents, we open up the possibility of making erroneous predictions. For example, onemorning when I go out and turn the key in the ignition of my car, I may nd that thecar indeed fails to start. This could be for any of a number of reasons, each of which isa background assumption to the channel C supportingkey:turned!car:started.Such an event is modelled as an exception in C.For example, consider the situation s where I go out to my car one sunny morning.As usual, I expect my car to start on turning the key in the ignition. I therefore usethe link Link(C), where C supports the above regularity, to reason that my car will berunning in the (temporally successor) situation s0, where s 7! s0 is a connection in C.However, for some reason, I nd that my car has not started in s0. This must mean thats 7! s0 is an exception in C, of course|if it were not, then (by the Principle of Harmony)it would be the case that (s : key:turned) and (s0 : car:started) both held. However,as shown in Section 3.3.2, an exception to C need not be an exception to some channelhigher up the hierarchy. For example, suppose that the reason the car didn't start wasbecause the battery was disconnected (my wife playing a practical joke!), and supposethat this condition is encoded as a background assumption.39 Then there is a channelC0 such that C vf C0, where, say,f(key:turned!car:started) = key:turned ^ battery:connected!car:started.In this channel, s 7! s0 is not an exception since (s : key:turned ^ battery:connected)does not hold in the classication A0 containing this type. This leads to the followingdenition, modelling the error-recovery process.39As discussed in Chapter 3, a channel hierarchy can be seen as a parameter in the representationof an agent, encoding the implicit background assumptions held by a particular agent|i.e. dierentagents (or the same agent in a dierent state) may have dierent background assumptions regarding the\same" regularity.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 213Denition Let M be an event-model, E : A) B an event-channel from M, e 2 tok(E)an event-connection and  2 typ(E) an event-description such that e is an exception to in E. A channel E 0 : A0 ) B0 is a solution to hE ; (e : )i in M if1. E vf E 0 in M; and2. e is not an exception to f() in E 0.E 0 is a preferred solution if there is no other solution E 00 such that E 00 v E 0 in M.The above denition models the following method of dealing with error. If an agentmakes a prediction, using E , that an event will have a particular eect and then ndsthat the successor situation does not satisfy the predicted condition, then the minimalchannel for which that event is not an exception contains the \reason" why the eventfailed. For example, in the case of starting my car, the channel whose event-descriptioncontains battery.connected in the antecedent \describes" why turning the key failed tostart my car|i.e. the battery was disconnected. (I don't mean this to be a claimregarding how I go about determining why my car failed to start, of course. Describingsuch a procedure, which would rely on all sorts of heuristics about my car and the noisesit makes, is well outside the scope of this model.)It could be the case that there is no solution to a given exception. This correspondsto the case where the problem that caused the corresponding event to fail to haveits predicted eects is not encoded as part of the event-model|i.e. that particularbackground assumption is not represented in the channel hierarchy. For instance, if Iknow very little about cars, then I may not realise that the distributor not being faulty isa background assumption behind my car starting. Alternatively, a condition that I maynever have even considered, simply because it was ludicrous, may be behind the car'sfailure|for example, my wife may have played another of her practical jokes, inserting apotato into the exhaust-pipe. Such cases|where the implicit conditions are insucientto explain the exception|correspond to the opportunity for the agent to expand itsknowledge by adding to the hierarchy.Since I am talking about reasoning and inference, I should really be using links ratherthan channels. This involves using the link hierarchy constructed from an event-modelhierarchy, as dened in Section 5.2.1, and modifying the above denition in the obviousway, replacing channels by links. The following results relate error-recovery under linksto error-recovery under channels.
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 214Proposition 5.4.1 If the channel C is a solution to hE ; (e : )i then the link Link(C)is a solution to hLink(E); (e : )i.Proof Obvious, since any exception to Link(C) is also an exception to C, and by Propo-sition 5.2.1, Link(C)  Link(C0). 2Proposition 5.4.2 For each channel C that is a preferred solution to hE ; (e : )i, thereis a link L that is a preferred solution to hLink(E); (e : )i such that L  Link(C).Proof By the previous result, Link(C) is a solution, so by denition there must be asolution L satisfying the required property. 2The above result seems to suggest that there may be a \better" solution fromamongst the links than from amongst the channels. This is because an event mayfail to have its predicted eect, but the predicted condition still holds due to some otherinuence. For example, Fred dies when I pull the trigger of the gun, even though thegun isn't loaded, because he has a cardiac arrest (Fred clutching his chest hides thefact from me that he isn't bleeding). However, in the absence of such coincidences|i.e.weak exceptions (dened in Section 2.3.4)|solutions amongst the channels and linkscoincide.Proposition 5.4.3 Let C be a channel containing no weak-exceptions. Then C is asolution to a given exception if and only if Link(C) is.Proof Exceptions in C exactly correspond to exceptions in Link(C) in the absence ofweak exceptions. 25.5 DiscussionThe channel theoretic analysis of generics of the previous chapter involved a generic beingsimply true or simply false, regardless of the properties of the associated individuals.This necessitated an extra assumption|one of maximal normality|to be imposed onthe signalling relations connecting tokens before the channel theoretic framework forgenerics could be used for default reasoning about the properties of individuals. What isof greater interest, however, is the way in which the specic maximal normality condition
A Channel{Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning 215I dened, particularly the way in which it is constructed with respect to a channelhierarchy, relates to a model of situated reasoning in which an \appropriate" regularity|appropriate with respect to known information|is picked from a hierarchy and is usedas the basis of inference. One of the tenets of situated reasoning is that a regularitycan be used without necessarily explicating all the background assumptions required tobe in place for the regularity to be reliable. As such, the methodology for reasoningoutlined in Section 5.4 can hopefully be seen as a step towards a general methodologyfor situated reasoning.Of course, there are many important issues which need to be investigated and clariedin eshing out the methodology. In particular, the task of reasoning with backgroundassumptions within the regularity itself has been replaced by the problem of choosingan appropriate channel to reason with. While this seems to be a more natural way toview the task, formulating this approach is not straightforward and it may turn outthat the choice of channel is analogous to the problem of specifying a (globally) reliableregularity. However, I believe that the shift in approach will prove to be a useful one,although clearly much more work is required on this task.
Chapter 6
Summary and Further Work
This chapter contains a brief summary of the thesis and a discussion of possible futurework. The future work involves both removing some of the technical shortcomings inthe thesis (usually in the form of simplications) as well as an outline of a plan for futureresearch. The longer-term research aim is to use channel theory as a uniform formalframework for an integrated model of various aspects of \situated reasoning".6.1 Summary of ThesisThis thesis has investigated the use of channel theory, Barwise and Seligman's recentmathematical model of information ow, as a formal semantic framework for several top-ics which I have collectively labelled conditional reasoning. I have shown how aspects ofchannel theory lead to analyses of conditional and generic sentences that address certainproblems with traditional semantic approaches. The analysis of generics in particularbenets from the various dierent options oered by channel theory for representingexceptions to a general regularity.My main concern throughout, however, has been to develop channel theoretic frame-works for reasoning with conditionals and generics, and for using generics to defeasiblyreason about the properties of associated individuals. This led to a method for encodingbackground assumptions of regularities via a relation between channels and modifyingthe operations on channels to account for such assumptions. The resulting logics werecompared to traditional logics of conditionals and default reasoning and shown to satisfy216
Summary and Further Work 217many important properties.Channel TheoryChannel theory was developed by Barwise and Seligman as a formal theory of infor-mation ow in response to various problems with previous frameworks. In particular,channel theory addresses the problem as to how regularities between types can be bothreliable and fallible. This problem has plagued philosophers for a long time and ledto a view that the only \true" regularities must be tautological, since all backgroundconditions of a regularity could never be fully specied. However, allowing a falliblerelationship between types to still count as a bona de regularity seems to avoid thisproblem.The fallibility of regularities is modelled in channel theory via a two-level analysis,explicitly distinguishing connections at the token-level from links at the type-level. Thisallows for three dierent ways of modelling \error": by a token falling outside thescope of applicability of a regularity (i.e. not being in the token set of the associatedclassication); by a token not being involved in a token-level connection; by a token-level connection not being classied by a type-level constraint. I showed in Chapter4 how these dierent sorts of \error" seem to account for dierent ways in which anindividual can be an exception to a generic sentence (i.e. without invalidating thegeneric). A crucial property in the channel-theoretic account of error is that there isno need to explicitly represent the background assumptions of a regularity within thechannel supporting that regularity|the fact that a token participates in a connectionthat is classied by the regularity reects that \normal conditions" are in place.Barwise and Seligman provide operations on channels that eectively lead to a \logicof channels", allowing a channel theoretic model of inference to be constructed. Thislogical framework has been my main focus throughout the thesis. I have taken initialobservations by Barwise (1986) and ter Meulen (1986)|whereby they (respectively)claim that situation theoretic constraints could be used as a basis for a semantic analysisof conditional and generic sentences|and shown how logics of conditional and genericsentences (and for default reasoning) can be constructed using the channel operations.The view that fallible regularities|as they are modelled in channel theory|are theobjects which such sentences describe ts well with the situation semantic view of naturallanguage semantics.
Summary and Further Work 218Conditional LogicsThe rst major contribution of this thesis involved the development of a channel theoreticsystem of reasoning about conditionals. Barwise (1986) originally suggested that anaccount of the semantics of conditional statements could be given in terms of situationtheoretic conditional constraints. Barwise and Seligman (1994) later suggested thata channel theoretic analysis would provide a conditional with demonstrative content,more in line with a situation semantic view of natural language semantics. In Chapter3, I took the demonstrative content to be a channel and then focussed on the logicof conditionals that arose from the channel operations. The central issue in logics ofconditionals is that Transitivity, Monotonicity and Contraposition must be invalidated.However, I showed that with the channel operations as they were dened by Seligmanand Barwise (1993), this was not the case. The problem, I argued, was that the token-level of a channel reected the underlying background conditions of a regularity but didnot capture them.To combat this problem I dened the notion of a channel hierarchy. This involves asubchannel relation between channels, allowing background assumptions of a regularityto be represented via the relationship between channels. The important aspect of thisconstruct is that such assumptions are not represented explicitly within the channel Csupporting the regularity, but only implicitly via C's relationship to other channels. Thisis critical since part of the motivation underlying channel theory is that such conditionsare not explicitly represented and that any particular use of a channel may lead to anerroneous inference. Since reasoning with a channel does not involve the subchannelhierarchy but only the channel itself, this concern is respected.To obtain a logic of conditionals that invalidated the above rules of inference, thestandard channel operations were modied so as to take into account the backgroundassumptions that were encoded via a channel hierarchy. The resulting logic did indeedinvalidate Transitivity, Monotonicity and Contraposition, as was illustrated via variousexamples. An important issue that was then tackled in some detail involved determiningwhich patterns of reasoning the system did validate. A number of axioms and rules ofinference (taken from (Nute 1980)) were examined and, assuming certain reasonableconditions (some that simply imposed a certain \symmetry" on a hierarchy, others thatany channel should be expected to satisfy), it was shown that many of these axioms andrules of inference were validated. In particular, the behaviour of the channel theoretic
Summary and Further Work 219logic of conditionals had much in common with logics of conditionals based on relevantlogic (which is also considered to be a \logic of information").Logics of GenericsRecently, several researchers from the AI and philosophical communities have attemptedto dene logics of default reasoning starting with a conditional logic basis. Chapter 4described a similar project within the channel theoretic framework. Several problematicissues in the semantics of generics were discussed and it was argued that they pointedto a need for a satisfactory analysis of generics to accommodate a notion of \context".It was proposed that the channel theoretic analysis of generics did just that, with achannel providing a context for the regularity which formed the descriptive content of ageneric statement.Various problematic examples for traditional analyses of generics were discussed andI proposed that the channel theoretic analysis, with its contextual aspect, gives a satis-factory account of these problems. The dierent ways by which channel theory accountsfor error|via restriction to a particular set of tokens; via a token being a pseudo-signal;via a connection being an exception|seems to provide a comprehensive analysis of thevarious dierent ways in which an individual can be an exception to a generic withoutinvalidating that generic. In particular, this seemed to give a more satisfactory analysisof certain examples that are particularly problematic for the \normative" approach togenerics (such as the example involving peacocks that lay eggs and have bright feathers).Other features of the channel theoretic account, such as the non-reductionist account ofregularities, meant that other problematic issues were also avoided.Once again, my main concern lay in providing an adequate system of reasoning aboutgenerics, starting with the channel theoretic logic of conditionals as a basis. While thechannel theoretic system for conditionals placed only minimal constraints on a channelhierarchy, I argued that a system for reasoning with generics required a tacit assumptionthat any background assumptions were implicit in the original collection of regularities.This was the only dierence between the logic of conditionals and the logic of generics|i.e. there was no modication of the channel operations themselves, only in what wasallowed as a channel hierarchy. This meant that the move from a conditional logicto a logic of generics did not involve what Morreau (1992a) called a \ghost in themachine". By dening a particular construction of a channel hierarchy (given an initial
Summary and Further Work 220collection of channels), a specic system of reasoning with generics was obtained. Itwas shown that this system satises various important patterns of reasoning outlinedin (Morreau 1992a), such as Specicity, Carlson's Graded Normality, and Addition ofGenerics. Various examples from the traditional AI literature on default reasoning werediscussed and it was shown that the logic of generics satised the required behaviour forthese examples.Logics of Defeasible ReasoningMorreau (1992a) argues that a critical issue in logics of generics is that they enabledefault reasoning about the properties of individuals. Under the channel theoretic ac-count of generics of Chapter 4, generics are eectively \simply true", due to the non-reductionist account of regularities. Hence, a condition of \maximal normality" had tobe imposed before the channel theoretic framework could be used to defeasibly reasonabout the individuals themselves. Such a condition was dened in Chapter 5. A defaultreasoning system, as dened in Chapter 5, consists of a hierarchy of information links,which is obtained directly from a hierarchy of channels comprising a system of generics,with the additional condition that it satises maximal normality.As a way of evaluating the channel theoretic logic of default reasoning, Kraus etal.'s (1990) work on nonmonotonic consequence relations was discussed, and it wasshown that under certain conditions, the channel theoretic default reasoning systemdened a preferential consequence relation. Unfortunately, the question as to whetherthe channel theoretic default system denes a rational consequence relation was notanswered, although it is conjectured that it does so.The nal section of Chapter 5 described how the maximal normality condition re-ects a methodology towards reasoning with \approximate" regularities. Rather thanreasoning with conditions that are assumed to hold by default, I argued that it was morenatural to view such reasoning as being performed at a certain level in a hierarchy, withthe appropriate level being determined using the available information. Such reasoningcould, of course, lead to erroneous conclusions, which is inherent in the nature of defaultreasoning. However, this subtle dierence seemed to encompass a more natural approachto \situated reasoning". The chapter concluded with an application of the methodologyto AI's qualication problem, providing a much more natural solution than the usualone involving traditional default logics.
Summary and Further Work 2216.2 Remaining Issues and Future ResearchThis thesis is meant to be a step along the path of using a channel theoretic frameworkfor various tasks in reasoning and semantic modelling. The specic tasks that havebeen addressed in this thesis, falling under the general topic of conditional reasoning ,are logics of conditionals, generics and default reasoning. Several issues have beenleft unanswered in the treatments of these topics|in particular, each system can begeneralised in certain ways. However, there are several related topics of interest thathave been touched upon along the way and some of these promise to lead to interestingquestions. In this section, I will summarise both the open questions of this thesis andthe areas of potential interest that it has raised.6.2.1 Tying Loose EndsIn various places in this thesis I have made certain simplications, often in order toallow more direct comparison with standard \unsituated" logics of conditionals anddefault reasoning. The most general version of the channel theoretic framework doesnot involve such simplications, of course, and work needs to be performed to investigatethe properties of the channel theoretic logics in their more general settings. In particular,removing the simplications of \decontextualisation" (e.g. ignoring the connection-levelin the logic of generics; assuming all channels are reexive; assuming there is only oneclassication involved in the logics of generics and default reasoning) will make thelogics t more comfortably with the methodological stance that reasoning is situatedand dependent on context. My motivation for wanting to directly compare the channeltheoretic systems to more standard logics was to demonstrate that the general framework(involving the encoding of background assumptions within a channel hierarchy) was ableto model behaviour that was generally agreed to be desirable. However, having seen thatthe channel-theoretic framework can capture such behaviour in the restricted setting,exploration of the more general setting|and investigating the sorts of behaviour thatthe channel-theoretic framework oers and which cannot be adequately modelled withmore traditional frameworks|becomes a higher priority.Other ways in which the general channel theoretic framework could be generalisedwas discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 and their respective appendices. One such taskinvolved further investigating the way in which complex propositions (and propositions
Summary and Further Work 222involving channels) can be represented within the general channel theoretic framework.Such objects should be expressible within the classication and channel theoretic frame-works, allowing a uniform representation of (among other things) nested conditionalsand generics, and negated conditionals and generics (i.e. assertions that a channel doesnot support a conditional/generic). As discussed in the body of the thesis, there seems tobe no inherent reason why this should not be possible. Another topic that requires fur-ther investigation involves incorporating more complex situation theoretic objects intothe general framework. Again, there seems to be no reason why this should present anyinsurmountable problems, although the properties of such objects in the channel theo-retic setting need to be explored. Incorporating situation theoretic objects would alsoallow more linguistically satisfying analyses of the semantics of conditional and genericsentences (including a more comprehensive modelling of the dyadic GEN operator).Chapter 5 contains the most explicit \open problem" of the thesis|i.e. whetheror not the channel theoretic model of default inference eectively denes a rationalconsequence relation. As I stated, I believe that the way in which a default channelhierarchy is constructed|whereby any background condition of a regularity must bepresent as a defeater in the initial collection of information|ensures this to be the case.However, further work on the representation of the negation of regularities (i.e. assertingthat a regularity is not supported by a channel) needs to be performed before RationalMonotonicity can even be meaningfully expressed within the framework. The otherslightly unsatisfactory issue of this particular chapter involved the denition of externalinappropriateness. I am not convinced that this condition is actually necessary to provethe result of Theorem 5.3.2|it may be that the constrained nature of the constructionof a default channel hierarchy negates the need for such a condition. This issue is notentirely clear at this stage.6.2.2 Further Properties of the FrameworkAs well as addressing the issues described above, there are a number of areas of potentialinterest related to the channel theoretic framework in general, and the channel hierarchyframework in particular. I have already mentioned that an investigation of the propertiesof the situated or contextualised versions of the logics of conditionals and defaults wouldbe an interesting topic, as would the general role of context in reasoning with conditionalsand generics.
Summary and Further Work 223The introduction of a channel hierarchy will be seen as unfortunate by some|e.g.Restall (1994) and Seligman (personal communication) have each stated that they be-lieve the use of channels as demonstrative content should invalidate the undesired rulesof inference for conditionals without the need of any further mechanism. The discussionof Section 3.2.3 showed that this was not the case. However, the particular approach Ihave taken here is obviously not the only possible one, and the question remains as towhether a variant of this approach would lead to similar results via a more satisfyingtreatment.1 It may be the case that the use of the channel hierarchy can be restrictedto particular cases only (e.g. the motivating examples of Chapter 3 all involved a logi-cal channel). The properties of the conditional operations themselves also bear furtherinvestigation. One of the particular questions raised in Chapter 3 regards whether itwould not be more natural to restrict the Parallel Join operation rather than the Con-traposition operation.2A nal topic of investigation involves the mathematical and logical properties of thechannel theoretic model of information ow. I mentioned earlier that Girard's (1987)linear logic is considered to be a logic of information and similarities between channeltheory and linear logic have been noted.3 Another recent innovation that seems to havesome similarities to channel theory is arrow logic (e.g. (van Benthem 1994)). Arrowlogic is an abstract framework of dynamic logic involving the notion of an arrow, whichis eectively a transition between states. Unlike in standard dynamic logic, an arrowis not in general identied with its source and target. Further, an arrow may supportan implicational formula which basically describes how information at the source of thearrow allows inference regarding the target of that arrow. Under this simple description,there seems to be some (at least supercial) similarities between channel theory andarrow logic and it would be most interesting to investigate to what extent the formercan be modelled by the latter,4 especially since this may clarify the relationship betweenchannel theory and other logics of information ow.1Simple variants of the approach taken here include denying the existence of a composition channelor of the oending pair of the signalling relation|rather than the oending pair of the indicatingrelation|when conict of background assumptions occurs.2As discussed in that chapter, the most damning problem with Contraposition in a logic of condi-tionals can be alleviated by disallowing Weakening of the Consequent instead. However, Freund et al.(1991) argue that Contraposition is also an invalid pattern of inference for default reasoning.3E.g. Jon Barwise and Vaughan Pratt have made such observations on the Linear Logic MailingList. Barwise et al. (1994) have also dened a channel theoretic model of the Lambek calculus, whichis closely related to the non-commutative implicational fragment of linear logic.4It is unclear to me whether the concept of an exception could be modelled at all in arrow logic.
Summary and Further Work 2246.2.3 Multi-Agent Situated ReasoningI talked a bit in Chapter 1 about the potential of channel theory as a framework formodelling multiple situated agents that interact with each other and their environment.Many of the important issues in this research area are closely related to the specicconcerns addressed by situation theory, such as: the role of context and its eect onecient reasoning; the eect of an agent's specic embodiment in the world on thecontent of its internal states; the importance of an agent's perspective or point of viewon its environment; communication and collaboration between (possibly heterogeneous)agents. This section contains some speculative thoughts on how such issues may beaddressed in a uniform channel theoretic framework.The Role of Context in ReasoningChapter 1 contained a number of references to important pieces of work in which itwas argued that accounting for the specic context an agent nds itself in is crucial toeective and ecient reasoning. Traditional AI approaches to the modelling of actingand reasoning do not model an agent reasoning \in a context" but rather ascribe aworld-view to the agent. Recent work, however, has seen the development of a number of\logics of context" (e.g. (Buvac et al. 1995; Giunchiglia and Traverso 1993; Guha 1991;McCarthy 1993)). These frameworks add the notion of context to standard predicatecalculus, where a context can be anything from situations of the situation calculus toseparate logical theories (each context possibly involving a separate language). In theseframeworks, context tends to be used to modularise reasoning systems. For example,Guha's (1991) micro-theories can be likened to modules of the full logical theory availableto an agent. Specic reasoning tasks are performed within micro-theories designed forthose tasks and information which is not available within the micro-theory for a taskcannot be used on that task. The purpose of micro-theories is to focus and modularisereasoning and thereby make it more ecient.An important facet of some of the logics of context is that information can be \lifted"and \lowered" between contexts (analogously to importing and exporting variables be-tween modules in a programming language). Reasoning can be localised within a par-ticular context with the resulting conclusions being lifted into another context whichperforms a separate (though related) reasoning task. This approach has been used
Summary and Further Work 225in various models (particularly by McCarthy (1993) and Giunchiglia et al. (1993)) inmodels for reasoning about the beliefs of other agents.The notion of \reasoning within a context" has clear similarities to the methodol-ogy for default reasoning sketched in Section 5.4, as demonstrated by Giunchiglia andBouquet's (1994) approach to the qualication problem using a logic of context. Oneshortcoming of most of the logics of context of the AI literature is that most of thetreatments are purely syntactic. Channel theory|which allows the contextualisation ofinformation as well as the use of channels for exporting information between contexts|would seem to be a candidate for providing a corresponding semantics. It would alsobe worthwhile investigating the issues and approaches used by the proponents of theAI logics of context and seeing whether they cast any light on the channel theoreticmethodology for situated default reasoning.Perspective and Situated ContentA property that is closely related to context is the indexicality of reasoning, whichinvolves accounting for the perspective or viewpoint of an agent on its environment. Theindexicality of reasoning is pretty much ignored in the AI literature but|particularlyin multi-agent settings|would seem to oer the possibility of more ecient systems.One would like to be able to specify or model the behaviour of each given agent in anenvironment from that particular agent's point of view, rather than needing to specifya global view of the environment which each agent then adopts. Agre and Chapman's(1987) Pengi system is the only AI system I know of that incorporates an explicit agent-centred view of the world. Lesperance and Levesque (1995) have recently proposed amodal logic of knowing and acting that incorporates an agent's particular point of view.Modelling perspective and point of view within the channel theoretic frameworkshould be a relatively straightforward process|in fact, classication theory seems nat-urally suited to this task. Let A and B be agents and for simplicity assume that theyreason over the same sets of tokens and types.5 We can associate classications A0 andB0 with the respective agents, where A0 and B0 contain the same tokens and types.Now suppose A and B face each other across a table which contains a ball and a pen-5This need not be the case, of course. In fact, Healey and Vogel (1994) take as a starting premisethe assertion that no two agents can reason over the same tokens and types|i.e. types are somehowinternalised to the agents and tokens are determined by the types they support.
Summary and Further Work 226cil. A0 may support (table : leftOf; ball; pencil) whereas B0 may support (table : rightOf; ball; pencil ). Of course, these two propositions are related|since A andB face each other across the table then A0's supporting (table : leftOf; ball; pencil)carries the information that B0 supports (table :  rightOf; ball; pencil ) and viceversa. This information is carried in a channel C : A0 ) B0. If A is attuned to thischannel, then she can infer something about B's mental state (although this inferencemay be incorrect and may therefore correspond to an exception in C).Related (in fact, in some way generalising) indexicality is the situatedness of thecontent of internal states, an issue which has received much attention in the philosophi-cal literature. Dretske (1988) shows how environmental constraints|particularly thoselinking an agent's internal states to its embedding environment|can be exploited in thedesign of simple systems that behave in seemingly complex ways in a rich environment.To take the frog example from Chapter 2, the frog seems to be feeding on ies becauseit is hungry, even though it cannot help itself since darting its tongue at \black yingthings" in its immediate vicinity is a reex action.Rosenschein and Kaelbling's work on situated automata (Rosenschein 1985; Rosen-schein and Kaelbling 1986) is perhaps the most notable AI attempt to explicitly designmachines based on this principle and provide a logical framework for explaining theirbehaviour. A situated automaton is only a very simple nite state machine, but eachof its states is related to a particular condition in the world. The workings of the statetransition function can then be explained using intentional language|i.e. by describingthe behaviour in terms of the outside environment and the machines \beliefs" about thisenvironment.The regularity between an agent's internal state and its external environment isjust one particular sort of regularity6 and hence can be modelled within the channeltheoretic framework. Channels supporting such regularities can be used to infer thecontent of a simple agent's internal states (with respect to some model of the world)and can thereby be used to ascribe complex intentional behaviour to the agent (withinthe theorist's model) without requiring the agent itself to possess the correspondinglyrich discriminatory and complex processing powers|i.e. the complex intentional view isonly available to the theorist because of the perceived regularities between the (simple)6Phil Agre (personal communication) considers it the most important sort of regularity when mod-elling situated agents.
Summary and Further Work 227internal states of the agent and the complex (i.e. rich in types) environment. Theresulting model involves a network of channels|some representing the link between theagent and the world, the rest representing other regularities in the world|with thesimple agent and its associated decient classication sitting in the middle. This wouldallow the logical design and specication of simple agents for performing (seemingly)complex reasoning tasks.Interacting Heterogeneous AgentsI have outlined above how the notion of \perspective" and \content of mental state"can be modelled in a channel theoretic setting. When multiple agents are involved,not only does each of these characteristics have to be modelled for each agent, but theinteraction between the agents must also be modelled. This interaction is usually withrespect to some \external" medium. If we assume agents to be heterogeneous in theiroutlook on the world, then this external medium cannot be some \objective" worldunless it is the theorist's own view of the world.7 One way in which an objective (or atleast perceived to be objective) medium is provided is via communication, particularlylinguistic communication.Healey and Vogel's (1994) channel theoretic model of dialogue addresses the prob-lems of agents that interact linguistically on some task for which the dierent agents maydisagree on certain ontological issues. In particular, this may lead to communicationbreakdown even though each dialogue participant considers each step of the dialogueto involve successful negotiation. Healey and Vogel show how the channel theoreticconcepts of pseudo-signal and exception can be used to explain various sorts of commu-nication breakdown that occur in dialogues involving negotiation. Their model involveseach agent being represented by a distinct collection of classications (with no tokensor types being shared across agents), with the only interaction between the agents be-ing provided by a single utterance situation which is shared between the agents.8 Ananalogous model could be used to model multiple interacting agents, with each agent7This is, of course, a useful stance to take|i.e. that the theorist discriminates some objective world inwhich the agents operate|particularly when using the framework for the specication of a multi-agentapproach to solving some task.8Personally, I would model the task slightly dierently to the way Healey and Vogel do. In particular,I would prefer an explicit communication channel linking private utterance sites. The fact that theparticipants classify the utterance site in the same way can only be established by an external observerand it seems more natural (to me) to instead introduce a single \external" channel.
Summary and Further Work 228being provided with its own frame of reference and reasoning. The interaction betweenagents would be conned to some interface, which is modelled by channels specifyingthe information-ow between the classications representing the dierent agents. Sucha model would lead to a methodology for the specication of multi-agent systems|each agent could be specied independently of the others, with the total system beingspecied on denition of the various agents' interaction.The dialogue model of Healey and Vogel also seems to oer a framework for a poten-tially interesting extension of some of the work described in this thesis. In the channeltheoretic semantic model of generics, the demonstrative content of a generic is a channel.Exactly which channel is the intended one is not always clear from the context and iscertainly not specied by the theory itself. It may well be that a speaker of an utterance(involving a generic sentence) intends a particular channel as the demonstrative con-tent while the hearer understands the generic as being about a dierent channel. Sincechannels form the basis of inference about individual tokens (in the model of defaultreasoning of Chapter 5), this may lead to erroneous conclusions about individuals. Forexample, suppose A utters\Dutch make good sailors."meaning that the channel C which contains only sailor tokens supports the regularitydutch!good:sailor|i.e. what A means to convey is that Dutch sailors make goodsailors. The hearer B may take this utterance to be about a channel C0 containing allDutch people|i.e. B takes the utterance to mean that all Dutch people make goodsailors. If the above assertion is made in a context where A is indicating to B as towho he should recruit for his navy, then B may well ll his boats with Dutch farmers,leading to some problematic sea voyages! The Healey/Vogel model of dialogue seemsto be a natural framework in which to model dialogues involving generics and the sortof erroneous \default information" that may be inferred when miscommunication of theabove sort occurs.9
9Sheila Glasbey and I have commenced investigation into modelling such phenomena.
Appendix A
Channel Theory: Further FormalDenitions
In this appendix, I elaborate on the formal concepts dened in Chapter 2.A.1 Simple Situation Theoretic UniversesThis section contains a more precise and complete presentation of Barwise and Cooper's(1991) formal denition of the concepts of situation theory. As they acknowledge, theirdenition makes use of a great deal of work of many others. The denition below isborrowed from (Barwise and Cooper 1991) (with a few minor cosmetic changes).DenitionA simple situation theoretic universe consists of various sorts of objects and operationson them, satisfying the conditions listed below.Objects1. Infons;2. Propositions, some of which are true, the rest false;3. Situations; 229
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 2304. Abstracts, including: infon abstracts, which are called relations; proposition abstracts, which are called types, and which include the follow-ing:{ types Infon, Proposition, Abstract, Relation, Type, Situation and Set,corresponding to the sorts of objects;{ a type j= ;{ a type IsOf;{ the collection of infons;5. Parametric objects corresponding to each of the above;6. Parameters;Note: an indexed family F of parameters is a one-one function whose range is a setof parameters. The domain of F is called the set of indices of F . A nite sequence[X1; :::;Xn] of parameters is an indexed family of parameters whose index set isthe set f1; :::; ng. An anchor is a function h whose domain is a set of parameters.7. Sets.Note: the inclusion of set theory allows the representation of functions. Functionswill often be referred to as assignments, since that is how they will be used.OperationsWe dene operations on the sorts of objects in a universe, as follows.Infon operations:1. Two partial binary operations  :+ and  : , whose rst argument is arelation r and whose second argument is an assignment f , with the results (ifdened) being infons. We write  r; f ; 1 and  r; f ; 0 for  r; f + and r; f   respectively.2. Two total binary operations ^ and _ from infons to infons.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 231Proposition operations:3. A partial binary operation (: : :) whose rst argument is an assignment f andsecond argument is a type T , with the result (if dened) being a proposition(f : T ).4. Two total binary operations ^ and _ from propositions to propositions.5. One total unary operation : from propositions to propositions.Operations on parametric objects:6. An operation par which assigns to each object o a set par(o) of parameters, calledthe set of parameters of o.7. A partial binary operation :[:] of substitution whose rst argument is an object oand second argument an anchor f .8. A binary operation  whose rst argument is an indexed family F of parametersand whose second argument is a parametric object o. The operation is dened forall such arguments and the result Fo is an abstract. If o is an infon, then Fo iscalled an infon abstract, and similarly for the other sorts of objects.Restricting objects:9. A partial binary operation : # : whose rst argument o is an arbitrary object andwhose second argument is a (possibly parametric) proposition.Operations on abstracts:10. An operation Ext which assigns to each non-parametric type T its extensionExt(T ), a collection of (possibly parametric) assignments.11. An operation Appropwhich assigns to each abstract b a type of assignmentApprop(b)(i.e. Ext(Approp(b)) is a collection of assignments). Approp(b) is called the appro-priateness conditions for b. An assignment f is appropriate for a non-parametricabstract b if f 2 Ext(Approp(b)).12. A binary operation Apply whose rst argument is an abstract b and whose secondargument is an assignment f .
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 232AxiomsTo qualify as a simple situation theoretic universe, the objects and operations mustsatisfy the following axioms. In what follows, = is Kleene equality: \b = c" means that\b" and \c" either both denote or neither does, and if they denote, then they denotethe same object.Parameters:1. par(o) satises the following conditions: par(o) = ; i o is non-parametric; par(X) = fXg if X is a parameter; par( r; f ; i) = par(r) [ par(f); par( ^ ) = par() [ par(), and similarly for _ ; par((f : T )) = par(f) [ par(T ); par(p ^ q) = par(p) [ par(q), and similarly for _ and :; par(o # p) = par(o) [ par(p); par(Approp(b))  par(b); par(Fo) = par(o)  rng(F ), for F an indexed family of parameters; par(o[f ]) is the set of parameters in o, less those in dom(f), together with allthe parameters in any f(X), for X 2 par(o).1Appropriateness conditions and extensions:2. There is a type T for every formula (x1; :::; xn) of set theory with atoms, forwhich every assignment [a1; :::; an] is appropriate. The extension of T consists ofthose assignments [a1; :::; an] that satisfy  when xk is interpreted by ak for eachk.3. The appropriateness conditions of an abstract b determine when b combines withother objects, either by substitution or (in the case of relations and types) bypredication. More precisely:Given an indexed family F and an assignment f to the domain of F , f̂ isthe anchor for the parameters in rng(F ) with f̂(X) = f(F 1(X))|i.e. f̂1I.e. par(o[f ]) = (par(o)  dom(f)) [ fpar(f(X)) j X 2 par(o)g.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 233anchors X with the object assigned to the role index corresponding to X inF .(a) If c = Fo then an assignment f is appropriate for c i o[f̂ ] is dened.(b) If T = Fp is a non-parametric type, then for any assignment f appropriateto T , f 2 Ext(T ) i p[f̂ ] is true.(c) For any non-parametric relation r, an assignment f is appropriate for r i r; f ; 1 and  r; f ; 0 are dened. Similarly, for any non-parametrictype T , f is appropriate for T i (f : T ) is dened.(d) An assignment f is appropriate for the basic types Infon, Proposition, Ab-stract, Relation, Type, Situation and Set just in case f is unary, say f = [b].In this case, f is of one of these types just in case b is a non-parametric infon,proposition, abstract, relation, type, situation or set, respectively.(e) The appropriate assignments for j= are the assignments [s; ], where s is a(possibly parametric) situation and  is a (possibly parametric) infon. (Wewrite s j=  rather than [s; ] 2 Ext( j= ) for all appropriate assignments toj= .)2i. s j= F; f ; 1 i s j=  [f̂ ].ii. If s j= F; f ; 0 and s is coherent then s 6j=  [f̂ ].(f) The appropriate assignments for IsOf are the assignments [a; T ] such thatT is a type and a is appropriate for T .(g) If [a; T ] is non-parametric and appropriate for IsOf , then [a; T ] 2 Ext(IsOf)i a 2 Ext(T ). (We write a : T rather than [a; T ] 2 Ext(IsOf). Note that ifa is appropriate for T then (a : T ) is a proposition such that a : T i (a : T )is true (see below)).The appropriate assignments for a non-parametric infon  are just thoseunary assignments s such that s is a non-parametric situation, and for suchan assignment, s 2 Ext() i s j= .(h) If o is an object and p a proposition, theni. o # p is dened i p is not a false proposition.ii. If p is true (and hence non-parametric), then o # p = o.2I do not include the rst two conditions of Barwise and Cooper's denition, involving the conjunctionand disjunction operations, for reasons discussed below.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 234iii. : # : distributes over the various closure operations that do not abstractover or substitute for parameters; e.g. ( ^ ) # p =  # p ^  # p.iv. Fo # p = F (o # p) if no parameters in p are in the range of F .Truth:Note: The following theory of truth applies to non-parametric propositions only.4. (f : T ) is true i f 2 Ext(T ).5. p ^ q is true i p and q are both true. Similarly, p _ q is true i either p or q istrue.6. :p is true i p is false.Abstraction, application and substitution:7. X[f ] = f(X) if X 2 dom(f) and X[f ] = f(X) if X 62 dom(f), for any parameterX.8. o[f ] = o if f is the empty function.9. o[f ] = o[f0], where f0 is the restriction of f to par(o).10. :[:] distributes over the various infon and propositional operations; e.g. r; a; i[f ] = r[f ]; a[f ]; ip ^ q[f ] = p[f ] ^ q[f ]o # p[f ] = o[f ] # p[f ]Fo[f ] = F (o[f ]) provided dom(f) is disjoint from rng(F ).11. If dom(F ) is disjoint from par(Go0) then Fo = Go0 i dom(F ) = dom(G)and o is the result of simultaneously substituting F (G 1(X)) for X in o0, for allparameters X 2 rng(G).312. Apply(Fo; f) is the result of substituting f(i) for the parameter Xi in o, providedf is an assignment that is appropriate for b. More precisely: Apply(Fo; f) is dened i f 2 Ext(Approp(Fo)). For any such f , Apply(Fo; f) = o[f̂ ].3This axiom eectively allows replacement of parameters.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 235Structure axioms:The following axioms are taken to be optional by Barwise and Cooper. However,I include them so as to ensure the ne-grained intensionality I desire.13. Basic infons and propositions are uniquely determined by the constituents out ofwhich they are formed. More precisely: If (a : T ) = (a0 : T 0) then a = a0 and T = T 0. If  r; a; i = r0; a0; j  then r = r0, a = a0 and i = j.Barwise and Cooper propose further possible axioms that could be added to the onesabove. I will not present such axioms here (although some of them deal with importantconcepts of situation theory, such as the part-of relation) since they play no part in theresults of this thesis. Note that, when I dene a situation theoretic classication (i.e.tokens are situations and types are situation-types), then the objects of this classicationare assumed to satisfy all the general conditions of classications, as set out in Section2.2. At the time of writing, no model of the Situation Theoretic Universe axioms hasbeen dened, so there is no guarantee that they are consistent; however, Barwise andCooper believe that they are so.The only dierence of any signicance I have made to Barwise and Cooper's denitionis in the axiom involving the extension of the type j= . Barwise and Cooper include thefollowing two conditions, which I omit:i. s j=  ^  i s j=  and s j=  ;ii. s j=  _  i s j=  or s j=  .On the one hand, I have no need for these conditions, since the interaction of the j=type with the infon-conjunction and -disjunction operations is handled by the conditionsI impose on classications with type-structure, as presented in Section 2.2.2. However,even there I do not impose a condition that captures the second of those above, i.e. thecondition involving the disjunction operation. In traditional situation semantics (e.g.(Barwise and Perry 1983)), a situation that supports a disjunctive item of informationmust support one of the disjuncts. However, in traditional logic, a disjunctive sentencecan be valid without either of its disjuncts being valid, and since this thesis involvesmodelling logical frameworks with this behaviour, I wish to leave this option open, ingeneral.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 236A.2 Operations on ClassicationsIn Section 2.2.3, I presented the denition of the sequential conjunction operation onclassications, one of several operations dened in (Seligman and Barwise 1993). Al-though I have not made use of such operations in this thesis (the assumption that all\logical" structure is represented at the type-level means that they are not needed), theframework could be signicantly generalised by doing so. In particular, a more \contex-tualised" version of the framework could be dened, whereby, for instance, negations andconjunctions of Austinian propositions involving dierent tokens could be represented.Some of the concepts dened earlier can be extended to take advantage of a frame-work generalised in this way. For example, the subclassication relation could be ex-tended so that, for classications A and B, A is a subclassication of A
B and B
A,4leading to an algebra of classications.Such operations could also be extended to channels leading to the notion of \merg-ing" information ow. In fact, one may be able to replace some of the current channeloperations dened in Section 2.3.7 by classication operations. Alternatively, the chan-nel operations themselves could be generalised by using the operations on classications.For example, the current parallel meet (and parallel join) composition operation requiresthat the two channels to be composed link the same classications. However, this re-striction could be removed by dening parallel meet as follows.Denition Let C1 : A1 ) B1 and C2 : A1 ) B1 be channels.The denition of a connection graph is modied so that h ^ ; a1; a2i (c1 k c2)7! h^ ; b1; b2i ia1 c17! b1 and a2 c27! b2.The parallel meet of C1 and C2 is a channel (C14C2) : (A1 
A1)) (B1 
B2) denedas follows:1. tok(C14C2) = f(c1 k c2) j c1 2 tok(C1); c2 2 tok(C2)g;2. typ(C14C2) = fh
; 1; 2i j 1 2 typ(C1) and 2 2 typ(C2)g;3. (c1 k c2) :+ h
; 1; 2i in (C14C2) i c1 :+ 1 in C1 and c2 :+ 2 in C2;(c1 k c2) :  h
; 1; 2i in (C14C2) i c1 :  1 in C1 or c2 :  2 in C2;4Similarly, AB and BA would be subclassications of A, where  is a suitably dened sequentialdisjunction operation on classications.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 2374. source(C14C2)(c1 k c2) = h ^ ; sourceC1(c1); sourceC2(c2)i;target(C14C2)(c1 k c2) = h ^ ; targetC1(c1); targetC2(c2)i;5. ante(C14C2)(h
; 1; 2i) = h ^ ; anteC1(1); anteC2(2)i;succ(C14C2)(h
; 1; 2i) = h ^ ; succC1(1); succC2(2)i.This generalised version of parallel meet composition provides a better model of themerging of the audio and visual channels of the television example of Section 2.3.7|theaudio channel A and visual channel V involve dierent classications but can still bemerged to provide an all-round sensory information channel.A.3 Parametric Types in Channel TheoryIn this section, I describe a proposal for a possible treatment of parameters withinthe channel theoretic. The motivation behind the proposed approach is that (i) itshould require minimal modication to the channel theoretic framework, and (ii) theproperties of the resulting framework should be analogous to those of other semanticfragments|in particular, the parameters should behave similarly to discourse referentsin DRT (Kamp 1981; Kamp and Reyle 1993) and variables in the generic operator GENin that variables in the antecedent are eectively universally quantied (or genericallyquantied) while variables in the succedent (and not appearing in the antecedent) areexistentially quantied.A.3.1 Classications with Parametric TypesAny classication A0 containing parametric situation-types is based on a classication Ainvolving only non-parametric situation-types, in the following way.5 In the following, Itend to take an anchor as assigning objects directly to parameters rather than to roles.This is simply a notational convenience that simplies the presentation.Denition Let A be a classication containing only non-parametric situation-types.The classication A[X] based on A and X, where X is a set of parameters, is such that5The situation-types of A could contain parameters but any such parameters will be bound bythe abstraction operation. For example, the situation-type X[X j= run; john; 1] contains theparameter X but X is bound by the abstraction operation. What counts, of course, is that par() = ;for any such type .
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 238tok(A[X]) = tok(A) and typ(A[X]) = f0 j  2 typ(A) and there is an anchor f suchthat dom(f)  X and 0[f ] = g. I require (s : ) to hold in A[X] i there exists ananchor f such that (s : [f ]) holds in in A. As an abbreviation, I will sometimes writes :f  in A[X] when a : [f ] in A.The notion of a \classication A[X] being based on classication A" could be mademore rigorous by employing Aczel and Lunnon's (1991) notion of a universe with pa-rameters. Aczel and Lunnon dene a universe with parameters A (which is basicallya universe of parametric objects) as being generated from a base universe Anp, whereAnp contains only non-parametric objects. They show that, given Anp and a class X ofparameters, the universe with parameters A generated is unique up to isomorphism. Bytaking typ(A) in the denition above to be a universe6 in the Aczel-Lunnon sense, wecan simply take typ(A[X]) to be the universe with parameters generated from typ(A)and X.Of course, even having more rigorously dened the notion of a classication withparametric types, this still leaves freedom of choice as to how the support of parametricsituation-types relates to non-parametric ones. Many authors are agnostic about suchmatters|e.g. Barwise and Cooper (1991) avoid the issue of truth for propositions involv-ing parametric types altogether. The above denition eectively existentially quantiesover parameters, which I take to be a reasonable choice|a parametric situation-type is supported by a situation s exactly when the parameters in  can be grounded insuch a way that the corresponding instantiated situation-type is supported by s. Forexample, s supports the parametric type runs;X; 1 exactly if there is some objecto such that s supports runs; o; 1|i.e. if there is some object that is running in s.The more interesting questions arise when such classications are involved in a channel.A.3.2 Channels and Parametric TypesI now turn to the properties of channels linking classications whose types may beparametric. The model that I present below will be seen to satisfy the following criteria:1. A channel is (basically) a classication and should be treated exactly as any otherclassication. The model below does just this, with the slight addition of an axiom6Actually, typ(A) will be the basis of a universe|there is a bit more to being a universe than beinga set of structured objects.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 239that channels are assumed to satisfy. Also, the denition of a channel should notbe modied|i.e. a channel involving parametric types should be a special caseboth of standard channels and of a classication involving parametric types.2. The basic behaviour I require from constraints containing parameters is that anyparameter in the antecedent is eectively universally quantied, while any remain-ing parameter in the succedent is eectively existentially quantied. For example,a constraint of the form p(X)!q(X;Y ) behaves analogously to the predicate logicformula 8X(p(X)  9Y q(X;Y )). This treatment is in line with the treatment ofdiscourse referents in DRT (Kamp 1981; Kamp and Reyle 1993) and in the genericoperator GEN .73. Since parameters are rst-class objects, they should be eectively \propagatedupwards" when we have nested constraints. For example, given a channel C :A) C0, where C0 is itself a channel, then for any constraint  in typ(C) containingparameter X in both its antecedent and succedent, anchoring X in ante() shouldeectively simultaneously anchor X in ante(succ()) and succ(succ()).For the rst part, I assume that channels are not nested|i.e. any classicationlinked by a channel C is not itself a channel. This restriction is made for the sake ofsimplicity and is relaxed below. Let A[X] and B[X] be classications based on A and Bin the way described in Section A.3.1. A channel C : A[X]) B[X] is a triple hfL; C; fRi,dened in the usual way. The rst criterion above is achieved by ensuring that typesin channels are never parametric. This is not to say that constraints do not containparameters|this is the very thing I want to model so as to capture regularities on a moreabstract level of generalisation. Instead, there is a distinction between the types of achannel and the antecedent and consequent types of the associated constraint|the latterare determined through use of the homomorphisms attached to the channel and maywell contain parameters. For example, suppose the channel C : A[X]) B[X] containsthe (non-parametric) type ; this type can still capture the more general regularityassociated with the use of parameters if fL and/or fR map  to types in A[X] and B[X]containing (free) parameters.Since channel-types are parameter-free, the concept of anchoring them is ratherpointless (although still well-dened, of course). However, I introduce the following7This is also the condition imposed on parametric constraints by Nivre's Axiom 7.2 (Nivre 1992, p.136).
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 240notion of the \anchored variant" of a channel-type , which is basically obtained byanchoring the parameters in ante() and succ().Denition Let C : A[X]) B[X] be a channel with  2 typ(C). The constraint  isan anchored variant of  (wrt f) in C, written  = ( # f), if  2 typ(C), ante() =(ante())[f ] and succ() = (succ())[f ].While the denition of a channel is exactly the usual one (in line with the rstcriterion above), I impose the following axiom on channels involving parametric types.(A ground anchor is one whose range contains only non-parametric objects.)Parametric Constraint Axiom: For any channel C : A[X]) B[X], type  2typ(C) and appropriate ground anchor f such that dom(f) = par(ante()) andante()[f ] 2 typ(A), we require that1. ( # f) 2 typ(C), and2. if (c : ) holds in C then (c : ( # f)) holds in C.The rst part of this axiom requires that, for a given constraint ! in C, allinstantiations of the constraint (obtained by appropriately grounding the parameters in) are themselves constraints in C. The second part ensures that if a constraint holdsof a connection c then every instantiated instance of it also holds of c. This is closelyrelated to the condition imposed by Nivre's Axiom 7.1 (Nivre 1992, p. 136), althoughNivre uses the notion of constraints being factual (i.e. supported by some situation)rather than classifying connections.I now turn to the question of what constitutes an exception to a parametric con-straint. For a constraint linking parametric types, it is not so clear as to what shouldcorrespond to an exception. A connection c may be an exception to some instances ofthe constraint while satisfying other instances. For example, given a constraint such asbird(x)!flies(x), a connection s 7! s0 may be an exception to opus being a bird andying while supporting the constraint for tweety. The approach I take here is that aconnection c is an exception to a constraint if c is an exception to any instance of thatconstraint. In fact, this is captured by the most obvious denition of exception.Denition Given a channel C : A[X]) B[X], a connection c is an exception to theconstraint  i (source(c) : ante()) holds in A[X] but it is not the case that (c : )holds in C.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 241This, of course, is simply the standard denition for exceptions, as it is dened forthe parameter-free case. The following result shows that it results in the behaviour thatI have claimed for it.Proposition A.3.1 Let  2 typ(C) and c 2 tok(C) be such that c is an exception to( # f) for some ground anchor f (where dom(f) = ante()). Then c is an exceptionto .Proof Since c is an exception to ( # f), then source(c) :f ante(); hence, source(c) :ante() by denition. Further, it is not the case that (c : ( # f)) holds, which means,by the parametric constraint axiom, that it is also not the case that (c : ) holds. 2Note that the converse does not necessarily hold|c can be an exception to someconstraint without necessarily being an exception to any instance of it. Again, I wouldargue that this is the way it should be|just because each known instance of the con-straint classies a connection, it is no guarantee that the parametrised constraint alsoclassies it.It is worth exploring this behaviour in a little more detail, especially with respect tohow this relates to generic relationships. Consider a generic such as \Birds y". In themodel described in Chapter 4, this generic describes a channel C containing a constraintbird!flies, with connections between bird-tokens. However, if we instead model thegeneric by a channel C0 containing the parametric constraint bird(X)!flies(X), withconnections between situation-tokens, then a connection s 7! s is classied by the con-straint only if every way of anchoring X (in such a way that bird(X)[f ] is a type inthe antecedent classication) results in an instantiated constraint that also classiess 7! s|i.e. if every (appropriate) bird ies in s. While this may at rst seem anoma-lous, it simply means that C and C0 correspond to dierent generics|C models thegeneric \Birds y", while C0 models a generic of the form \In (normal) situations, allbirds y".I now consider the other criteria spelt out above, namely, that involving the implicitquantication of parameters and that involving nested channels. The satisfaction of therst of these is demonstrated by the following result.Proposition A.3.2 Let C : A[X]) B[X] be a channel with c 2 tok(C) and  2 typ(C),where source(c) = a, target(c) = b, ante() =  and succ() =  .
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 2421. If (c : ) holds then a :  and b :  ;2. For any appropriate anchor f , if (a : [f ]) holds in A and (c : ( # f)) holds inC then there exists an anchor f 0 such that (b :  [f ][f 0]) holds in B.Proof The rst result is easily shown. To show the second, suppose the antecedentcondition holds. Then (b :  [f ]) holds in B[X], which, by denition, implies the result.2 Finally, I want to allow the possibility of a channel being nested. The desired be-haviour is achieved by extending the notion of anchored variant as follows, ensuring thatinstantiations are propagated downwards into the nested constraints.Denition Let C be a classication (possibly a channel), with  2 typ(C). The anchoredvariant of  wrt an anchor f in C, written ( #C f), is dened as follows: If C is not a channel, then ( #C f) = [f ]; If C : A) B is a channel (A and B are possibly channels), then ( #C f) is atype  2 typ(C), if such a type exists, such that ante() = (ante() #A f) andsucc() = (succ() #B f);if no such type  tting this description exists, then ( #C f) is undened.By modifying the Parametric Constraint Axiom so as to make use of this revisednotion of anchored variant, the desired behaviour for nested parametric constraints isobtained.A.4 Further Formal Properties of Classications and Chan-nelsThis section contains some further results regarding the formal properties of channels.A.4.1 Further Properties of the Composition OperationsThe following results prove the various properties claimed of the channel operations inSection 2.3.7.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 243The rst property demonstrates that the objects dened by the parallel compositionoperations are themselves channels.8Proposition A.4.1 If C1 : A) B and C2 : A) B are channels, then so too are(C14C2) and (C15C2).Proof This basically requires us to show that the bifunctions left and right associ-ated with (C15C2) dene homomorphisms, and similarly for (C14C2). Let (c1 k c2) 2tok(C15C2) and  2 typ(C15C2) be such that (c1 k c2) :  in (C15C2). Now,  =h _ ; 1; 2i, for 1 2 typ(C1) and 2 2 typ(C2), and so c1 : 1 in C1 or c2 : 2 in C2.Suppose the former is the case; then, since C1 is a channel we can use the Principle ofHarmony to show that it must be the case that source(c1) : ante(1) and target(c1) :succ(1) in C1. But source(c1 k c2) = source(c1), so source(c1 k c2) : ante(1). But,given the interaction between type-entailment and type-disjunction (Section 2.2.2), itmust also be the case that source(c1 k c2) : (ante(1) _ ante(2)). Similarly, it can beshown that target(c1 k c2) : (succ(1) _ succ(2)). The case whereby c2 : 2 in C2 leadsto the same conclusion. Similarly, the analogous case for (C14C2) involving h ^ ; 1; 2ileads to a similar property, which completes the proof of the desired result. 2The following result demonstrates associativity and commutativity of the parallelcompositions. Associativity of serial composition is shown in (Seligman and Barwise1993).Proposition A.4.2 For any channels C1, C2 and C3 linking classications A and B, (C14C2) = (C24C1), and (C15C2) = (C25C1) ; (C14 (C24C3)) = ((C14C2)4C3), and (C15 (C25C3)) = ((C15C2)5C3).Proof The commutativity properties follow easily from the assumption that the type-conjunction and -disjunction operations on A and B are commutative. Associativity isalso very easily checked (given associativity of the type-operations), although this is alot more tedious. 28The analogous result for serial composition is shown in (Seligman and Barwise 1993).
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 244A.4.2 Relevant Logical ChannelsThe Relevant Logical Channels are based on Relevant Logic (e.g. (Anderson and Belnap1975; Dunn 1984; Read 1988)) which is a particularly attractive non-classical logic.In particular, it shares with channel theory the underlying motivation of accountingfor \information containment". Relevant implication is highly intensional and avoidsthe paradoxes of material implication: these paradoxes are the facts that any formula(materially) entails a tautology, and that a logical contradiction entails any formula. ARelevant Logical channel R eectively captures rst-degree relevant entailment, in thefollowing way: for token s and types ;  , (s : ) carries the information that (s :  )via R i 0 relevantly entails  0, where 0;  0 are logical sentences corresponding to thetypes ;  .Apart from the desirable properties associated with relevant implication I alluded toabove, the logic of rst-degree relevant entailment also has some interesting parallels withthe operations of channel theory. Consider the following Hilbert-style axiomatisation ofrst-order entailment (Dunn 1984, p. 147):9Axioms:A ^ B  A; A ^ B  B Conjunction EliminationA  A _ B; B  A _ B Disjunction IntroductionA ^ (B _ C)  (A ^ B) _ C DistributionA  ::A; ::A  A Double NegationRules of Inference:A  B; B  C ` A  C TransitivityA  B; A  C ` A  B ^ C Conjunction IntroductionA  C; B  C ` A _ B  C Disjunction IntroductionA  B ` :B  :A ContrapositionThe four rules of inference above correspond to the four Principles of Informationow that Barwise obtains from the operations of serial and parallel composition andcontraposition (Barwise 1993), which in turn are obtained through the channel opera-tions dened in Section 2.3.7. This means that we can dene a Relevant Logical channelR simply by stipulating that there are constraints which correspond to the axioms,9The following axiomatisation is for the rst-degree fragment of Anderson and Belnap's system R.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 245and then closing R under the channel-theoretic operations, as required by the LogicalClosure constraint.Denition Given a classication A, the Relevant Logical channel for A, denoted RA :A) A,10 is the smallest logical channel whose set of types contains the following con-straints, for each ;  ;  2 typ(A): ( ^  )! ( ^  )!  !( _  )  !( _  ) ( ^ ( _ ))!(( ^  ) _ ) !(::) (::)!Note that any Relevant Logical channel R must satisfy all the properties required oflogical channels, as listed above. Hence, closure under the channel operations ensuresthat R models precisely the rst-degree relevant entailments over a given set of types.This is shown by the following result.Denition Given a classication A with types typ(A), a propositional language basedon typ(A) is a set P of propositional sentences such that, for each type  2 typ(A), thereis a sentence 0 2 P satisfying the following constraints:111. (:)0 = :()0;2. ( ^  )0 = 0 ^  0;3. ( _  )0 = 0 _  0.Proposition A.4.3 Let R : A) A be a relevant logical channel and L a propositionallanguage based on A|given a type , 0 denotes the corresponding formula in L. Then! 2 typ(R) i 0   0 is a valid rst-degree entailment in R.10Note that there is a dierent Relevant Logical channel for each classication A. I will usually dropthe subscript on RA when it causes no confusion.11Some care should be taken here: the operations on the left-hand and right-hand sides of the equalitysign are dierent of course|the one on the left is a type-operator while the one on the right is a logicalsymbol. This should cause no real problem.
Channel Theory: Further Formal Denitions 246Proof The proof is quite simple. I will simply show that the parallel compositionoperations preserve rst-degree entailment|all other steps of the proof are even simpler.Suppose typ(R) contains 1! 1 and 2! 2, and that 01   01 and 02   02 are rst-degree entailments. Using the parallel composition operations (under whichR is closed),we obtain constraints (1 ^ 2)!( 1 ^  2), and (1 _ 2)!( 1 _  2). Consider the rstof these (the other follows analogously)|we need to show that (01 ^ 02)  ( 01 ^  02)is a valid entailment in R. This is easily shown as follows: by Conjunction Elimination,we have (01 ^ 02)  01 and (01 ^ 02)  02; using Transitivity on each of these plusthe two given entailments, we obtain (01 ^ 02)   01 and (01 ^ 02)   02, to which weapply Conjunction Introduction to obtain (01 ^ 02)  ( 01 ^  02), as required. 2
Appendix B
Channel Theoretic Model forConditional Logics: FurtherDiscussion and Results
This appendix contains extended treatments of some concepts which were covered onlybriey in the main text of Chapter 3, as well as proofs of the formal results claimed inthat chapter.B.1 Nested ConditionalsIn Section 3.1.2, I showed how conditional sentences can be interpreted within the chan-nel theoretic analysis without any extension to the basic framework. However, the de-nition of the channel theoretic system for reasoning with conditionals basically ignorednested conditionals. In this section, I present one way in which the channel theoreticconditional logic can be extended so as to handle nested conditionals.Jackson (1987) claims that the only meaningful nested conditionals are those thatcontain the inner conditional in the consequent of the outer one. Further, he claims thata nested conditional of the form \if X then if Y then Z" is equivalent to \if X and Ythen Z". This observation underlies the following usual axiom of conditional logics:(A!(B!C))  ((A ^ B)!C). 247
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 248Basically, the antecedent of the outer conditional is eectively treated as an extra back-ground condition of the inner conditional. This suggests the following treatment withinthe channel theoretic system for reasoning with conditionals: given a channel C sup-porting the outer conditional and a channel C0 supporting the inner conditional, thenthere must be a channel C00 in the hierarchy such that C0 v C00 and C00 encodes the outerantecedent of C as a background assumption to C0. For example, if C supports\If Pete doesn't have an umbrella then if it rains he'll get wet"and C0 supports \if it rains he'll get wet", then C00 will eectively support the conditional\If Pete doesn't have an umbrella and it rains then he'll get wet."The above behaviour can be imposed by dening the following constraint, along thelines of those dened in Section 3.5, which all channel hierarchies are required to satisfy.1Denition Nested Conditional Constraint: Let C : A) K be a channel such that K isa classication of channels by conditional facts.2 Suppose typ(C) contains the constraint!h ) ; (b :  ); (c : )i and tok(C) contains the connection a 7! C0 where C0 : B ) C.Then there is a channel C00 : (A
B)) C such that C0 vf C00 and f( !) = (^ )! .This constraint ensures the axiom given earlier is supported by the channel theoreticlogic of conditionals. The following result shows that Jackson's requirement that the twoconditionals (one involving nesting, one conjoining the extra antecedent) are eectivelyequivalent holds.Proposition B.1.1 Suppose (!h ) ; (b :  ); (c : )i) 2 typ(C) and (( ^  )!) 2typ(C00). The information (c : ) is carried in C via the former constraint i (c : ) iscarried in C00 via the latter constraint.Proof Suppose (c : ) is carried via the constraint !h ) ; (b :  ); (c : )i. Then (a : )holds in A and (a 7! C0) : (!h ) ; (b :  ); (c : )i) holds in C. By the Principle ofHarmony, this means that (b 7! c :  !) must hold in C0 which in turn means that(b :  ) must hold in B. But since C0 v C0 this must mean that ((ha; bi 7! c) : ( ^  )!)must hold in C00, so (c : ) must hold in C|i.e. (c : ) is carried via ( ^  )! in C00.Conversely, suppose (c : ) is carried via ( ^  )! in C00. From this it follows that1The following denition is for the general setting|in particular, there is no assumption that channelsare reexive.2I.e. the tokens of K are channels and the types are conditional facts.
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 249(a : ) holds in A and (b :  ) holds in B, from which the result follows. 2B.2 Contextualising the Channel Theoretic ConditionalLogicThe conditional channel operations of Section 3.4 take account of conicting backgroundconditions but only at the type level. The restriction of attention to the type-level is onlyreasonable under the assumption that channels and signalling relations are reexive.For example, if C : A) B, C0 : B ) C,  2 typ(C) and 0 2 typ(C0), then even if abackground condition  conicts with a background condition of 0 at the type level thisneed not mean that the serial composition should in any way be aected since A and Bare (presumably) dealing with dierent tokens. Of course, if the background conditionon  concerned the consequent of  and the background condition of 0 concerned theantecedent of 0, then in this case type-conict would need to be taken into accountsince the same classication B is involved in each case.In the most general version of the channel theoretic framework|in which a chan-nel may link two dierent classications and signalling relations are not reexive|it isproposition conict/inconsistency rather than type-conict that matters. Of course, thisis true for the simplied case as well; it is just that under the simplication, proposition-inconsistency and type-conict coincide. In general, however, proposition-conict is aweaker notion than type-conict|the only time they need coincide is when the sametoken is involved in both propositions. As such, the systems for reasoning with condi-tionals, generics and default properties of Chapters 3{5 can be seen as subsystems ofthe most general channel theoretic systems possible for these tasks.Apart from the obvious simplication, the restriction to reexive channels and sig-nalling relations also allowed a more direct comparison to traditional \unsituated" log-ics of conditionals and default reasoning. In particular, I was able to show that themodied channel operations|which respect the background assumptions encoded in ahierarchy|satised many important patterns of inference (as well as invalidating variousproblematic ones). An investigation into the sorts of appropriate patterns of inferencefor a \fully contextualised" version of the channel theoretic systems (i.e. with the re-exivity simplication removed) would need to be undertaken in order to evaluate theresulting systems.
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 250At this stage, the way in which the use of proposition conict would replace the useof type-conict in the conditional channel operations is unclear. A particular potentialproblem is that the background assumptions of a conditional may involve dierent tokensto those of the antecedent and consequent of the conditional. For example, consider thefollowing modication to the example involving the British political parties.\If the Lib Dems get the most votes (in this election) then the Tories will be inpower (for the next term)."\If the Tories aren't in power (for the next term) then Labour will be."The second conditional is true only under the assumption that the Lib Dems don'tget the most votes (in the current election). If we assume that the current-electionsituation and the next-term situation are dierent, then the superchannel encodingthe background assumption of the second conditional involves tokens not necessar-ily available in the channel supporting this conditional. One way of overcoming thisproblem is to use complex classications (and the corresponding subclassication re-lation) of the form described in Section A.2 and modify the denition of subchannelaccordingly. For example, the channel C : T ) T supporting the second conditionalabove would be a subchannel of the channel C0 : (T 
 E)) T|(T 
 E) would con-tain tokens of the form ht; ei, where t is a \term" situation and e an \election" sit-uation, and C0 would encode the background assumption in a constraint of the formh:tories:in:power;:lib:dems:wini!labour:in:power.Other operations and conditions dened in Chapters 3{5 would also need to be mod-ied. For example, the conditional Contraposition operation would require modicationand the Consequent Consistency, Antecedent Background and Consistency BackgroundConstraints would no longer be generally acceptable. The maximal normality conditionof Chapter 5 would also need to be modied|specically, some of the inappropriate-ness conditions would no longer reect inappropriateness. Interestingly, the particularinstances of inappropriateness that would need to be dropped (i.e. those requiring someform of consistency between antecedent and consequent types) are the same ones whichI ignore in the description of how the methodology for defeasible reasoning relates tothe maximal normality condition (Section 5.4.2), which reects that that methodologyis indeed a step towards situated defeasible reasoning.
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 251B.3 The Problem with Necessitation ConditionalsPollock (1976) has outlined a problem for the necessitation view of conditionals|whereby any conditional requires some sort of \link" between antecedent and consequent|which can be demonstrated by the following example.\If I press the button then the doorbell will ring."\If the doorbell rings then the doorbell exists."\If I press the button then the doorbell exists."The rst two conditionals are necessitation conditionals but the third is not|if it istrue, it can only be because of the contingent truth of the fact that I have pressed thebutton and the bell exists. In particular, the third conditional does not seem to be areasonable assertion under the channel theoretic analysis while the rst two do.The above pattern of inference is an instance of Transitivity that is validated usingthe conditional serial composition operation dened in Section 3.4 since the doorbell'snon-existence is not an implicit assumption to the rst conditional! It is the fact that thesecond conditional describes an entailment, and therefore has no associated backgroundassumptions, that is at the root of the problem.3 Barker (1994) has suggested that thisproblem involving entailment conditionals arises when the conclusion of the entailmentconditional (i.e. the second one in the example), is an implicit assumption (though not acondition that necessarily holds) to the other conditional. For example, the assumptionthat the doorbell exists is implicit behind any assertion of the rst conditional in theexample.Given this analysis of the problem, the operation of conditional serial compositionas dened in Section 3.4.1 can be modied to avoid problematic examples of this sortby adding the extra proviso to the denition. (I have not explicitly dened what Imean be an \entailment channel": it may be taken to be that any channel satisfying theconditions required of logical channels|particularly that specied in Section 3.3.2|isan entailment channel.)Denition Let C1 : A) B and C2 : B ) C be channels, with 1 2 typ(C1) and 2 2typ(C2). The conditional serial composition of C1 and C2, written (C1 ; C2), is identical3Note that any logic of conditionals with a possible-worlds semantics will also support the pattern ofreasoning underlying this example.
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 252to the standard serial composition of C1 and C2 except that h1; 2i 2 typ(C1 ; C2) onlyif 1. there do not exist C01; C02 such that1. C1 vf1 C01, C2 vf2 C02; and2. anteC01(f1(1)) ? anteC02(f2(2)); and3. if C2 is an entailment channel, then there does not exist a channel C01 such thatC1 vf1 C01 and anteC01(f1(1)) type-entails succC2(2).B.4 Proofs of Results in Chapter 3In this section, I present proofs of all the propositions stated in Chapter 3. So asto simplify the presentation of the proofs, I will make use of the following notationalconvention. Let C and C0 be channels, with ! 2 typ(C) and C vf C0. I will sometimesuse f(! ) to denote ante(f(! )), which I will further abbreviate to f when theconstraint of which  is the antecedent is unambiguously determined. Note, f denotesthe antecedent of the constraint to which f maps the constraint ! , of which  is theantecedent. If there is more than one constraint, in the pertinent context, of which  isan antecedent, then I will use the f(! ) notation to disambiguate. Similarly, I willsometimes write  f , and  f(! ), for succ(f(! )).The rst result is from Section 3.4.3 and concerns the interaction of the conditionalcontraposition operation with the channel hierarchy.Proposition 3.4.1 Let C : A) B and C0 : A0 ) B0 be channels such that C vf 0 C0.Further suppose that ! 2 typ(C) and that f(! ) = 0! 0.1. If : !: 2 typ(C) then : 0!:0 2 typ(C0);2. C v C0.Proof1. Suppose : 0!:0 62 typ(C0). (For simplicity, I assume  0 =  |the more generalcase is proved using an application of the Antecedent Background condition.)There exists a channel C00 such that C0 vf 0 C00, f 0(0! 0) = 00! 00 and : 0?  0,where  0 is the least type such that 00  0 ^  0. But the subchannel ordering istransitive, so we also have C vf 00 C00. Also, since   0 and  =  0, it is clearly
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 253the case that : ?  , where  is the least type such that 00   ^  . So the resultfollows.2. This result follows pretty much from the previous one|all I basically need to showis that (: !:)  (: 0!:0), and this is easily done.2 The following results are from Section 3.5.3.In a footnote to the denition of the function (f1 k f2) (Section 3.5.3), I mentionedthat it was necessary to prove that the parallel composition of the higher channels (i.e.(C01 k C02)) actually contains the type h ^ ; f1(1); f2(2)i. This is shown as follows.Proof Let f1(1) be 01 and let f2(2) be 02, and suppose h ^ ; 01; 02i is not con-tained in (C01 k C02). Then, by the denition of conditional parallel meet, theremust be channels C001; C002 such that C01 vf 01 C001, C02 vf 02 C002, andante(f 01(01)) ? ante(f 02(02)). But the subchannel relation is transitive, so we can-not then have h ^ ; 1; 2i contained in (C1 k C2), which contradicts the conditionsstated in the denition. 2The next proposition regards the interaction of this function with the channel hier-archy.Proposition 3.5.1 Suppose all the conditions of the above denition hold. Then(C1 k C2) v(f1 k f2) (C01 k C02).Proof The proof involves checking that each condition of the subchannel denitionholds. I will simply show that   (f1 k f2)(), for  2 typ(C k C0); the other conditionsare checked more easily than this one.Suppose  is constructed from ! 2 typ(C1) and ! 2 typ(C2). There are twopossibilities:1. Let  be ( ^ )!( ^ ). By the denition of  , we have   f1 and  f1   .Similarly,   f2 and f2   . So clearly, ( ^ )  (f1 ^ f2) and ( f1 ^f2)  ( ^ ); i.e. ( ^ )!( ^ )  (f1 ^ f2)!( f1 ^ f2). But the latteris just (f1 k f2)(), so the result follows for this case;2. Let  be ( _ )!( _ ). This case follows exactly analogously to the other.2 Proposition 3.5.2, which concerns the analogous result to the above for serial compo-
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 254sition, is proved much the same way as the proposition above; the proof is even simpler.The following result is from Section 3.5.5 and shows that channels failing the Relia-bility Constraint lack robustness.Proposition 3.5.3 Suppose in the denition that ante(f1(! )) ? ante(f2(!)),and let (a 7! b) 2 tok(C) be such that (a : ) holds in A. Then a 7! b is an exception toat least one of the given constraints.Proof Let c = a 7! b and suppose that (c : ! ) holds in C. Then, by denition ofthe subchannel relation, (c : f1(! )) holds in C1. But then it cannot be the case that(c : f2(!)) holds in C2, due to the conict in these types. Hence, again by denitionof subchannel, it cannot be the case that (c : !) holds in C|i.e. c is an exception.By reversing the roles of the constraints, we obtain the desired result. 2The following result, from Section 3.5.6, concerns the lack of robustness of channelsfailing the Consequent Consistency Constraint.Proposition 3.5.4 Let C be a channel as described in the denition, and ! 2 typ(C)a constraint that fails the given condition. If a 7! a 2 tok(C) and (a : ) holds in A,then a 7! a is an exception to ! .Proof (The proposition involves the underlying assumption that a is coherent.) Let cbe the connection a 7! a and suppose that (c : ! ) holds. Then (a :  ) holds in A,which means (a :  ) holds in A0 (since, by the denition of subchannel, A 6 A0). But wemust also have that (c : f(! )) holds, in which case (a : ante(f(! ))) holds. Butthis can't be so without a being incoherent. 2B.5 Evaluation of the Channel Theoretic Model|ProofsThis section contains the proofs that various axioms and rules of inference of standardconditional logics are supported by the Channel Theoretic model of conditionals (seeSection 3.6.3).Axioms CC: ((! ) ^ (!))  (!( ^ ))Proposition B.5.1 Let C be a channel containing constraints ! and ! .Then (C k C) contains the constraint !( ^ ).
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 255Proof !( ^ ) 2 typ(C k C) i for every C1; C2 such that C vf1 C1 andC vf2 C2, it is not the case that ante(f1(! )) ? ante(f2(!)). But this isexactly the (simpler version of the) Reliability condition, so the required resultfollows. 2 RT: ((! ) ^ (( ^  )!))  (!)Proposition B.5.2 Let C be a channel containing constraints ! and( ^  )! . Then the channel ((C k L) ; C) contains the constraint ! , whereL is an appropriate logical channel.4Proof Consider (C k L)|by Reliability, (!( ^  )) 2 typ(C k L).To show that the composition of the constraints !( ^  ) and ( ^  )!is contained in typ((C k L) ; C), we need to ensure that, for any C1; C2 suchthat (C k L) vf1 C1 and C vf2 C2, it is not the case that f1 ? ( ^  )f2 , wheref1 = ante(f1(!( ^  ))) and ( ^  )f2 = ante(f2(( ^  )!)). This is shownas follows.By the Parallel Subchannel condition, C1 = (C0 k L00), where C vf 0 C0 andL vf 00 L00. Let f 0 = ante(f 0(! )).5 By the Reliability constraint, f 0 ,  and( ^  )f2 must be mutually consistent. But f1 = (f 0 ^ ), since f1(!( ^  ))is formed by parallel composing f 0(! ) and !. Hence, it can't be the casethat f11 is inconsistent with ( ^  )f2 . This completes the proof of the result. 2The above is perhaps best visualised by way of an illustration; see Figure B.1. ST10: (! )  (::! )Proposition B.5.3 Let C be a channel containing the constraint ! . Then thechannel (L ; C) contains the constraint ::! , where L is an appropriate logicalchannel.Proof Suppose there is a C0 such that C vf C0 and ante(f(! )) ? ::, where!:: 2 typ(L). By the minimal conditions on the ? relation (Section 2.2.2), itmust be the case that  ? ante(f(! )) (since   ::), which contradicts theReliability Constraint. So the required result follows. 24I.e. L is the logical channel linking the same classications as does C.5Since L is a logical channel, it must (by denition) be the case that f 00(!) = !.
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! f 0
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 ^  )f2!:::f2f 00C 0 : f 0!::: C : ( ^  )!L : 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 ^  )
L00 : 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!C1 : f1!::: (where f1 = (f 0 ^ ))
Figure B.1: Companion to proof ...Rules of inference RCEC: if  ()  then (!) () ( !)Proposition B.5.4 Let L : A) A be a logical channel containing ! and !. If C : A) A contains ! (resp.,  !) then (L ; C) contains  ! (resp.,!).Proof The result holds so long as there is no channel C0 such that C vf C0 and ? ante(f(!)). This must be the case as otherwise the Reliability constraintwould be violated, since  A  . (The other case is symmetric.) 2 RCEA: if  ()  then (!) () (! )Proposition B.5.5 Let L : A) A be a logical channel containing ! and !. If C : A) A contains ! (resp., ! ) then (C ; L) contains ! (resp.,!).Proof The result holds so long as there is no channel C0 such that C vf C0 and ? ante(f(!)). This must be the case as otherwise the Consequent Consis-tency constraint would be violated. 2 RCK: if (1 ^ ::: ^ n)   then ((!1) ^ ::: ^ (!n))  (! )
Channel Theoretic Model for Conditional Logics: Further Discussion and Results 257Proposition B.5.6 Let L : A!A be a logical channel containing(1 ^ ::: ^ n)! . If C : A!A is a channel containing !1 ... !n then((C k ::: k C) ; L) contains ! .Proof By Reliability, it is clear that (C k ::: k C) must contain !(1 ^ ::: ^ n).Let C0 be a channel such that (C k ::: k C) vf C0. By the Consequent Consistencyconstraint, it cannot be the case that ante(f(!(1 ^ ::: ^ n))) ? (1 ^ ::: ^ n),and so the result follows. 2
Appendix C
A Channel Theoretic Model forGenerics: Further Discussionand Results
This appendix contains an illustration of the use of Morreau's logic of commonsenseentailment.C.1 An Illustration of Commonsense EntailmentIn Section 4.1.4, I noted that Morreau's logic of commonsense entailment does not fallvictim to the problem of Irrelevance. For example, 8x(bird(x) ^ red(x)!flies(x))can be (defeasibly) inferred from 8x(bird(x)!flies(x)). This is illustrated here. Forsimplicity, I will consider only the propositional variant of this example.To show that (bird!flies) j (bird ^ red!flies), we need to show that for everyxpoint t accessible (via some chain of normalisations) from  + f(bird!flies)g, t j=(red ^ bird!flies).1 Let s be the state +f(bird!flies)g. This state contains exactlythose worlds w such that (w; kbirdk)  kfliesk. The normalisation of s with respectto kbirdk is dened as follows.1Even though I do not explicitly state it, recall that the collection of worlds, individuals, the acces-sibility function  and the interpretation k:k of non-logical symbols are from the canonical model.258
A Channel Theoretic Model for Generics: Further Discussion and Results 259It is easily shown that (in the canonical model) (s; kbirdk)\s 6= ;, so N (s; kbirdk) =sn(kbirdkn(s; kbirdk)). Now, kbirdkn(s; kbirdk) is the collection of worlds that supportkbirdk yet are not normal bird worlds. So removing such worlds from s leaves us witha collection of worlds W such that each world in W supports bird!flies (all worlds ins support this sentence already) and any world in W that supports bird also supportsany property that normal birds possess|i.e. for every w 2 W such that w 2 kbirdk,w 2 (s; kbirdk); in particular, if w 2 kbirdk, then w 2 kfliesk, since (from above)(s; kbirdk)  kfliesk. It turns out that s is actually a xpoint of normalisation andkbirdk is the only proposition with respect to which we need to normalise t, so s is theonly information state we need to consider.We now need to determine whether s (defeasibly) supports the sentence (bird ^red!flies). This is true i w j= (bird ^ red!flies) for every w 2 s, which in turnis true i (w; kbird ^ redk)  kfliesk for every w 2 s. By Facticity, we know that(w; kbird ^ redk)  kbird ^ redk;2 hence (w; kbird ^ redk)  kbirdk. But for everyw 2 s, we have removed worlds for which w 2 kbirdk and w 62 (s; kbirdk). So, if w 2 sand w 2 kbirdk, then w 2 (s; kbirdk), and so w 2 kfliesk. So it follows that, for allw 2 s, (w; kbird ^ redk)  kfliesk; i.e. s j= (bird ^ red!flies). This proves that(bird!flies) j (bird ^ red!flies).
2All \normal" red birds are red birds!
Appendix D
A Channel Theoretic Model ofDefault Reasoning: FurtherDiscussion and Results
This appendix contains proofs of the results claimed in Chapter 5.D.1 Proofs of Propositions from Chapter 5This section contains the proofs of several results from Chapter 5.Proposition 5.2.1 For any channels C and C0, if C vf C0 then Link(C) f Link(C0).Proof We simply need to check each of the conditions in the denition of sublink.1. The rst condition clearly holds, by denition of subchannel;2. Suppose ht; t0i 2 Link(C)_ . Then there exists c 2 tok(C) such that sourceC(c) =t; targetC(c) = t0. But, by denition of subchannel, c 2 tok(C0) and sourceC0(c) =sourceC(c); targetC0(c) = targetC(c). Hence, the second condition follows;3. Suppose h;  i 2 Link(C)^ . Then there exists  2 typ(C) such that ante() =; succ() =  . By denition of subchannel,  2 typ(C0), anteC() A0 anteC0()and succC0() B0 succC(). Hence, the third condition follows.2 260
A Channel Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning: Further Discussion and Results 261Proposition 5.2.2 Let D = hL;Fi be a link hierarchy and let D0 = hL0;Fi be amaximally normal version of D. Further, let L1; L2 2 L, where L1 f L2, and letL01; L02 2 L0 be the links corresponding to L1; L2 respectively. Then L01 f L02.Proof Since L01; L02 are exactly the same as L1; L2 except possibly for the signallingrelations, then I only need to show that (L01)_  (L02)_ . Suppose ha; bi 62 L02. Thenha; bi is internally inappropriate in L02. So one of the following cases must hold:1. (b :  ) holds, such that h2;  2i 2 (L02)^ and  ? 2. In this case, there is someh1;  1i 2 L1 _ , such that f(h1;  1i) = h2;  2i:1 Hence,  2   1 and so  ? 1,which means that ha; bi is inappropriate in L01, and so ha; bi 62 (L01)_ .2. (a : ) holds, such that h2;  2i 2 (L002)^ , where L02  L002 and ?2. By thetransitivity of the subchannel and sublink relations, the result follows easily inthis case.So in either case, ha; bi is inappropriate in L01, and the required result follows. 2D.2 Channel-Theoretic Default Systems and PreferenceRelations|ProofsThis section contains the proof of Theorem 5.3.2 in Section 5.3.3, showing that channel-theoretic default consequence corresponds to preferential consequence. The followingresult proves useful in the proof of the theorem.Lemma Let L and L0 be links such that h; i 2 L^ , L f L0 and f(h; i) = h0; 0i.Further suppose that (a : ) holds and that ha; ai is not internally inappropriate in L.1. If 0? then ha; ai is externally inappropriate in L.2. If 0? then ha; ai is externally inappropriate in L.Proof The proof is straightforward for each case, using L as both links required in thedenition of external inappropriateness, and using the fact that L  L for the rst case.2Theorem 5.3.2 For any collection S of channels, j;S satises all the conditions cor-responding to the principles required of preferential consequence relations.1This holds for default hierarchies since each (non-logical) channel of a default hierarchy containsexactly one constraint.
A Channel Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning: Further Discussion and Results 262Proof To prove the theorem, I need to consider in turn the channel-theoretic version ofeach of KLM 's constraints and show that each one is satised by the j;S consequencerelation.Recall that the Parallel and Serial Subchannel Constraints ensure that if C is achannel formed by composition from C1 and C2, and C v C0, then C0 is itself composedfrom channels C01 and C02, where C1 v C01 and C2 v C02. In particular, this means thatthe background assumptions of C0 are related to the background assumptions of C. Forexample, if C is formed from parallel composition, then the antecedent of any constraintin C0 must be of the form 0 ^ 0, where 0 (resp. 0) is the antecedent of a constraintfrom C01 (resp. C02). Similarly, since a logical channel L has no superchannels (other thanitself), then the background assumptions of the channel formed from the compositionof a logical channel with some other channel C must be the background assumptions ofC. For example, if L contains the constraint !, C contains the constraint !, and(Lk C) v X , then the antecedent of any constraint in X must be of the form  ^  0,where  0 is the antecedent of a constraint in some superchannel of C.Left Logical Equivalence. Given that the logical link Link(L) contains both h; iand h; i in its signalling relation, and that (a : ) j; (a : ), I need to show that(a : ) j; (a : ). This holds if and only if there is a link in the default hierarchy whosesignalling relation contains ha; ai and whose indicating relation contains h; i. Giventhe premises, there must be a link L such that L^ contains h; i.Let C be the channel from which L is constructed (i.e. L = Link(C)) and suppose that(L ; C) does not contain h; i. This can only be the case if there is a channel C0 such thatC vf C0, where f(!) = 0!0 and 0?. But (from the constraints supported inthe logical channel) we know that   , so we then must have ?0, which contradictsthe result of the lemma above since ha; ai cannot be externally inappropriate in L. Sothe indicating relation of Link(L ; C) (call this link LC) must contain h; i.To show that ha; ai 2 LC _ , I need to show that ha; ai is not inappropriate inLC. This is done by considering each of the cases (one each for internal and externalinappropriateness) in turn.1. Suppose ha; ai is internally inappropriate in LC. Then either (i) (a : ) holds and? , in which case ha; ai must also be internally inappropriate in L, contradicting(a : ) j; (a : ); or (ii) there exists a link LC 0 such that LC f LC 0, f(h; i) =h0; 0i, (a : 00) holds and 00?0. By the nature of the subchannel (and therefore
A Channel Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning: Further Discussion and Results 263sublink) relation's behaviour w.r.t. sequential composition, it must be the casethat there is a link L0 such that L f 0 L0, f 0(h; i) = h0; 0i and 0   ^ 0(since the logical channel/link has no associated background conditions). (This isillustrated in Figure D.1.) But    and   0, so  ^ 0 = 0. Hence, if 0?00then 0?00. But then ha; ai would be internally inappropriate in L, which cannotbe since L supports the inference (a : ) j; (a : ) and hence L_ must containha; ai. So ha; ai cannot be internally inappropriate in LC...................................................... ...............................................L : h; i LC : h; iLink(L) : h; i
L0 : h0; 0i LC 0 : h ^ 0; 0i
Figure D.1: Channel hierarchy when ha; ai is internally inappropriate in LC2. Suppose ha; ai is externally inappropriate in LC. Then there must be links LC 0,N , N 02 such that LC f LC 0, N f 0 N 0, h; i 2 N ^|as illustrated by FigureD.2|and1. ha; ai is not internally inappropriate in N ;2. f(h; i) = h0; 0i and f 0(h; i) = h 0; 0i;3. (t : ) holds and either (t : ) also holds or   ; and4. either 0?,  0?  or 0?  0.(I will only show the result for the case where (t : ) and (t : ) both hold. Theproof for the case where (t : ) holds and    follows more easily.) Supposethe rst three items hold and consider the conditions described in the last. Sinceha; ai 2 L^ , ha; ai cannot be externally inappropriate in L, it cannot be the casethat  0? . Similarly, as described in the proof regarding internal inappropriate-ness, any background conditions to LC must come from some superlink L0 of Lsatisfying the conditions described above. Again, ha; ai is not externally inappro-priate in L so it cannot be the case that 0?, and since I showed that 0  0 italso cannot be the case that 0?. Similarly, it cannot be the case that 0?  0, so2Actually, to be more precise I need to show that there cannot be n channels satisfying the require-ments of the more complex denition of external inappropriateness. However, this greatly complicatesthe presentation and the proof generalises easily enough.
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...................................................... ......................................................LC : h; if
LC 0 : h0; 0i
N : h; if 0
N 0 : h 0; 0i
0? or  0?  or 0?  0Figure D.2: Conditions for ha; ai to be externally inappropriate in LCneither can it be the case that 0?  0. This covers all the possible cases associatedwith external inappropriateness, so ha; ai cannot be externally inappropriate inLC.So, I have shown that h; i 2 LC ^ and that ha; ai is not inappropriate in LC, inwhich case (by maximal normality) ha; ai 2 LC _ . Hence, (a : ) j; (a : ), whichproves that j; satises Left Logical Equivalence.The rest of the proof is not described in such detail as the above case.Right Weakening. Suppose L = Link(C) is the link supporting (a : ) j; (a : ), andlet CL be the link Link(C ; L), where L is the logical channel (and h; i 2 Link(L)^ ).I will show that h; i 2 CL^ and ha; ai 2 CL_ .Suppose that h; i 62 CL^ . Then there must be a link L0 such that L f L0,f(h; i) = h0; 0i and 0?. But then ha; ai would be externally inappropriate in L(using the result of the above lemma), which contradicts ha; ai 2 L^ .Suppose that ha; ai is internally inappropriate in CL. Then there is a link CL0 suchthat CL f CL0, f(h; i) = h0; 0i and either (i) (a : ) holds and ?, or (ii) (a : )holds and ? 0. If case (i) holds, then since   , then ?, in which case ha; aiwould be internally inappropriate in L, contradicting ha; ai 2 L_ . If case (ii) holds,then again ha; ai would be internally inappropriate in L, so ha; ai cannot be internallyinappropriate in CL.Suppose that ha; ai is externally inappropriate in CL. Then there is a link withthe properties of CL0 above, and links N and N 0 with the properties described earlier(i.e. in the proof for LLE ) such that (among the other requirements of the denitionof external inappropriateness), either 0? or  0? or  0? 0. Since ha; ai is not
A Channel Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning: Further Discussion and Results 265externally inappropriate in L, it can neither be the case that  0? nor that 0? northat 0?  0 (recall that the logical link does not have any background assumptions).Since   , neither can it be the case that  0?. Hence, all possible cases of externalinappropriateness are covered, completing the proof for the case of Right Weakening.Reexivity: This constraint is trivially supported since the logical channel containsthe constraint ! for every type .And: Let L1 = Link(C1) and L2 = Link(C2) be the links that support (a : ) j; (a : )and (a : ) j; (a : ) respectively. I will show that L = Link(C1 k C2) supports(a : ) j; (a :  ^ ).Suppose that h; ( ^ )i 62 L^ . Then there are links L01; L02 such that L1 f1 L01,L2 f2 L02, f1(h; i) = h0; 0i, f2(h; i) = h00; 0i and 0?00. But this cannot bethe case as otherwise ha; ai would be externally inappropriate in these links, unless itwas internally inappropriate in one of them|either way, this contradicts the fact thatha; ai 2 L_1 ; L_2 .Suppose ha; ai is internally inappropriate in L. Then (a : ) holds and either (i)? ( ^ ) or (ii) there is a link L0 such that L f L0, f(h;  ^ i) = h0;  i and?0. Since all that is assumed in the initial classication is (a : ), then for (a : )to hold it must be the case that   , in which case it must also be that 0?. Butthis contradicts the above lemma, so (ii) cannot hold. Further, if ? ( ^ ) then? ( ^ ), in which case ha; ai is externally inappropriate in each of L1 and L2 (usingthe complex denition of external inappropriateness), so (i) also leads to a contradiction.Suppose ha; ai is externally inappropriate in L. Then there is a link L0 with theproperties above and the usual links N and N 0 described earlier, such that 0?, 0? ( ^ ) or 0?  0. From what was said in the paragraph preceding the proof ofLLE, it must be the case that 0 = (01 ^ 02), where 01; 02 are antecedents of constraintsin super-links of L1 and L2 respectively. Hence, by the (complex) denition of externalinappropriateness, it can neither be the case that 0? nor that 0?  0, since otherwiseha; ai would be externally inappropriate in L1 and L2 (and N). Similarly, if it was thecase that ( ^ )?  0 then once again ha; ai would be externally inappropriate in L1and L2. Hence ha; ai cannot be externally inappropriate in L.Or: Let L1, L2 and L be as in the proof for And, with the dierence that L1 supports(a : ) j; (a : ) and L2 supports (a : ) j; (a : ). By the nature of conditional
A Channel Theoretic Model of Default Reasoning: Further Discussion and Results 266parallel composition, it is clear that h _ ; i 2 L^ .It is also easily shown that ha; ai is neither internally nor externally inappropriatein L. By the nature of the interaction of conditional parallel composition with thesubchannel relation, the antecedent of any constraint in a superchannel of L must be ofthe form 0 _ 0, where 0 and 0 are antecedents of constraints in superchannels of L1and L2 respectively. Since (0 _ 0)  0 (resp., 0), then it is easily checked that forha; ai to be internally/externally inappropriate in L it must also be internally/externallyinappropriate in L1 (resp., L2), which leads to a contradiction.Cautious Monotonicity: Let L1 = Link(C1) be the link supporting (a : ) j; (a : ),L2 = Link(C2) be the link supporting (a : ) j; (a : ) and L be the logical channel(containing the constraint  ^ !). I will show that the link LC = Link(L ; C1)supports the required inference.Suppose LC does not contain h ^ ; i. Then there must be a link L01 such thatL1 f L01, f(h; i) = h0; 0i and 0? ( ^ ). However, this would mean that ha; aiwas externally inappropriate in L1, which cannot be the case.Suppose that ha; ai is internally inappropriate in LC. Then there is a link LC 0 suchthat LC f LC 0, f(h ^ ; i) = h0 ^ ; 0i (given the interaction of the subchannelhierarchy with serial composition and the fact that the logical channel has no backgroundconditions), and either (i) (a : ) and ? (0 ^ ); or (ii) (a : ) and ? . Clearly,(ii) cannot be the case as ha; ai would otherwise be internally inappropriate in L1. Also,since (a :  ^ ) is the only premise then it must be that   ( ^ ), hence (i) wouldrequire that ( ^ )? (0 ^ ). This would mean that ha; ai was externally inappropriatein Link(L), L1 and L2, which cannot be the case.Suppose that ha; ai is externally inappropriate in LC. Then there is a link LC 0 asabove and the usual linksN;N 0 such that either (0 ^ )? or  0?  or (0 ^ )?  0. Asusual, if any of these was the case, then ha; ai would also be externally inappropriate inone or both of L1 and L2, which leads to a contradiction. The only case that is non-trivialis that involving  0? . Since (a : ) must hold (if ha; ai is externally inappropriate inN) and (a :  ^ ) is the only premised information, then it must be the case that  (^ ). But ! is a constraint in Link(L) and ! a constraint in Link(C2), andby And , ha; ai cannot be inappropriate in LC2 = Link(L k C2). But since   ( ^ ),ha; ai would indeed be externally inappropriate (wrt fa : g) in L1; LC2 and N if  0? (using the complex denition of external inappropriateness).
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